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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In the last decades, the rapid development of digital information technology has
significantly facilitated our daily works and lives. The popularity of smart phone,
digital camera, digital camcorder, and personal computer, has inspired us to
create, enjoy and share multimedia content. Furthermore, the technological ad-
vancements in telecommunications and the popularization of broadband networks
have made multimedia distribution and sharing over the Internet very easy and
popular.
However, this simultaneously brings some serious problems such as unlimited
duplication, arbitrarily modification, unauthorized upload, illegally redistribution
etc. Because pirates can easily modify multimedia content by using some simple
attacks, while maintaining a high quality, and then redistribute it without autho-
rization, this inevitably infringes on the intellectual property of the multimedia
holders. One example is that certain illicit users upload some famous films with-
out authorization via the peer-to-peer streaming video network softwares, such
as PPLive [1] and PPStream [2]. We can take another example of commercial
market here, according to an investigation report by the Motion Picture Associ-
ation of America (MPAA): worldwide losses are about $18.2 billion due to piracy
in 2008, of which $322 million in France, $565 million in China, and $1.3 billion
in United States etc [3]. Therefore, effective solutions to protect copyright hold-
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ers are necessary, and although lots of works have already been done in the last
decades, some challenging open problems are remaining.
Currently, Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems [4] are used to pre-
vent multimedia content from unauthorized modification and redistribution, and
thereby safeguard the intellectual property of right holders. Generally speaking,
they include two basic parts for protecting multimedia content: 1) The first one
is the access path control: the multimedia content is encrypted so that only the
authorized users can access it; 2) The second one is multimedia forensics, a water-
mark is hidden in the protected multimedia by the holder, and then multimedia
forensics is used to detect whether the multimedia content is illegal tampered and
redistributed by users who have the right to access it. DRM system can be used
for movies, television, audio CDs, Internet music, DVDs, computer games, com-
puter software, E-books etc. Now it is widely applied by some famous companies
such as Microsoft, Apple Inc., Adobe Systems Inc., Sony, America Online, BBC
etc.
Digital watermarking is a branch of multimedia forensics, it can provide the
posterior protection when the multimedia content is decrypted by the authorized
users. It imperceptibly alters the original work (host signal) by hiding the identi-
fication information (watermark). Originally it has been developed for copyright
protection and authentication. In these cases, the embedded watermark corre-
sponds to the copyright owner’s identity. The advantage of digital watermarking
is that the embedded watermark does not spoil the usage of multimedia content,
but can still be detected if needed.
Multimedia fingerprinting for traitor tracing is an application of digital wa-
termarking, where the copyright holder hides a unique watermark in each user’s
copy. The purpose is to trace back the identities of the pirates (colluders) when
an illicit copy is found, and then force them to be responsible for their actions.
Here we can take the VOD (Video On Demand) application as an example (see
Figure 1.1): for each video, the server divides it into lots of blocks, and then
watermarks each block into q versions (here we suppose q = 4); finally, the server
distributes a unique sequence to each user by swapping these different finger-
printed blocks. However, in order to avoid being accused, the pirates will try
to employ a variety of attacks to remove the watermark. For example, in the
3
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Step 1 Step 3
Step 2
1 1 11 11…...
2 2 22 22…...
42 1 21…... 3
1 4 13…...1 2
3 1 12…...2 4
…
...
…
...
…
...
…
...
…
...
…
...
…
...
…
...
…...
3 3 33 33…...
4 4 44 44…...
21 3 42…... 3
13 4 24…... 3
Case: q = 4
Figure 1.1: Multimedia fingerprinting example: VOD.
video fingerprinting scenario, if the sequences are watermarked with few secret
keys according to the fingerprinting code, it is possible for a lonely pirate to ex-
tract enough information to estimate the secret keys, and thereby remove the
watermark while preserving an excellent perceptual quality [5]. Another power-
ful attack is the collusion attacks, where several colluders mix several different
copies of the same content into one hybrid version, in order to attenuate or even
remove all the original fingerprints. If the multimedia fingerprinting system is
designed improperly, it might fail to detect any fingerprints, although the attack
is affected with only a few different copies. Consequently, these additional at-
tacks bring new challenges to the multimedia fingerprinting system design, and
especially relative to digital watermarking. In general, a good multimedia finger-
printing system must meet three conditions: firstly, the hidden fingerprint should
be perceptually invisible; secondly, the system must be robust to some common
signal processing operations like compression, denoising, scaling, filtering, rota-
tion, etc; thirdly, it should be secure against intentionally attacks such as collusion
and the security attack for the scenario where a number of fingerprinted contents
4
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are available. Unfortunately, since these aspects are conflicting with each other.
Because the imperceptibility means a upper limit for the capacity of the hidden
information, but robustness and security performance require a lower limit for
this capacity. Furthermore, robustness performance is relative to some common
operations, while security aims at certain specific attacks, sometime we have to
make a compromise between them. Therefore, these reasons makes a multimedia
fingerprinting system design becoming a very challenging work.
1.2 Past Approaches and Thesis Objective
Since the first paper written by Wagner on the fingerprinting appeared in 1983 [6],
lots of works on this topic have been produced. Their focus is mainly concerning
about the potential attacks, the fingerprinting code design, or the combination
between the fingerprinting code and some classical watermarking technique. Of
course, the studies might be carried out from the theoretical or experimental
point of views. In this section, we will summarize some significant progresses in
this field.
Firstly, we will talk about the progress on the study of attacks against mul-
timedia fingerprinting. Because there are practical tools to verify whether a
designed multimedia fingerprinting system is successful or not, and a thorough
understanding of these attacks will help us to create an effective multimedia fin-
gerprinting system. The attacks for the multimedia fingerprinting system include
all the attacks against the watermarking system, besides, they include some spe-
cific fusion attacks because of the difference among the fingerprinted copies. An
early systematic study on these fusion attacks could be found in [7] [8]. Later,
Schaathun introduced some novel fusion attacks [9], his attacks aim the spread-
spectrum watermarking based multimedia fingerprinting. We will give a more
detail description of these attacks in Section 2.2.
According to the literature, there are several different approaches to design
a multimedia fingerprinting scheme. First of all, there is the approach from the
cryptography and coding community. Early works can be traced back to [6]
and [10]. Later, Boneh and Shaw introduced the now well-known concept of
Marking Assumption, and constructed a two-level binary code [11]. This binary
5
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code was later improved by Yacobi for the application of the multimedia sig-
nals [12]. Some recent works [13] [14] extended Boneh and Shaw’s framework
and considered the construction of codes with traceability, such as the identifi-
able parent property (IPP) code and the traceability (TA) code. Usually, we can
split the codes into two parts: weak traceability versus strong traceability. Weak
traceability codes should satisfy the basic property that a collusion may frame
an innocent user or an innocent group of users, but with a very small probabil-
ity. But for the strong traceability codes, it should satisfy another property: the
success of identifying at least one colluder, and never frame an innocent user.
Actually, strong traceability is not reachable in practice [15] [16]. Hence, all the
below mentioned approaches are in the weak traceability category.
It is worth mentioning that another significant approach of the multimedia
fingerprinting from the signal processing point of view, which was made by the
scientists of the University of Maryland in USA. Wang et al. used the mutually in-
dependent (or orthogonal) basis signals as fingerprints to identify pirates [17]. Due
to the computational burden of this independent fingerprinting signal, Trappe et
al. employed the code modulation combining with the independent fingerprint-
ing to construct the redundant fingerprint signals [18]. Furthermore, in order to
make their fingerprinting system design more effective, some accessorial strate-
gies were introduced [19] [20] [21]. Finally, some applications of the multimedia
fingerprinting were explored [22] [23].
Another major breakthrough is the Tardos probabilistic fingerprinting code in-
troduced from the statistics viewpoint. In 2003, Tardos proposed a fingerprinting
code whose code length has a theoretically minimum order [24], which is known
to be optimal with respect to the codelength and the collusion resistant capacity.
Afterwards, Skoric et al. extended the original Tardos fingerprinting code genera-
tion from binary to q-ary [25]. Furthermore, there are other improvements which
were introduced to reduce the codelength of original Tardos fingerprinting code
[26] [27] [28] [29], or to optimize memory usage [30], or to improve the accusation
function [31] [32]. We will give a more detail description for these past approaches
in Chapter 2.
The objective of this thesis is completely different from the above approaches.
Our goal is to design a secure and robust multimedia fingerprinting system. This
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system should satisfy the following conditions: 1) robust for the unintentional
attacks such as some common signal processing operations; 2) secure against
intentional security attacks, whose aim is to explore the knowledge about the
secret keys of the system by observing lots of fingerprinted content; 3) resistant
to the fusion attacks, whereby a group of different copies are collected together
to remove the fingerprints. This thesis firstly addresses the robustness issues of
one watermarking scheme, which will be used for the multimedia fingerprinting
system; based on this achievement, we try to improve the security performance
of the watermarking scheme; finally we combine it with a Tardos fingerprinting
code to construct a complete multimedia fingerprinting scheme.
1.3 Thesis Organization and Contribution
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 starts with a general frame-
work of multimedia fingerprinting and reviews potential attacks. Then, we briefly
review the design of multimedia fingerprinting from the cryptography and coding
viewpoint, and then discuss the approach from the signal processing viewpoint,
which was introduced by the group of the university of Maryland, finally, we talk
about the recent developments on the Tardos probabilistic fingerprinting code
from the statistics point of view.
Based on the discussion on the state of the art in Chapter 2 and our analysis,
Chapter 3 is dedicated to design an adequate watermarking scheme, which will
serve for our robust and secure multimedia fingerprinting system. Since there is
no watermarking scheme which is very robust as well as secure so far, we begin
our study with a very robust watermarking scheme named “Broken Arrows” [33],
which is state of the art. It has been specifically designed for the second contest
of Break Our Watermarking System (BOWS-2) [34]; therefore it has been widely
tested and showed a good robustness capacity. However, A. Westfeld found the
worst attack in the first episode of the contest, which inevitably threaten the
technique. In Chapter 3, we propose some solutions to plug this flaw. Our
results show that the proposed solutions further improve the robustness of the
watermarking technique. The obtained result in this Chapter has been published
in the paper [32].
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With the achievement obtained in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 focuses on improving
the security performance of this scheme. Actually, security is a very different
concept from robustness in watermarking; it relates to the intentional attacks
whose purpose is to discover the secret keys used during embedding. For the
studied watermarking scheme, two key estimation attacks have been proposed
in [5]. In Chapter 4, we propose some solutions to block these security flaws,
the simulation results show that the threats of these two security attacks are
perfectly eliminated. However, our study shows that: although the improved wa-
termarking technique is much more secure than before, it is not perfect, a slight
security vulnerability still exist. In consequence, we design a novel robust and
secure watermarking scheme via a maximization function under constraints, the
watermarking technique seeks at maximizing a given robustness criterion under
the perceptual constraint and the security constraint. As far as we know, this is
the first time that security criteria is taken into the watermarking algorithm. The
experimental results reveal that this new scheme provides an excellent security
level, but its robustness is much weaker than the above mentioned watermark-
ing techniques, this is the cost to pay. The results have been included in two
conference papers [35] and [36].
In Chapter 5, a complete multimedia fingerprinting scheme is proposed, which
includes a watermarking technique combined with the symmetric Tardos finger-
printing code. We test all the three watermarking techniques introduced in the
last two chapters. Furthermore, we propose two different accusation functions
for the fingerprinting detection scheme. The simulations show that, if the pirates
employ the fusion attacks by collusion, it would rather help the accusation pro-
cess than puzzle it. Up to now, the watermarking layer attacks are prevented by
the proposed watermarking schemes, the fingerprinting layer attacks are averted
by the Tardos fingerprinting code, and the fusion collusion attacks are avoided
thanks to the efficient accusation functions. Therefore, we proposed a concrete
and operational multimedia fingerprinting system. Part of the results has been
published in the paper [37] and the paper [38].
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the main conclusions of this dissertation, and
discusses the main challenges and important topics in the future works.
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Chapter 2
Framework and State of The Art
In this chapter, we present the general framework and the background of the
multimedia fingerprinting. Especially, we study the various attacks for multime-
dia fingerprinting, which have appeared in the literature. Finally, we talk about
three significant approaches to design the multimedia fingerprinting system: the
first approach is the cryptography and coding approach based on the Marking
Assumption, the second approach is the signal processing approach of the group
of Maryland university, the third approach is the statistical approach around the
Tardos probabilistic fingerprinting code. The content of this section is mainly to
provide the background knowledge for the remaining chapters.
2.1 General Multimedia Fingerprinting Frame-
work
A completely multimedia fingerprinting framework is very similar to a commu-
nication chain, which has a transmitter, a channel and a receiver. Both the
transmitter and the receiver correspond to the system: the fingerprint embed-
ding for the transmitter, and the fingerprint extraction and pirates accusation for
the receiver; while the collusion attacks are modeled by a transmission channel.
In general, this whole framework can also be divided into three parts: finger-
printing layer, watermarking layer and attacks channel. In detail, they can be di-
vided into six major steps: fingerprint encoder, fingerprint embedding(watermarking),
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Figure 2.1: The multimedia fingerprinting design schema.
copies selection, collusion attacks, watermarks detector and pirates accusation,
as depicted in Figure 2.1. We describe the role of each layer in the following
subsections.
2.1.1 Fingerprinting Layer
The fingerprinting layer is a layer directly related to the users. In this layer, the
multimedia content holder associates each user’s identity with a unique finger-
printing codeword, which will be used in the embedding layer. Of course, the
encoding technology is critical, since fingerprint must be unique. Furthermore,
under the Marking Assumption [11] (in which we assumed colluders can change
symbols in the blocks which have different symbols, and remain the same for the
blocks that have identical symbols), a collusion of these fingerprints cannot frame
an innocent user, or an innocent group of users. Furthermore, in the fingerprint
detection process, this layer should have some efficient methods to correctly iden-
tify the pirated code. Because the existence of a variety of attacks brings a lot
of diversity, the accusation process is thus becoming very complicated. So this
two aspects propose a higher level of requirements for the fingerprinting layer.
Some practical fingerprinting techniques will be mentioned in the other sections
of this chapter, such as the Identifiable Parent Property code and the Trace-
ability code 2.3, the Error Correction Code (ECC) based fingerprinting code in
subsection 2.4 and Tardos probabilistic fingerprinting code 2.5.
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2.1.2 Watermarking Layer
After each user’s identity has been associated with a unique codeword, the water-
marking layer takes charge of embedding it into the host signal to generate each
users copy. Firstly the host signal is split into blocks, and then each symbol of
the codeword is hidden into one block to produce the watermarked block. This
is not an easy work, because the symbols should be embedded imperceptibly,
robustly, and securely. Imperceptibility can be obtained by using a human visual
model, as well as imposing a constraint to the visual distortion brought by the
embedding, so that the fingerprinted version is perceptually similar to the origi-
nal signal. Robustness requires the embedded fingerprints to resist some common
signal processing operations, such as denoising and compression. Security means
the embedded fingerprints can withstand some malicious attacks, such as a se-
cret keys estimation attack. However, these three aspects constraint each other,
making the design of a practical watermarking system hard, as it is difficult to
strike a balance between them.
On the detection side, if the holder finds a pirated content, he will apply
the watermarks decoder to retrieve the symbols, and then pass the results to the
fingerprinting layer to identify the possible attackers. According to the availability
of the host signal at the detection side, the watermarks detection process can be
blind and non-blind. In non-blind detection, the host content is available to the
watermark decoder, and it will be removed to avoid the interference during the
detection process. Its advantage is that the decoding results have a far smaller
variance and are thus more accurate. However, some people think that it is too
complex to find back the host signal, and then perfectly synchronize the pirated
version with the host to finally erase its contribution. It is true that people
working with blind detector avoid these troubles. So in this thesis we mainly
focus on blind decoding.
2.1.3 Attacks Channel
When the fingerprinted contents are distributed to the authorized users, some
of these users (so-called colluders) may redistribute the content to someone else
in order to pursue some illegal business interests. To avoid being accused, they
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will use their several different copies and then perform an attack to erase the
fingerprints or frame any other innocent user. For example, they can exchange the
blocks between the different copies to produce a hybrid version; or they can mix
the different blocks of the different copies together to produce a new block; even
if they have just one copy, they can also modify the blocks in using some common
signal processing such as de-noising, compression or noise addition. Hence, during
the multimedia fingerprinting system design, all these possible attacks must be
taken into account. At least, this can ensure that the designed system will not
be destroyed by the existing attacks. For this purpose, we will give a full study
for a number of attacks in the next section.
2.2 Various Attacks
In this section, we study the possible strategies which can be applied in the attack
layer. Generally speaking, according to their targets, the various attacks can be
divided into three classes: pure watermarking attacks, pure fingerprinting code
attacks and fusion attacks. We will detail them in the following subsections.
2.2.1 Pure Watermarking Attacks
Pure watermarking attacks is a class of attacks which focus on the watermarking
technique of the multimedia fingerprinting system. The purpose of these attacks
is to break down the multimedia fingerprinting system by attacking the water-
marking technique. If the watermarking system is broken down, the symbols of
the fingerprint will not be correctly detected, and thus the multimedia finger-
printing system is unable to trace the colluders. Of course, these attacks can be
effected even if just one copy is available.
Pure watermarking attacks can be classified into two families. The first fam-
ily consist of robustness attacks, which includes some common signal process-
ing actions, such as digital-to-analog and analog-to-digital conversion, sampling,
scaling, quantification, compression, format transform etc. If we take the Broken
Arrows watermarking technique [33] as an example, there is an efficient robust-
ness attack, namely Westfeld’s de-noising attack [39], which was introduced by
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A. Westfled during the first episode of the BOWS-2 contest [34]. Its core idea is
based on the estimation of the amplitude of a wavelet coefficient as function of
the coefficients in its neighborhood via a linear regression.
Another family consist of security attacks, whose purpose is to take advan-
tage of several observations to design a dedicated attack whose goal is to remove
the watermarks or fingerprints through precise processes. Such attacks can for
example proceed through secret key retrieval, or use oracles to get accurate in-
formations about the watermarking region [40]. In the multimedia fingerprinting
application, a huge number of contents are marked with the same key. For in-
stance, the watermarking technique embeds the fingerprinting code in a video
block by block, and for a given user all these blocks are watermarked with a
few number of secret keys, the number of secret keys is equal to the symbol size
of the fingerprinting codeword. So this may greatly help the pirate to estimate
the secret key and therefore remove the fingerprints. We have two watermarking
security attack examples here [5], which are also mainly against Broken Arrow
watermarking technique. The first one is Westfeld clustering attack, which was
introduced by A. Westfeld in the third episode of BOWS-2 contest, it extracts
the estimated watermarks by using Westfeld’s de-noising attack, and classifies
them into several bins, and finally gets the attacked image by subtracting the
average value of all the estimated watermarks of the bin which this image is
in. The second one is Bas subspace estimation attack, which is later proposed
by P. Bas [5]. He uses the OPAST algorithm and the Independent Component
Analysis (ICA) technique to estimate the secret subspace, and then pushes the
watermarked content outside the detection region in using this estimated secret
subspace.
Of course, the type of these attacks can be avoided, if the watermarking
technique of the multimedia fingerprinting system is robust enough, and secure
enough. However, a sufficiently robust and secure watermarking system design is
still a great challenge so far, due to the trade-off between robustness and security.
14
2.2 Various Attacks
2.2.2 Pure Fingerprinting Code Attacks
Pure fingerprinting code attacks are some attacks which focus on the fingerprint-
ing code layer of the multimedia fingerprinting system, and they do not “touch”
the watermarking layer. In other words, we assume that the splitting of the host
signal into blocks is an open knowledge, because we suppose that there is no way
to keep this process secret. Therefore, the colluders know the blocks, and they
will replace some blocks by the blocks of other copies. However, they regard each
watermarked block as an inseparable whole and do not modify them. One general
model of these attacks for the i-th block can be considered as:
y
(p)
i =
c∑
`=1
ωi` · yij` (2.1)
with y
(p)
i is the pirated copy, c is the number of the colluders, {j1, . . . , jc} are the
indices of the c colluders, yij` are the available blocks of colluders, and ωi` being
c weighing vectors such that one ωi` = 1, ∀` ∈ {1, ..., c}, and the others equal
zero, so the weights are exclusive. Comparing the available different versions of
the i-th block, the pirates can know how many different symbols are embedded in
their blocks, and their frequency, and then choose a method to select one block.
According to the different selection methods, we enumerate some of such attacks
here: Uniform exchange attack, minority vote attack, majority vote attack.
1. Uniform exchange attack: the block put in the pirated copy is one block
which is independently and randomly selected from the different available
blocks.
2. Minority vote attack: the block put in the pirated copy is the less frequent
block in the available copies.
3. Majority vote attack: the block put in the pirated copy is the most frequent
block in the available copies.
Of course, we only enumerate several typical attacks here, much more attacks
might be introduced. However, please note that the constant symbol strategy,
where the pirates always select the block with a given symbol inside, is not rele-
vant a priori in our multimedia fingerprinting. Fingerprinting codes invented by
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cryptographers foresee this case because the content is modelized as a long string
of symbols directly observable by the colluders. In multimedia scenario, the col-
luders do not know the watermarking secret key to decode symbols embedded in
their copies.
Any way, the class of these attacks are managed by the fingerprinting code,
because it exactly matches the scenario envisaged by the cryptographers: the
so-called Marking Assumption [11], which will be detailed in Section 2.3.1.
2.2.3 Fusion Attacks
Another family of attacks is a number of most powerful attacks, called fusion
attacks. These attacks span the watermarking layer and the fingerprinting layer.
In these attacks, the colluders fuse their different copies into one pirated version
to delude the accusation. These attacks are carried out under two assumptions :
all the fingerprinted blocks are independents to each other; all the samples in one
block are independent to each other. In this way, the process for the i-th block
can be considered as a general model:
y
(p)
i (u, v) =
c∑
`=1
γi` · yij`(u, v) (2.2)
where y
(p)
i (u, v) is the sample of the pirated copy (i.e. the pixel value in spatial
space, or the wavelet coefficient in the wavelet transform domain), yij`(u, v) (∀` ∈
{1, ..., c}) are the elements of the copies for collusion, γi` being c weighing vectors
such that
∑c
`=1 γi` = 1, and {j1, . . . , jc} are the indices of c colluders. We remind
here this model is sample-wise, and not bloc-wise. It describes a lot of attacks,
including (the definitions being given for all (`, i) ∈ {1, ..., c} × {1, ...,m}, to
simplify the expression):
1. Average: γi` = 1/c.
2. Minimum: γi` = 1 if ` = arg(min(yij`(u, v))), else 0.
3. Maximum: γi` = 1 if ` = arg(max(yij`(u, v))), else 0.
4. MinMax: γi` = 1/2 if ` ∈ {arg(min(yij`(u, v))), arg(max(yij`(u, v))}, else 0.
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5. Median: γi` = 1 if ` = arg(median(yij`(u, v))), else 0.
6. Modified Negative: γi` = 1 if ` ∈ {arg(min(yij`(u, v))), arg(max(yij`(u, v))},
and γi` = −1 if ` = arg(median(yij`(u, v))), else 0.
7. Interleaving: γi` = 1 if ` is one index selected independently and uniformly
at random from the set {1, ..., c}, else 0.
8. Uniform: y
(p)
i (u, v) ∈ [min(yij`(u, v)),max(yij`(u, v))], which is a random
value of this interval.
9. Randomized Negative: γi` = 1, if ` = arg(min(yij`(u, v))), with probability
p; or if ` = arg(max(yij`(u, v))), with probability 1− p; else 0.
10. Majority Extreme: γi` = 1 if ` = arg(min(yij`(u, v))), when average(yij`(u, v))
< median(yij`(u, v)); or ` = arg(max(yij`(u, v))), when average(yij`(u, v)) >
median(yij`(u, v)); else 0.
11. Minority Extreme: γi` = 1, if ` = arg(min(yij`(u, v))), when average(yij`(u, v))
> median(yij`(u, v)); or ` = arg(max(yij`(u, v))), when average(yij`(u, v)) <
median(yij`(u, v)); else 0.
12. Moderated Minority Extreme: γi` = 1, if ` = arg(min(yij`(u, v))), when
Z > θ; or y
(p)
i (u, v) = average(yij`(u, v)), when θ > Z > −θ; or ` =
arg(max(yij`(u, v))), when Z < −θ; else 0. Here Z = average(yij`(u, v)) −
median(yij`(u, v)) and θ is a threshold value.
We enumerate some typical fusion attacks here, however, some more complex
collusion attacks can be considered as a combination of these basic collusion
attacks.
In the literature, these fusion attacks have frequently been studied by the
fingerprinting community. Zhao et al. gave a fairly comprehensive investigation
about some typical nonlinear collusion attacks in [7] [8], they include Average
attack, Minimum attack, Maximum attack, MinMax attack, Median attack, Uni-
form attack and Modified Negative attack. During the study, they used the
independent Gaussian fingerprinting and the human visual model based spread
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spectrum embedding. They gave a theoretical analysis for these attacks, and com-
pared the effectiveness of these collusion attacks in [8], based on two criterias: the
probability of falsely accusing at least one innocent user ε1 and the probability of
capturing at least one colluder 1−ε2, with ε2 is the probability of failing to accuse
any colluder. They showed that the Average attack gives the lowest distortion;
the Median or MinMax attacks have comparable performances as the Average
attack; the Minimum, Maximum and Randomized Negative attacks bring much
larger distortion than others. Since the extracted colluded fingerprints under
the Minimum, Maximum and Randomized Negative attacks have non-zero mean.
However, a post processing could be applied to remove it before the detection
process. From the viewpoint of Zhao et al, they considered that the Randomized
Negative attack is the most effective attack without the post processing.
However, H.G. Schaathun denied this point as the Randomized Negative at-
tack brings great distortion in practice, he thinks that the Minority choice attack
is more powerful if correlation decoding is used [9]. Moreover, he designed an
adaptive collusion attack so-called Minority Extreme attack to break the He and
Wu joint Watermarking/Fingerinting scheme [41]. Furthermore, he introduced
several novel collusion attacks against the orthogonal or random Gaussian finger-
printing that are based on the spread spectrum watermarking technique [41] [9].
These include Majority Extreme attack, Minority Extreme attack, Uniform attack
and Hybrid attack. He proved the effectiveness of these attacks in the experimen-
tal evaluation, but did not give a theoretical analysis. Up to now, these attacks
are still the major potential threats to the fingerprinting scheme.
2.3 Cryptography and Coding Approach
We have discussed the various attacks for the multimedia fingerprinting system in
the last section. In this part, we review some former works of fingerprinting from
the cryptography and coding viewpoint. We know that fingerprinting was mostly
studied by cryptographers. The concept of fingerprinting was introduced in [6],
and it has gained interests since Boneh and Shaw’s work [11]. In this field, the
fingerprinting problem can be decomposed into the following issues: setup of a
mathematical model of the attacks, definition of features of the code, construction
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of such a code. In a way, the assumption is that watermarkers will embed finger-
printing codes developed by cryptographers. Thanks to the mathematical model
of the collusion attack, the conception of codes is decoupled from the physical
layer. We now summarize the available literatures in cryptography and coding.
2.3.1 Marking Assumption
The marking assumption is a terminology coming from [11]. A watermark that
in a position of the content can be in one of q different states, without causing
perceptual artifact. The dishonest users of a collusion can spot the watermarks
where the hidden symbols differ, and modify in some way these hidden symbols;
but the undetected marks are unchanged. This is the marking assumption as
stated in [11]. This stems in a first variation presented in [14]. In the narrow
sense problem, colluders replace a detected mark by randomly selecting one of
their marks at that position, whereas in the wide-sense problem, colluders replace
a detected mark by randomly selecting a symbol in the alphabet. The second
variation is the presence of erasures. Boneh and Shaw introduce the case where
the colluders can erase the detected marks [11]. This has been generalised by Guth
and Pfitzmann in a weak marking assumption [42], where a bounded number of
erasures might occur everywhere in the sequence. It was used, for instance, in [43]
and [14].
2.3.2 Types of Fingerprinting Codes
A perusal of the fingerprinting literature in cryptography shows a large diversity of
types of codes. They can be classified into the following types: 1) the Frameproof
code, which means that no collusion can frame another user not in the collusion
by producing its codeword. 2) the Secure Frameproof code, which means that no
collusion C can frame a disjoint collusion C′ by producing its descendant. This
introduces two branches of fingerprinting codes: either, we strengthen the feature
of the code in order that such an event is impossible (strong traceability), either
the probability of this event, called error probability, is small and decreasing
as the code length increases [11] [14] (weak traceability). 3) the Identifiable
Parent Property code, which means that no collusion can produce a codeword
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that cannot be traced back to at least one member of the collusion. The goal
here is to avoid the case where the potential collusions are indeed disjoint sets.
4) the Traceability code, which means that the pirated codeword is closer to the
ones of the colluders than to others. Tracing traitors reduces to searching for the
codewords that agree in most symbol positions with the pirated one. However,
the tracing algorithm cannot expect to find all parents, since some of them may
contribute with too few positions and cannot be traced.
2.3.3 Strong Traceability
Strong traceability is a very hard requirement and typical code lengths are ex-
tremely huge. Here we list some useful tools to build and decode traceability
codes: 1) first of all, error correcting codes, which is often used to construct
the strong traceability codes. For example, references [44] and [16] have inde-
pendently suggested the use of Reed-Solomon codes. This is also the key idea
in [45]. 2) the second tool is the q-ary alphabet. Boneh and Shaw show that
strong traceability is not possible for c ≥ 2 with binary alphabet. This implies
the use of q-ary alphabet with q > 2 when we expect more than two colluders.
Furthermore, strong traceability is a hard constraint implying long codes and/or
large alphabets. It is feasible in practice with Reed-Solomon codes but at the
cost of a large alphabet. 3) the third tool is the list decoding. The problem with
fingerprinting decoding is the identification of several colluders. The input is a
corrupted codeword, the output a list of codewords. This functionality is quite
unusual in coding theory. For a short the traceability codes, the exhaustive de-
coding is practicable. But for a long codes such as Identifiable Parent Property,
the exhaustive decoding is obviously not viable. The former work dealing with
list decoding from Guruswami and Sudan [46] enforce this functionality, it suc-
ceeds in finding codewords within a given distance. The list decoding brings two
advantages to the traceability codes based on the error correcting codes [45; 47]:
a) Frist, list decoding takes into account soft information about the collusion
attack model and the embedding technique, while the classical Reed-Solomon de-
coding algorithm do not take into account a priori information about the channel
transmission; b) The second advantage is that it is a relatively efficient decoding,
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it is slightly better than the exhaustive search with respect to the decoding com-
plexity. 4) The last tool is the iterative decoding. Because list decoding has a
drawback, it works great when colluders share evenly the risk, but, if one colluder
contribute less than the others, list decoding doesn’t succeed to find him. Thus,
Fernandez and Soriano proposed the iterative decoding to deal with the situation
where colluders’ contributions are uneven [48]] [45]. They showed that when the
dominating contributors of the collusion are caught, it is still possible to find the
remaining colluders with a list decoding. In their algorithm, a first list decoding
succeeds to find j < c colluders. The received codeword is modified, creating
a copy of the pirated codeword where symbols matching with caught colluders
codewords are erased. A list decoding is performed on this new codeword. This
process is iterated until c colluders are caught.
2.3.4 Weak Traceability
Strong traceability implies two big drawbacks: long codes over large alphabets.
This stems in a lack of feasibility for some applications. This is the reason why
weak traceability is usually preferred. The tracing algorithm usually allows the
capture of only one colluder with an error probability  exponentially decreasing
as the code length increases. The code is said to be c-secure with -error. This
probability of error  introduces the notion of randomness. What is random here?
The marking assumption states that colluders are able to locate the detectable
marks. This does not imply any knowledge about the scheme. But, the colluders
may or may not be able to read the embedded symbol or to write in place a
given symbol. They might simply be able to change the symbol to another one
which they do not control. In the same way, they may or may not know their
codewords or the codewords not in the collusion. These issues are related to their
knowledge about the fingerprinting scheme. To prevent this, the scheme usually
uses some secret keys to make traitors in a blind state. In this thesis, we focus
on weak traceable fingerprinting codes because they are the most experienced in
literature.
We also lists some useful tools for constructing the weak traceability codes.
1) the first one is the permutation, this tool is firstly introduced in [11], which is
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used combined with the replication of code. This permutation serves as a secret
key, it scrambles the symbol positions before embedding them in content. Hence,
colluders cannot notice repeated symbols (unless they notice only the detectable
marks). The inverse permutation is applied just after symbol decoding to get
back to the original code. 2) the second tool is the concatenation, we know that
the code is not practical as its length grows roughly with the number of users.
The most well known tool used in weak traceability in order to tackle big number
of users is the concatenation of codes, which includes the inner code and the
outer code. The decoding of such a concatenated code begins by decomposing
the received word in blocks. Then, the decoding for the inner code is applied.
This gives, for each block, a codeword or a set of codewords. This sequence of
results is the input for the decoding for the outer code. At the encoding side, the
outer code is called first, then the inner code. In the tracing algorithm, the inner
code is decoded first, then the outer code; whence the terminology ‘outer/inner’.
The basic idea is that the inner code tackles the robustness against collusion of
size c, but for a low number of users. The concatenation with the outer code
allows to increase the number of users while keeping the property of the inner
code. Yet, this kind of scheme is quite hard to fine tune. If we use a good inner
code, with a low probability of error, the blocks are already quite long. There is
clearly a tradeoff to strike between the features of the inner and outer codes.
2.4 Signal Processing Approach
In this section, we will talk about how to design a multimedia fingerprinting
system from the signal processing point of view in the literature.
2.4.1 Independent Fingerprint Signals
Wang et al. use the orthogonal signals to represent the multimedia fingerprinting
code since their orthogonality [49] [17]. Each user is identified by an orthogo-
nal pseudo-random basis signal, so their correlations between each other are null
or at least can be neglected, this character helps to decrease the probability of
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false positive and leads to simplify detection schemes which employs the corre-
lation. These orthogonal fingerprint signals are embedded into the multimedia
content via some typical robust watermarking technique likes spread spectrum
watermarking [50]. Then, the fingerprinted multimedia contents are distributed
to many different users. The pirate collects several different copies together to
perform the attack. Of course, the attack process can be any attack as men-
tioned in Section 2.2, however, it is often considered as an Average attack in
their works [51] [7] [17], since they think that the Average attack is easy to real-
ize and the colluded signal often have a lowest distortion compared to the original
signal. Moreover, Zhao et al give some analyses on several nonlinear collusion
attacks against the independent fingerprints [51], their experimental works show
that the different attacks lead to almost the same perceptual distortion except
the Randomized Negative attack.
At the detection side, the distributor finds the pirated copy, he subtracts the
original content, here they assume that the detection process is nonblind, in order
to get a better accuracy of accusation process. Then, he calculates n test statistics
as the correlations of the obtained signal with the n orthogonal watermark signals.
The used test statistic could be one of the three detection statistics introduced by
Zhao et al [7]: Z-statistic, TN -statistic and q-statistic. The number of correlation
peaks is increasing with the colluder number c, but their amplitudes are decreased
by a factor 1/c. The collusion succeeds if the correlation peaks is below a decision
threshold Z. This threshold is calculated according to the desired false positive
probability ε1, which is the probability of falsely accusing at least an innocent
user. The power of the detection process is the probability of identifying a real
colluder is εr. The false negative probability is the probability of failing to accuse
any colluders, it could be written as: ε2 = (1 − εr)c. So the global probability
to identify at least one colluder equals to 1 − ε2 = 1 − (1 − εr)c. Note that the
probability ε1 given above is for one user. The total probability of false alarm is
equal to 1 − (1 − ε1)n−c ∼ (n − c)ε1. Consequently, the system is c-secure with
-error,  < ε2 + (n− c)ε1.
One great advantage of the independent fingerprint scheme is its simple struc-
ture of the encoding and embedding process, this makes it attractive in identifi-
cation application which has a small number of users. However, this scheme has
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two drawbacks: a relatively high total probability of false alarm and a complex-
ity proportional to the number of users as n correlations are calculated. In [18],
the authors propose a recursive algorithm to reduce the number of correlations.
However, the number of correlations is almost 2(dlog2 ne − 1). When there are
several colluders, the number of correlations increases and the difference with the
exhaustive search is very small, and it becomes less interesting.
2.4.2 Redundant Fingerprint Signals
A more effective solution is to use the redundant fingerprint signals. The prim-
itive works can be traced back to the Boneh and Shaw fingerprinting code [11],
which is a two-level binary c-secure with -error. In fact, the independent finger-
print signals can be formulated as the On-Off Keying modulation of an orthogonal
signals basis by binary messages. One can observe that it is not the best modu-
lation. The BPSK modulation is more powerful, it can manage n users with only
log2n basis signals. This modulation is efficient in the sense that it addresses
more users than the number of basis signals. Indeed, shorter codes allow greater
power per basis signal and also need less correlation calculus at the decoding side.
Having selected a modulation, the next step is to model the impact of the
attacks on the fingerprinting code decoding. The main difference compared with
the independent fingerprinting scheme is that they have a watermark decoder
(that decodes bits) instead of a watermark detector (that looks for the presence
(On) or the absence (Off) of watermark signals). For a great number of colluders,
it is illusive to base a traitor tracing program on the estimation of the pirated
fingerprint signal, due to the interferences with the host and noises. This is the
reason why [18] only detect the symbol with a quite high threshold, correlations
smaller than this threshold are decoded as ‘0’. This looks like the way Boneh and
Shaw replace erasures by symbols ‘0’. The decoded bit is then a ‘1’ if and only if
all the embedded bits were set to ‘1’.
Thereby, Trappe et al. assume that the impact of the collusion approxi-
mates the bitwise AND operation in the message domain [18]. They then look
for a AND-ACC (AND Anti Collusion Code) binary code. A trivial code is
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{110, 101, 011}. The AND operation on two codewords leaves two ‘0’ indicat-
ing the colluders. Furthermore, they create more powerful AND-ACC based on
Balanced Incomplete Block Design, a mathematical tool which is out of scope of
our study. They also improve the algorithm with a soft decoding. Experimental
measurements are given in their article [18], they indicate the probability of false
alarm and the power of the test against the number of colluders and the total
number of users. Although AND-ACC are based on an average attack model, the
authors asserted that more complicated attacks have the same impact if the col-
luders evenly share the risk. However, AND-ACC have never been tested against
more malicious attacks using weighting vector as presented in [52].
In contrast to AND-ACC, He and Wu use Reed-Solomon codes to construct
the ECC (Error Correction Code) based fingerprint code. Their reasons are
that Reed-Solomon codes have the minimum distance, and some ECC have more
efficient decoding algorithms. Furthermore, the ECC based fingerprint code re-
quires much less orthogonal sequences than the independent fingerprint code.
This implies that the ECC based fingerprint system has a simpler design and
implementation at the embedding stage. A full study about the performances of
ECC based fingerprint code is available in [53].
2.4.3 Accessory Strategies
In the complete fingerprinting system proposed by He and Wu [20], several acces-
sory strategies are proposed to improve the collusion resistance and computation
performance. In the fingerprinting code layer, He and Wu applied the prior group
information to the redundant fingerprinting scheme [54]. This strategy is derived
from the fact that an adversary is more likely to collude with some users than with
other users due to geographic area or social background. This technique is firstly
introduced by Wang et al [19], where they proposed group-oriented fingerprint-
ing to enhance the collusion resistance of independent fingerprinting. In this way,
the fingerprinting code for each user consists of user subcode and group subcode,
which are hidden overlappingly into host signal via a watermarking technique.
The detection is done in two levels, which identifies guilty groups through cor-
relation and then narrows down to specific colluders inside the extracted guilty
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groups. According to their simulation results [54], they stated that the improved
fingerprinting system provides substantial improvement over the previous ECC
based fingerprinting.
In the embedding layer, an other strategy called sub-block permutation is
used for their ECC based multimedia fingerprinting [20]. This technique is firstly
utilized for the construction of collusion-secure fingerprinting codes by Boneh and
Shaw in [11]. The core idea is that the watermark embedding hides the fingerprint
codes into the content block by block, each block can be divided into several sub-
blocks, and these sub-blocks are permuted according to a secret key to obtain
the final fingerprint signal for representing the user.At the detection side, the
extracted fingerprint sequence is first inversely permuted before being passed to
the detector. This technique can prevent the colluders from the attacks for the
whole fingerprinted blocks, since they have no way to identify which sub-blocks
belonging to one block. Moreover, this technology renders the collusion process
similar in effect to an averaging, and averaging collusion is far less effective from
the colluders’ point of view. However, this solution has no effect on the fusion
attacks.
At the detection side, He and Wu also propose a method that automatically
adjusts the group detection threshold according to the detection statistics for
group information to adapt to different collusion patterns [21]. Their strategy is
similar as in [19]. The core idea is that they choose the group detection threshold
by tuning system parameters to obtain the optimal colluder detection probability
and the lowest false alarm probability. Their experimental results show that
this adaptive detection outperforms the non-adaptive detection under a variety
of collusion scenarios, and it can provide up to 10% improvement on the overall
probability of detection.
These above accessory strategies play some important roles in He-Wu joint
Watermarking/Fingerinting scheme [20], and this fingerprinting system was later
used in video fingerprinting application for a large group of users [23]. However,
it is broken by an adaptive collusion attack so-called minority extreme attack,
which was introduced by Schaatun in 2007 [41]. In order to fill this hole, Lin
et al. propose a new solution [55], where they introduce a row-permuted binary
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orthogonal inner code along with an adaptive detector. However, it brings a lot
of additional computation.
2.5 Statistical Approach
In 2003, Tardos proposed a fingerprinting code whose code length has the theoret-
ically minimum order [24]. Afterwards, many improvement works have appeared
from different directions. The related works mainly focused on the generalization
of Tardos code from binary to q-ary, the reduction of the code length, the im-
provements of the accusation function. In this sections, we detail Tardos seminal
fingerprinting codes and summarize the improvements.
2.5.1 Original Tardos Fingerprinting Code
Peikert et al. gave the lowest bound of O(c2log(1/c)) on the length of the general
fingerprinting code (if c << n) [56], with collusion size c and accusation error .
Tardos was the first to publish a binary probabilistic fingerprinting code whose
length touches this bound [24]. We now review Tardos seminal works here.
Tardos original fingerprinting code is generated as follows: first of all, we note
n the number of users, m the code length of the binary codeword in the Tardos
fingerprinting system. The distributor chooses m independent and identically
distributed random variables {pi}mi=1 from the interval [t, 1− t], in other words
pi ∈ [t, 1− t], where t is a small cutoff parameter and Tardos set t = 1/(300c).
The variables pi are distributed according to the pdf:
f(p) =
1
2 arcsin(1− 2t)
1√
p(1− p) (2.3)
Secondly, he fills the columns of the n×m codewords matrix X by independently
drawing random bits Xji ∈ {0, 1} according to the law P (Xji = 1) = pi. X is
the code-matrix, whose j-th row corresponds to the fingerprint distributed to the
j-th user.
We define C to denote a collusion set which has c colluders, and the c × m
matrix XC to denote the codewords distributed to the colluders. The pirates mix
their personalized copies to create a pirated copy y. The distributor later finds
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this pirated copy and extracts the fingerprint Y . In order to identify at least
one colluder in the coalition, he computes an accusation sum for each user. The
accusation sum Sj for the j-th user can be calculated as:
Sj =
∑m
i=1
UT (Yi, Xji, pi) (2.4)
where
UT (Yi, Xji, pi) =

g1(pi) if Yi = 1 and Xji = 1
g0(pi) if Yi = 1 and Xji = 0
0 if Yi = 0 and Xji = 1
0 if Yi = 0 and Xji = 0
(2.5)
The accusation weight functions g1(p) and g0(p) are defined as:
g1(pi) = −g0(1− pi) =
√
1− pi
pi
(2.6)
The distributor decides that user j is guilty, if Sj is greater than a certain accusa-
tion threshold Z. Here Z mainly depends on the desired false positive probability
ε1 (the probability that an innocent user gets accused). Tardos chooses the fin-
gerprinting code lengths m and the accusation threshold Z in the following ways:
m = 100c2
⌈
ln ε−11
⌉
; Z = 20c
⌈
ln ε−11
⌉
(2.7)
Furthermore, he proved that, if the collusion size ≤ c, and with ε2 = εc/41 , the
achieved false positive and false negative error rates by his scheme are respectively
lower than ε1 and ε2 [24] .
2.5.2 Symmetric Tardos Fingerprinting Code
The original Tardos fingerprinting scheme has two drawbacks. Firstly, the com-
putation of Tardos accusation sum in equation (2.4) is asymmetric, because
only those codewords Yi = 1 in i-th block are taken into account, and the
others(Yi = 0) are discarded. This way of exploiting the information hidden
in the pirated copy is unfair and inefficient, since the Yi = 0 blocks carry as much
information as the Yi = 1 blocks. Secondly, this construction cannot be extended
to nonbinary alphabets due to its asymmetry.
Skoric et al. improve Tardos original scheme by two modifications [25]. Firstly,
they generalize the fingerprinting code generation from binary to q-ary. Let Q be
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an alphabet of q symbols and Q = {0, 1, ..., q − 1}, they use Xji ∈ Q instead of
bits {0, 1}. Instead of one random scales {pi}mi=1, they employ the Dirichlet distri-
bution function to generate m independent random vector pi = (p
0
i , ..., p
q−1
i ) for
1 ≤ i ≤ m, where the components satisfy pαi ∈ [t/(q − 1), 1− t] and
∑q−1
α=0 p
α
i = 1.
We note p¯ = {pi}mi=1, the vectors pi have the pdf F (pi) which is invariant un-
der any permutation over Q. Thus this construction is symmetric in all symbols
α ∈ Q. In the i-th column of X, random symbols are generated according to pi
such that P(Xji = α) = pαi . The j-th row of the matrix X will be used for the
j-th user.
The second modification is the computation of the accusation sum. Unlike
Tardos original scheme, their accusation sum computation take all fingerprint
symbols that occur in the pirated copy into account. This accusation sum for a
certain user at a certain symbol block is positive if he has the same symbol as in
the pirated copy; otherwise it is negative. The expression of the accusation sum
Uj can be written in the following way:
Sj =
∑m
i=1
U(Yi, Xji, p
Yi
i ) (2.8)
with
U(Yi, Xji, p
Yi
i ) = δ(Yi, Xji)g1(p
Yi
i ) + (1− δ(Yi, Xji))g0(pYii ) (2.9)
where δ(Y,X) denotes Kronecker delta, and they use the same accusation weight
functions as in Equation (2.6).
In detail, the accusation sum of Equation (2.8) is computed as follows: if user
j has the same symbol as in the i-th block as the pirated copy, his accusation score
is added by a positive amount g1(p
Yi
i ), where this score decreases with the symbol’s
probability. If user j has a different symbol than the pirated copy, then his score is
added by a negative amount g1(p
Yi
i ), which has the largest effect when the symbol
yi is likely to occur. Note that their improved accusation sum function (Equation
(2.8)) is fully symmetric with the symbols, where the Kronecker deltas reduces
the symbol space into two classes: Xji = Yi and Xji 6= Yi. Therefore, the value of
the accusation sum does not depend on the actual value Xji, since it just depends
on the similarity with the symbols appearing in the pirated copy.
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2.5.3 Reduction of Tardos Code Length
The length of the fingerprinting code plays an important role in the multime-
dia application, so there are numerous works aiming at finding a tighter lower
bound on the Tardos code length [57] [25] [26] [27] [30] [28] [29]. In the seminal
work [24], Tardos proposed a code length: m = 100c2 log 1
ε1
for n users that are
ε1-secure against c pirates. This length is shorten than Boneh and Shaw’s result
in O(c4 log 1
nε1
log 1
ε1
). Afterwards, Skoric et al. showed that for the sufficiently
large value c, the code length can be reduced to approximately m = 4pi2c2 log 1
ε1
in
typical content distribution applications, if a high false negative error probability
ε2 can be tolerated [57]. Furthermore, they found that, for the colluders size c suf-
ficiently large, the accusation sums of the innocent user and of the colluder have
probability distributions that are very close to Gaussian; and they indicated that
if these distributions are perfectly Gaussian, a code length of m ≈ 2pi2c2 log 1
ε1
is sufficient for achieving the desired error probabilities ε1 and ε2 if they are in-
dependents. Later, they proposed a symmetric version of Tardos fingerprinting
code used for arbitrary alphabets [25]. When c is large, the code length can
be shortened to m ≈ pi2c2 log 1
ε1
for binary alphabets, by improving the accusa-
tion function. Furthermore, invoking the Central Limit Theorem in the case of
sufficiently large c, they showed that even a code length of m ≈ 1
2
pi2c2 log 1
ε1
is
adequate. Moreover, they indicated that the code length can be further reduced
by using a q-ary alphabet to replace a binary alphabet, their numerical results
show that a reduction of 35% is achievable for q = 3 and 80% for q = 10.
Blayer and Tassa took another direction to reduce of the code length by im-
proving the parameter choice for Tardos codes [29]. They replaced the constants
with parameters in Tardos’ original scheme and derived a set of inequalities that
those parameters must satisfy, then, they looked for a solution of those inequal-
ities in which the codes length m is minimal. In this way, the code length can
be reduced by a factor of approximately 4. Moreover, they pointed out that this
value can be further reduced by decoupling ε1 and ε2. In their simulation, the
code length can be reduced to 6.426% of the Tardos original scheme, in the case
of n = 100, c = 20 and ε1 = ε2 = 0.01.
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Hagiwara et al. also shortened the code length of Tardos code for a small
number of colluders, and gave a primitive construction for the discrete Tardos
fingerprinting code in [58]. Following this work, Nuida et al. have done some
improvement works [26] [27] [30] [28] which concern the practical implementa-
tion issues of Tardos code and the reduction of code length. Especially in [28],
they showed that, when the collusion size c goes to infinity, the code length are
significantly reduced to 5.35%, thanks to the modification of the tracing algo-
rithm object: tracing only the pirate with the highest score leads to a small error
probability.
Recently, Amiri and Tardos introduced a high rate fingerprinting [59] by com-
bining the two approaches [24] [60]. They gave a tight estimation about the rate
of the fingerprinting code as the code lenght m goes to infinity, and they de-
clared that the rate of their code achieves the fingerprinting capacity. However,
the computational complexity in the accusation algorithm of their fingerprinting
code makes it very difficult in practical application. But their work pointed out
a direction for the future research.
Contrasted to these theoretical improvements, Furon et al. found an experi-
mental approach to estimate the minimal code length of binary symmetric Tardos
code [61]. Firstly they assessed the worst case attack that the colluders can lead,
then they used a rare event analysis algorithm to compute the probabilities of
error ε1 and ε2. Finally, for a given collusion size, they were able to estimate the
minimal length of the code satisfying some error probabilities constraints. Their
experimental result indicated that the estimated code length are far smaller than
the previously known theoretical lower bounds.
2.5.4 Improvements of Accusation Function
Another major improvement about Tardos code concerns the accusation func-
tion. The first improvement is the symmetric accusation function introduced
by Skoric et al. as we mentioned in subsection 2.5.2. Later in [31], Furon et
al. indicated that Tardos’ original accusation functions and Skoric’s symmetric
accusation functions are very conservatives: they used the same generic accusa-
tion functions for any kind of collusion strategy. They are optimum with respect
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to the original assumptions, but some more efficient functions can be derived if
the knowledge of the collusion strategy is available. In the subsequent work [32],
Charpentier et al. proposed a practical way to improve the accusation function in
binary case through an iterative estimation of the colluders’s strategy. With the
iterative structure and their improved accusation functions, Tardos fingerprint-
ing code works much better than the original ones when matching the collusion
strategy. The efficiency is verified in their experimental work when the collusion
size c is big; but if c is too small, the Expectation Maximization algorithm fails
and the estimated collusion strategy is not accurate at all, that’s because the
accuracy of estimation strongly depend on the ratio c/n.
2.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter mainly provides the background and the state of the art in multime-
dia fingerprinting field. We give a general framework of multimedia fingerprinting
system in Section 2.1, which is based on three layers: fingerprinting layer, water-
marking layer and attacks layer. Then, we fully analysis the various attacks for
multimedia fingerprinting in Section 2.2, they include the attacks in watermark-
ing layer, the attacks in fingerprinting code layer, and the fusion attacks which
lies across these two layers. These attacks are very important in the multimedia
fingerprinting system design, because they are the criterion for testing whether a
multimedia fingerprinting system is successful or failing.
We also review three multimedia fingerprinting systems: the first approach
is the cryptography and coding approach initiated by Boneh and Shaw, which
based on the Marking Assumption (Section 2.3). The second approach is intro-
duced by the researchers who worked in Maryland university, they tried to design
a practical multimedia fingerprinting system from the signal processing point of
view (Section 2.4); The third approach is from the statistical viewpoint, which
is mainly around the Tardos probabilistic fingerprinting code (Section 2.5). The
first approach focuses on the fingerprinting code design. The second approach
further improved the fingerprinting code design and investigated the method of
combination between the fingerprinting code and the watermarking layer. The
last approach mainly concerns the fingerprinting code and shortens the code
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length. These approaches have a common drawback, that is, they do not pay
sufficient attention to the watermarking layer. Actually, the watermarking layer
is very important for the full system design of multimedia fingerprinting, because
a good watermarking is a necessary condition to establish a powerful multimedia
fingerprinting. If the fingerprints can be removed by application of normal wa-
termarking attacks, the multimedia fingerprinting system cannot be considered
as a successful design. So in the following two chapters, we will explore some wa-
termarking schemes, which have good robustness and security, and finally they
will be used in our secure and robust multimedia fingerprinting system design.
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Chapter 3
Robust Watermarking for
Multimedia Fingerprinting
Any robust and secure multimedia fingerprinting scheme must rely on a robust
and secure watermarking technique to embed users’ fingerprinting codes. How-
ever, as far as we know, a robust and secure watermarking technique design is
a challenging work, since robustness and security are considered as two different
concepts in the watermarking area [62] [63] [64]. Watermarking robustness con-
cerns common signal processing actions without a precise strategy. In contrast,
watermarking security deals with attacks based on the knowledge of the water-
marking technique and the observations of several contents marked with the same
key. Therefore, during these attacks, the attacker carries out precise actions to
estimate the secret key/subspace and perform a surgical strike which removes
the watermark with as less distortion as possible. These are two indispensable
aspects of watermarking, they influence and restrict each other.
In this chapter, we study the watermarking technique for multimedia finger-
printing, especially we focus on its robustness performance. We firstly analyze
the robustness and security performances of some classical existing watermarking
techniques. Based on these analysis, we decide to take a very robust watermark-
ing technique, “Broken Arrows”, as a starting point, and further enhance its
robustness capability in this chapter.
35
3.1 Watermarking Choice for Multimedia Fingerprinting
3.1 Watermarking Choice for Multimedia Fin-
gerprinting
Lots of watermarking schemes have been presented in the literature. The wa-
termark can be embedded in pixel space or transformed space, such as Discrete
Fourier Transform (DFT), Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), Discrete Wavelet
Transform (DWT), Curvelet Transform, or Contourlet Transform etc. In or-
der to choose a suitable watermarking, we briefly compare two main families of
watermarking methods: spread spectrum watermarking and quantization based
methods.
3.1.1 Spread Spectrum Watermarking VS Quantization
Index Modulation
Spread spectrum watermarking introduced by Cox et al. is probably one of the
important breakthroughs in watermarking field [50], their result greatly increased
the robustness of the watermarking scheme to resist the common signal processing
operations and certain intentional attacks. In this method, the host signal is
firstly transformed into a frequency subspace; then the pseudo-random generator
generates a pseudo-random sequence depending on the secret key, it is always
considered as secret carrier; next the watermarking embedder modulates this
secret carrier according to the message to be hidden to obtain the watermark
signal, and finally adds it to the original host signal. In this way, the watermark
is concealed secretly, and therefore preventing the unauthorized users to access
or remove it. This watermarking method can be considered as Additive Spread
Spectrum, afterwards, some improvements have been proposed, such as Scale
Spread Spectrum [65], and Improved Spread Spectrum [66]. Even so far, spread
spectrum method is still widely used; many actual embedding schemes are based
on this method.
Another important family of watermarking schemes is the Quantization In-
dex Modulation (QIM) proposed by Chen and Wornell [67]. The main inspiration
came from considering watermarking as communications with side information by
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Cox et al. [68], and the rediscovery of Costa’s result about the interference cancel-
lation channel [69]. In the literature, the implementation of QIM includes Distor-
tion Compensation-Dither Modulation (DC-DM), Spread Transform-Dither Mod-
ulation (ST-DM) [67], Trellis Code Quantization [70] [71], and Lattice-Quantizer
Index Modulation (Lattice QIM) [72]. These quantization-based methods prov-
ably outperformed the former spread spectrum methods in the sense of the tra-
ditional watermarking evaluation criteria: the distortion and robustness.
However, the security performance of quantization-based methods is not so
good. Pe´rez Freire et al. have deeply studied and compared the security levels of
these two classes of watermarking methods [73] [74] [75]. They took the lattice
based QIM as an example to represent the quantization-based methods, their
results showed that the security level of lattice based QIM scheme is lower than
for spread spectrum methods. Moreover, they indicated the reasons of this gap:
this is due to the host-rejection properties of lattice based QIM scheme, and
to the host interference of the spread spectrum watermarking (see [76, Chapter
7]). We can also find some previous works for assessing the security level of
quantization-based schemes, for instance the dirty paper trellis, in [77]. These
analyses revealed the relatively weak security levels of advanced robust techniques
based on quantization.
In this thesis, our objective is to design a robust and secure watermarking for
the multimedia fingerprinting application. Based on the above analysis, we will
focus on spread spectrum watermarking in this thesis.
3.1.2 Why Choose “Broken Arrows”?
How to design a robust and secure watermarking technique? Especially in using
spread spectrum methods? This is a recent hot topic. Cayre and Bas have re-
alized a trial, they gave a detailed analysis for the security of spread spectrum
methods; afterwards, they proposed two new watermarking modulations in the
Watermarked-Only-Attack framework (Only the watermarked contents are avail-
able for the attacker) from theoretical point of view, called natural watermarking
and circular watermarking [78]. Natural watermarking is shown to provide per-
fect security, however, the price is the significant degradation of the robustness
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relative to the previous spread spectrum method. Circular watermarking method
was proposed to improve robustness at the cost of achieving lower security levels.
Mathon et al. confirmed and optimized these results for the experimental point
of view [79] [80]. These schemes considered security as a top priority, then eval-
uated the robustness. The gap is quite big compared to past advanced robust
techniques. It is just this reason that motivates us to seek a breakthrough from
other directions.
In this thesis, our approach is the reverse, we start with a very robust zero-bit
watermarking technique, “Broken Arrows”, and then try to increase its security
levels. “Broken Arrows” [33] has been designed for the second contest of Break
Our Watermarking System (BOWS-2) [34]. Its performances in terms of robust-
ness and imperceptibility are state-of-the-art. One another great advantage is
that it has been intensively put to a lot of usual attacks during BOWS-2 contest
and resisted well, this superiority is incomparable with other watermarking tech-
niques. First of all, we will review the original “Broken Arrows” watermarking
scheme in the next section.
3.2 “Broken Arrows” Watermarking Scheme
We briefly review the original “Broken Arrows” watermarking technique in this
section. Its embedding and detection processes involve three spaces conversion
among the following four nested spaces: the pixel space, the wavelet subspace,
the secret subspace and the MCB (Miller, Cox and Bloom) plane.
3.2.1 Watermark Generation
We summarize the main processes of watermark generation in “Broken Arrows”
in this subsection. An illustration for this scheme is shown in Figure 3.1. Firstly,
we take the original image iX in the pixel space, which is the Hi ×Wi matrix of
8-bit luminance values; then we perform the 2D wavelet transform (Daubechies
9/7) on three levels of decomposition of iX , and select the coefficients from all
the bands in the wavelet subspace except the low-frequency LL band. These
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Figure 3.1: The illustration for “Broken Arrows” watermarking scheme.
Ns = Hi×Wi(1−1/64) wavelet coefficients are then stored as the host in wavelet
space sX .
Secondly, the host coefficients in the wavelet space is transformed to the se-
cret space, we use Nv secret binary antipodal carriers signals of size Ns: SC,j ∈{−1/√Ns, 1/√Ns}Ns , ∀j ∈ {1, ..., Nv}, produced by a pseudo-random generator
seeded by the secret key K. The host signal is projected onto these carrier signals:
vX(j) = S
T
C,jsX , these Nv correlations being stored as vX = (vX(1), ..., vX(Nv))
T .
This means that vX represents the host signal in the secret subspace. We can
write this projection with the Ns ×Nv matrix SC whose columns are the carrier
signals:
vX = S
T
C .sX (3.1)
Note that the norm is conserved because the secret carriers are assumed to con-
stitute a basis of the secret subspace: ‖vX‖2 = sTXSCSTCsX ≈ ‖sX‖2.
Finally, we transfer the host secret vector vX to the MCB plane. In the secret
subspace, we define a set V of secret directions with Nc secret unitary vectors:
V = {vC,k}Nck=1. With the host signal being represented by sX in this space, we
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look for the “nearest” secret direction from the host vector:
v∗C = sign(v
T
CvX)vC (3.2)
with
vC = arg max
k∈{1,...,Nc}
∣∣vTXvC,k∣∣ (3.3)
With the secret vector v∗C ∈ RNv in the secret subspace, the basis of the MCB
plane is given by (v1,v2) as in [33, Eq.(3)]:
v1 = v
∗
C , v2 =
vX −
(
vTXv1
)
v1
‖vX − (vTXv1) v1‖
. (3.4)
Hence, the MCB plane contains v∗C and vX. The coordinates representing the
host are cX = (cX(1), cX(2))
T with cX(1) = v
T
Xv1 and cX(2) = v
T
Xv2. According
to a certain criterion for maximizing the robustness (see [33, Sec 3.1.2]), the
watermarked coordinates cY = (cY (1), cY (2))
T are presented as:
cY =
 (cX(1) +
√
ρ2 − cX(2)2, 0)
T
for cX(2) ≤ ρ cos(θ)
cX + ρ(sin(θ),− cos(θ))T for cX(2) > ρ cos(θ)
(3.5)
Here the parameter ρ is related to the embedding distortion constraint, which
we will detail it in the next subsection, and θ is an angle defining the cone of
the detection region, which is a function of the parameter Nv and the probability
of false alarm pfa for watermark detection. We can compute it according to the
paper [81]:
T =
√
2√
Nv − 2
erf−1(1− 2 ∗ pfa), (3.6)
θ = acos(
e2T − 1
1 + e2T
). (3.7)
Therefore, the generated watermark signal in the MCB plane can be represented
by cW = cY − cX .
3.2.2 Watermark Embedding
In order to reconstruct the watermarked signal, the watermark signal should be
projected back to the wavelet subspace. Firstly, cW in the MCB plane is projected
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back to the secret space as:
vW = (v1,v2).cW (3.8)
and the watermarked signal in the secret space is:
vY = vX + vW (3.9)
here vW is the watermark vector of secret space, we note its norm is ρ. Then,
vW is projected back in the wavelet subspace to get the watermark signal in the
wavelet domain sW , which can be written as
sW = SC .vW (3.10)
The norm of sW satisfies: ‖sW‖2 = vTWSTCSCvW . In BA, SC was considered as
orthonormal since it is a very long random matrix, so we have STCSC ≈ INv and :
‖sW‖ ≈ ‖vW‖ = ρ. (3.11)
The watermark signal is added to sX with some perceptual mask M:
sY = sX + M.sW . (3.12)
In “Broken Arrows”, the mask is indeed proportional to the absolute value of the
host wavelet coefficients: M = |sX |. The mask has two important impacts we
will take into account in the following subsections.
3.2.2.1 Effect on The Embedding Distortion
We model the masking weights by random variables statistically independent of
sW , and with second order moment empirically measured asM2 = N
−1
s
∑Ns
i=1M(i)
2.
This assumption allows us to write that:
‖sY − sX‖2 ≈M2.‖sW‖2 = M2ρ2. (3.13)
This squared norm is also equal to the Mean Squared Error over the image, times
the number of pixels, because the wavelet transform conserves the Euclidean
norm. Hence the following relationship between ρ and the required PSNR:
ρ =
255.
√
WiHi√
M2
10−PSNR/20, (3.14)
where (Wi, Hi) is the width and height of the original image.
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3.2.2.2 Effect on The Projection Vector
A difficulty stems from the fact that the mask disturbs the vector retro-projection.
When we mix the generated watermark signal sW in the wavelet space, and then
retro-project the watermarked signal sY back onto the secret space, it is not
located where we expect, that is, not in vX + vW . Actually, the retro-projection
denoted by vY works as follows:
vY (k) = vX(k) +
Nv∑
j=1
vW (j)
Ns∑
i=1
M(i)sC,j(i)sC,k(i), (3.15)
We need to assume that:
i) the involved variables can be treated as independent random vector;
ii) the second sum over Ns coefficients can be seen as the empirical average
equaling the expectation;
iii) STCSC ≈ INv , to derive this simplification:
vY (k) ≈ vX(k) + vW (k)M. (3.16)
with M = N−1s
∑Ns
i=1M(i). Therefore, from a vector vW of norm ρ created at
the embedding side, we end up with a vector MvW , at the detection side. We
must take this ‘amplification’ into account when looking for the best watermark
vector. For this, we modify ρ by a factor M , we get its final expression:
ρfin =
255.M
√
WiHi√
M2
10−PSNR/20 (3.17)
sY (k) = sX(k) +M(k).sW (k)/M. (3.18)
In this way, the embedding can yield perceptually acceptable watermarked pic-
tures for PSNR above 40 dB. In our experiments, we set the targeted PSNR =
43 dB as in the BOWS-2 contest.
3.2.3 Technique Flaw
With the PSNR greater than 40 dB, it appears that the amplitude of the samples
of sW are almost all lower than 1. Therefore, this embedding technique conserves
the sign of the wavelet coefficients. In our opinion, this is the real flaw of the
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technique: the watermarking amplitude is proportional to the host signal, and
the sign of the wavelet coefficient of the watermarked signal are unchanged. An
attack not modifying the sign of the coefficients automatically preserves this
important part of the original content. Therefore, if the amplitude of the attacked
coefficients is sufficiently different while preserving the quality of the content,
the watermark can no longer be detected. This is indeed the case with the
attack mounted by A. Westfeld [39] in the first episode of BOWS-2 contest. He
designed a specific attack for wavelet-based schemes, which can be regarded as
a de-noising process. It is mainly based on the estimation of the amplitude of
any wavelet coefficient as a function of the coefficients in its neighborhood via a
linear regression. Our purpose in this chapter is to provide an improved version
of “Broken Arrows”, which is robust against this specific attack, as well as the
normal signal processing operations. Our countermeasures are to design a less
predictable mask, with a stronger watermark amplitude. We will detail them in
the next section.
3.3 Robustness Enhancement of “Broken Ar-
rows”
In order to strengthen the robustness performance of the “Broken Arrows” em-
bedding technique, we propose two improvement directions: (i) Balancing the
Wavelet Coefficients of three subbands in the same transformation level (BWC),
and (ii) Averaging the Wavelet Coefficient with four neighbouring coefficients in
the same subband (AWC). We will present them in the following subsections.
3.3.1 BWC Proportional Embedding
Our first study consists in correlating coefficients of the three subbands in the
same wavelet transformation level. In each level of wavelet transformation, we
balance the wavelet coefficients of the three subbands. The Level 0 case is given
as an example in Figure 3.2. We denote MBWC(LH0) (resp. MBWC(HH0) and
MBWC(HL0)) to represent the sub-masks of the perceptual mask to modulate the
watermark signal in subband LH0 (resp. HH0 and HL0). For Level 0 of wavelet
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LH0
HH0HL0
HH1HL1
LH1
HL2
LH2
HH2
Figure 3.2: Balancing the Wavelet Coefficients of three subbands in each trans-
formation level (BWC).
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transformation, their three sub-masks for LH0, HH0, HL0 three subbands are
all set to:
MBWC(LH0(m,n)) = MBWC(HH0(m,n)) = MBWC(HL0(m,n))
=
|sX(LH0(m,n)) + sX(HH0(m,n)) + sX(HL0(m,n))|
3
(3.19)
where sX(LH0(m,n)) (resp. sX(HH0(m,n)) and sX(HL0(m,n))) denotes the
original wavelet coefficient in position (m,n) of the host signal in subband LH0
(resp. HH0 and HL0). In the same way, we can obtain the sub-masks for the
Level 1 and Level 2 of the wavelet decomposition. The mask MBWC is the only
difference between the original BA and BWC proportional embedding methods.
Intuitively, this embedding enhances the dependency between the subbands of
the wavelet coefficients of the watermark signal. For a given position, the mask
has a value might bigger than the smallest amplitude of the three considered
coefficients. Depending on the value of the watermark signal at this position,
the embedding might consequently change the sign the wavelet coefficient. In
other words, the presence of the watermark is not only hidden in the amplitudes
of the coefficients but also in some of their signs. We will verify our statement
in the subsection 3.3.3. The robustness performance of the improved embedding
technique will be confirmed by the experimental results in Section 3.4 for resisting
Westfeld denoising attack as well as the common signal processing.
3.3.2 AWC Proportional Embedding
Another avenue to improve the robustness of the embedding scheme is to take into
account the dependency between the neighbouring coefficients. The main idea is
inspired from Westfeld denoising attack. We replace any coefficient of the wavelet
transform by an average of five coefficients: itself and four local neighbors. In the
Figure 3.3, we take the wavelet coefficients in the subband LH0 as an example.
We obtain the mask:
MAWC(m,n) =
1
5
∣∣∣∣∣
m+1∑
r=m−1
n+1∑
t=n−1
sX(r, t)
∣∣∣∣∣ (3.20)
where sX(m,n) denotes the wavelet coefficient of the position (m,n) in sX for any
band except the low frequency LL band. sX(m−1, n), sX(m,n−1), sX(m+1, n),
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HH0HL0
HH1HL1
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HH2
Figure 3.3: Averaging the Wavelet Coefficient with four neighboring coefficients
in the same subband (AWC).
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Figure 3.4: The test image “sheep” in the database of BOWS-2 contest.
and sX(m,n+1) are its four neighbors. Putting all the MAWC(m,n) together, we
get another mask MAWC, which will serve in the AWC proportional embedding.
The masks MAWC, MBWC, MBA are the only differences between the AWC,
BWC and BA proportional embedding methods.
In this way, the watermark signal might modify the signs of the host coef-
ficients. As BWC, it is also efficient solution to cope with Westfeld denoising
attack. We now confirm our statements concerning the BWC and AWC embed-
ding techniques through the experiments.
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3.3.3 Experimental Validation
In order to verify our proposed solutions in the last two subsections, we test
the image “sheep” as shown in Figure 3.4, which is taken from the database of
BOWS-2 contest. We keep the same test conditions as in [33], except change the
visual mask. In simulation, three different embedding strategies are compared:
the original BA proportional embedding, the BWC proportional embedding and
the AWC proportional embedding. The expected PSNR is set to 43 dB; the real
PSNR of the watermarked images are 42.88 dB for BA, 42.88 dB for BWC, and
42.81 dB for AWC. The histogram of the visual mask MBA of the BA proportional
embedding (resp. MBWC of the BWC proportional embedding and MAWC of
the AWC proportional embedding) is shown as Figure 3.5 (resp. Figure 3.6 and
Figure 3.7). According to these histograms, we can see that the values of the
visual masks MBWC and MAWC are more centered on 0. Thereby, the factors,
which amplify the watermark signal vW during the embedding, are smaller for
the two improved embeddings BWC and AWC. Actually, we can confirm this
result by the experiment, since we have MBA = 16.02, MBWC = 9.71, and
MAWC = 7.08.
However, on the other side, for each kind of embedding technique, we want
to have almost the same PSNR for the final watermarked image, or the Mean
Squared Error over the image. In other word, we should have almost the same
value of ρfin (see Equation 3.17) for the different embedding techniques. In order
to achieve this objective, we should increase the norm value ρ of the watermark
signal vW (see Equation 3.14) for the two improved embedding techniques. This
is indeed we have done in the experiment. In the test, we obtained the M2BA =
23.95, M2BWC = 13.87, and M2AWC = 11.08. According to the Equation 3.14,
the norm of the watermark signal to be embedded for these three watermarking
techniques are: ρBA = 38.59, ρBWC = 66.63 and ρAWC = 83.39.
We know that with the PSNR greater than 40 dB, the amplitude of the sam-
ples of sW are almost all lower than 1, so the BA original proportional embedding
almost conserves the signs of the wavelet coefficients. Actually, according to the
test for the image “sheep”, only 0.76% wavelet coefficients change their signs after
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Figure 3.5: The histogram of the BA visual mask MBA of image “sheep”.
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Figure 3.6: The histogram of BWC visual mask MBWC of image “sheep”.
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Figure 3.7: The histogram of AWC visual mask MAWC of image “sheep”.
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the BA embedding process. Therefore, we can say that the watermark signal is al-
most hidden in the amplitude. However, the norm of the watermark signal of the
two improved embedding techniques are so big, the watermark signal inevitably
change certain signs of the wavelet coefficients. In our simulation, the 2.36%
wavelet coefficients have changes the signs after the BWC proportional embed-
ding, and the 2.16% wavelet coefficients have changes the signs after the AWC
proportional embedding. Consequently, the watermark signal is not only hid-
den in the amplitude of the wavelet coefficients, but also concealed in their sign.
Furthermore, the Figure 3.8 shows the mask distributions for three embedding
techniques(BA, AWC, and BWC), for the image “sheep”. The results confirm
that: the maskes of our improved embedding techniques are less predictable than
before.
In the next section, we will evaluate the robust performance for both BWC
and AWC.
3.4 Robustness Evaluations
We first compare the robustness of the improved BWC and AWC proportional
embeddings with the original BA proportional embedding, using the same bench-
mark as in the original paper [33]. Then we discuss the robustness performance
for resisting the Westfeld denoising attack.
3.4.1 Facing Common Attacks
We use the same 2, 000 luminance images of size 512 × 512 as in [33]. These
pictures represent natural and urban landscapes, people, or objects, taken with
many different cameras from 2 to 5 millions of pixels. Three different watermark
embedding strategies are compared: the original BA proportional embedding and
the variants BWC and AWC. During embedding, the input PSNR is set to 43 dB;
the real PSNR of the watermarked images is in between 42.5 dB and 43 dB. As
for the original BA, the visual distortions are invisible for almost all images when
using BWC or AWC proportional embeddings. Indeed, these latter schemes yield
slightly better quality (this is a subjective assessment).
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Figure 3.8: The mask distributions for three embedding techniques for the image
“sheep”.
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Figure 3.9: Probability of good detection versus average PSNR of the attacked
images for the three watermark embedding techniques: BWC, AWC and BA.
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We apply the same benchmark on watermarked images as in BA’s original pa-
per, that is, a number of attacks mainly composed of combinations of JPEG and
JPEG 2000 compressions at different quality factors, low-pass filtering, wavelet
subband erasure, and a simple de-noising algorithm. Figure 3.9 reveals the impact
of 15 most significant attacks on the three embedding techniques. The selected
attacks include: 1) denoise threshold 20; 2) denoise threshold 30; 3) JPEG Q =
20; 4) JPEG2000 r = 0.001; 5) JPEG2000 r = 0.003; 6) JPEG2000 r = 0.005; 7)
scale 1/2; 8) scale 1/3; 9) scale 1/3 + JPEG Q = 50; 10) scale 1/3 + JPEG Q =
60; 11) scale 1/3 + JPEG Q = 70; 12) scale 1/3 + JPEG Q = 90; 13) scale 1/4
+ JPEG Q = 70; 14) scale 1/4 + JPEG Q = 80; 15) no attack. The probability
of detecting the watermark (i.e. number of good detections divided by 2, 000)
is plotted with respect to the average PSNR of the attacked images. Because
these classical attacks produce almost the same average PSNR, the three points
for a given attack are almost vertically aligned. The impact on the probability of
detection is interesting: each watermark embedding technique has its advantage
for resisting different attacks. AWC proportional embedding is more robust than
others technique for resisting Attacks 9-14. BA proportional embedding is better
for resisting Attacks 2, 5, and 6. For Attacks 1, 3, 4, 7, and 15, the three embed-
ding technique have a comparable performance. Although the BWC proportional
embedding has a tiny predominance for Attack 8, its overall performance is worse
than the two other techniques.
3.4.2 Facing Westfeld Denoising Attack
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of the three watermarking embedding
techniques (BA, BWC and AWC) against Westfeld denoising attack. To get a
result comparable with the above experiment, we keep the same testing conditions
and use the same 2, 000 images. This is the main difference with Westfeld’s
test presented in [39], as he used all the 10, 000 images available on BOWS-2’s
website [34].
The PSNR of the attacked images ranges from 19.9 to 46.2 dB. This result
is almost the same as Westfeld’s (from 19.7 to 45.0 dB). Figure 3.10 shows the
decreasing percentage of successfully broken images for increasing PSNR. For BA
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Figure 3.10: Operating curve of the estimated images from the BOWS2 database.
proportional embedding, Westfeld denoising attack is really powerful, successful
for 100% of the images when the PSNR is less than 30 dB, and even if its efficiency
decreases when the PSNR is growing, it is still successful for 40% of the images
when the PSNR is around 35 dB. Note that this does not exactly fit Westfeld’s
experimental result, because he used a bigger set of images. Nevertheless, our set
is large enough to illustrate the power of his attack on the original BA.
Figure 3.10 also shows the results of both variants BWC and AWC. For BWC,
Westfeld denoising attack does not work at all: the percentage of successfully bro-
ken images is 0 for any PSNR. For AWC, Westfeld denoising attack works for very
few images for a PSNR ranging from 26 to 32 dB. Any of our two improved em-
bedding techniques is sufficient to cope with Westfeld denoising attack. However,
some robustness is lost against some common attacks, especially for the BWC
proportional embedding. Therefore, in order to prevent Westfeld denoising attack
as well as the others, we have to make a trade-off, and the AWC proportional
embedding seems to be the best choice.
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3.5 Chapter Summary
One task of this chapter is to seek a promising watermarking technique for con-
structing robust and secure multimedia fingerprinting scheme. For this purpose,
we briefly compared the robustness and security performance of two main cate-
gories of watermarking techniques: spread spectrum watermarking and quanti-
zation based methods. According to some previous works, we found that quan-
tization based methods provided a better robustness against AWGN, but weak
security levels. Therefore, we explored the spread spectrum based watermarking
schemes.
Some schemes have exploited spread spectrum methods by considering secu-
rity as a priority, and then evaluated its robustness, but the gap is still large to
the advanced robust techniques. Our approach is different, we start with a very
robust zero-bit watermarking technique, “Broken Arrows”, and try to increase
its security levels. Because it had been tested by many attacks during BOWS-2
contest and gave a good performance.
To further improve the robustness performance of “Broken Arrows” water-
marking technique, we propose two improved embedding techniques AWC and
BWC. These proposed techniques perfectly prevent Westfeld denoising attack,
which is the worst robustness attack in the first episode of the BOWS-2 con-
test. In the next chapter, we will continue to enhance the security aspect of the
watermarking technique.
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Chapter 4
Secure Watermarking for
Multimedia Fingerprinting
This chapter considers the security aspect of watermarking for multimedia fin-
gerprinting. We recall that in the multimedia fingerprinting scenario, the water-
marking technique embeds the fingerprinting code into multimedia content block
by block. For a given user, all these blocks are watermarked with a few number
of secret keys according to the fingerprinting code. It is easy for the pirate to ex-
tract enough information for estimating the secret keys, and thereby remove the
watermark while preserving an excellent perceptual quality. So the security level
of watermarking technique plays an important role in the security of multimedia
fingerprinting.
In the previous chapter, we have selected “Broken Arrows” as the water-
marking technique for multimedia fingerprinting application, and proposed an
enhancement called AWC proportional embedding, which further strengthened
the robustness to against Westfeld denoising attack [39], which was the worst
attack disclosed during the first episode of BOWS-2 challenge. However, security
flaws have been disclosed and discussed [5] during the second and third episodes of
BOWS-2, during which the pirates could observe plenty of watermarked pictures
with the same secret key. These flaws clearly prevent the use of “Broken Arrows”
in multimedia fingerprinting applications. But the second episode of BOWS-2
is concerning about the oracle attacks, which is not relevant in multimedia fin-
gerprinting. Thereby, one goal of this chapter is to propose counterattacks to
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strengthen the security performance of “Broken Arrows”.
4.1 Security Attacks for “Broken Arrows”
First of all, we focus in this section on two security attacks specifically dedicated
to “Broken Arrows”watermarking scheme [5].
Algorithm 1: Cluster by exclusion
l1 := 1 (we used l1 := 3661, image Sheep, without restricting generality);1
for k = 2 . . . Nc − 1 do2
lk+1 := argmin
|D|
j=1 max
k
i=1(|cor(sˆW (li), sˆW (j))|);3
for m = 1 . . . k do4
lm := argmax
|D|
j=1|cor(sˆW (lm), sˆW (j))| for j 6= lm;5
end6
end7
4.1.1 Westfeld Clustering Attack
A security attack called Westfeld clustering attack was introduced by A. West-
feld [5], which is the worst security attack in the third episode of BOWS-2 chal-
lenge. Its main steps can be summarized as follows:
1. He applies Westfeld denoising attack [39] to the (10,000 in BOWS-2) wa-
termarked images.
2. As these attacked images look like estimated original images, he removes
them from the watermarked images to estimate the watermark signals.
3. These estimated watermarks are sorted into several bins (Nc = 30 in BOWS-
2), by using a clustering method as show in Algorithm 1.
4. For a given bin, he averages all the estimated watermarks of the bin to
estimate the secret carrier of this bin, and subtracts it from images water-
marked with this carrier. Finally he obtains the attacked images.
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4.1.2 Bas Subspace Estimation Attack
Another watermarking security attack is the subspace estimation attack proposed
by P. Bas [5]. We sum up its main process here:
1. Through a huge number of observations, the fast and efficient OPAST al-
gorithm estimates the projection matrix W, whose size is Ns × Np, here
Ns is the number of the wavelet coefficients to be watermarked and Np
represents the number of principal components. In order to assess the per-
formance of his subspace estimation algorithm, he used the Square Chordal
Distance(SCD) between the secret subspace Span(SC) and the estimated
subspace Span(Wˆ) during this step. SCD was firstly proposed by Pe´rez-
Freire et al. [75] in the watermarking security domain, the computation of
the SCD is defined by the principal angles (the minimal angles between two
orthogonal bases [82]). Here he uses it to compute the distance between
the secret subspace and the estimated subspace. The smaller the SCD, the
better the subspace estimation.
2. With this projection matrix Wˆ, he uses Independent Component Analysis
(ICA) technique to estimate each axis direction and thereby the whole secret
matrix Cˆ.
3. Finally, he pushes the watermarked content outside the detection region by
making use of the estimated secret matrix Cˆ. In this way, the watermark
is removed with a high PSNR.
Our experimentation confirmed its good performance. OPAST (Orthogonal Pro-
jection Approximation Subspace Tracking) is the key ingredient of this attack.
The usual Principal Component Analysis (PCA) algorithm based on eigenvalue
decomposition cannot operate a so big data set. The designers of “Broken Ar-
rows” thought that therefore PCA was no longer a threat. However, the discovery
of the inline and iterative OPAST proved that they were wrong.
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4.2 Security Improvements of “Broken Arrows”
In order to prevent these two attacks pulling down the watermarking scheme
and thereby the multimedia fingerprinting system, we have to find some ways to
enhance the watermarking security. In this part, several efficient solutions will
be introduced.
4.2.1 Countermeasure to Westfeld Clustering Attack
As we mentioned in the last chapter, AWC proportional embedding is introduced
as one of the best efficient solutions to prevent the Westfeld denoising attack while
maintaining a good robustness against a lot of usual attacks. But its impact on
the security performance has never been examined before.
In other words, Westfeld’s clustering attack was the worst security attack dur-
ing the third episode of BOWS-2 [34], and Westfeld denoising attack is a core
step in this clustering attack (See Section 4.1.1). Therefore, since AWC propor-
tional embedding prevents Westfeld denoising attack to estimate the watermarks
correctly, Westfeld clustering attack may no longer do a good classification of the
watermarks.
In order to confirm this idea, we implemented Westfeld’s clustering attack in
Matlab and found two slight improvements of his Algorithm (see Algorithm 1) [5].
In his algorithm, all the bin leaders are updated at each iteration (step 4 to step 6).
This operation does a lot of repetitive work, and wastes a lot of computing power.
We give the reason here: for a given bin leader, we compute its correlations with
all the observations which are not the current bin leaders, during each iteration;
and then choose the one who has the biggest correlation value to replace the
previous bin leader. In this way, the algorithm converges towards a stable region
very quickly. After certain number of iterations, the cluster inevitably converges
to two observations, they are both the one which has the biggest correlation for
each other. So in this case, the iteration is not necessary to continue. According to
our experiment, for a given cluster, it usually needs 3 or 4 iterations to find a stable
bin leader, while the following iterations output the last 2 leaders alternatively.
The observation of this phenomenon is used as a stopping condition. This greatly
reduces the computing time by 25%.
62
4.2 Security Improvements of “Broken Arrows”
Another improvement is that in our experiment, we also consider the condi-
tion to avoid the repetition of the bin leader. In Westfeld’s clustering algorithm
(Algorithm 1 [5]), the observation which has the smallest correlation with all the
existing bin leaders, is selected as a leader of a new bin. But, with this initializa-
tion of the new bin, it is possible to select as the bin leader a vector which was
already a leader of another bin. This tends to split a ‘correct’ bin into several
small clusters. So in our simulation, we pay attention in truly finding new lead-
ers. In this way, the probability of splitting bins is reduced, and this improves
the accuracy of the classification.
We keep the same test condition as A. Westfeld in order to obtain comparable
results. Firstly, we take the m images of the BOWS-2 database (m = 10, 000),
then during the watermark embedding, we save the cone index information for
every image. This allows to build a ground truth classification. Denote Bref (i)
the subset of all images which have been watermarked with the i-th secret cone.
As there are Nc secret cones, the m watermarked images are classified into a
partition Bref of Nc subsets: Bref =
⋃Nc
i=1Bref (i). This partition is the ground
truth and it will be used to evaluate the accuracy of the clustering attack.
Secondly, we apply Westfeld denoising attack on all the watermarked images
to get an estimation of the original images. This yields an estimation of the
watermark signal: sˆW = sY − sˆX . Thirdly, we run our improved Westfeld’s
clustering attack with a targeted bin number Nt in the range {1, ..., Nc}. This
yields a partition Best of Nt subsets: Best =
⋃Nt
i=1Best(i).
The question is now how to evaluate the accuracy of this clustering attack.
Note that Nt might not be equal to Nc. For that purpose, the confusion matrix
Pconf is first computed:
Pconf (k, l) =
|Best(k) ∩Bref (l)|
M
, ∀(k, l) ∈ {1, .., Nt} × {1, .., Nc}. (4.1)
This confusion matrix can be considered as the probability transition of a noisy
Discrete Memoryless Channel. The subset indices of ground truth partition are
the symbols of the source to be broadcast through this channel. Their proba-
bilities are given by Pref (l) = |Bref (l)|/M , l ∈ {1, .., Nc}. The indices of the
partition induced by the clustering attack are the received symbols. Denote
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Pest(k) = |Best(k)|/M , k ∈ {1, .., Nt}. Then, the accuracy of the attack is mea-
sured as the quantity of information its clustering carries about the ground truth
partition, i.e. the mutual information between the index of the clustering (the
‘received symbols’) and the index of the ground truth partition (the ‘emitted
symbols’):
MI(Best,Bref ) =
Nt∑
k=1
Nc∑
l=1
Pconf (k, l) log
Pconf (k, l)
Pref (l).Pest(k)
(4.2)
Now, the problem is that this measure is not very well calibrated. For in-
stance, if the attack doesn’t work at all, producing a clustering which is purely
random and independent of the ground truth, the expected value of the mutual
information will depend on Nt and Nc. This prevents us from comparing cluster-
ing accuracy for different values of Nt. The adjusted mutual information (AMI)
has been recently proposed by Vinh et al.[83] as a calibrated measure:
AMI(Best,Bref ) =
MI(Best,Bref )− E{MI(R(Nt),R(Nc))}
maxC{MI(C,Bref )} − E{MI(R(Nt),R(Nc))} (4.3)
where E{MI(R(Nt),R(Nc))} is the expected mutual information between two
random clusterings R(Nt) of size Nt and R(Nc) of size Nc, under a given statistical
model; and maxC{MI(C,Bref )} is maximum value of the mutual information for
this particular ground truth partition (indeed the maximum of the entropies of
the ‘emitted’ and ‘received’ symbols).
In our simulation we measure the accuracy of the clustering attack by the
adjusted mutual information AMI(Best,Bref ) and then we plot it with respect
to the ratio Nt/Nc in Figure 4.1. For the original BA embedding technique, with
Nt/Nc = 1, the adjusted mutual information AMI is 0.7, this means that the
estimated clustering Best is very similar to the ground truth partition, and the
Westfeld clustering attack succeeds in estimating the secret cones with a decent
accuracy. However, this classifier does not work with our improved embedding
method AWC: for almost all ratio Nt/Nc from 0 to 1, the adjusted mutual infor-
mation is smaller than 0.05. The reason is that: the estimation of the watermark
signal plays a crucial role in Westfeld clustering attack, and our improved embed-
ding AWC prevents the estimation and thus the attack. So AWC proportional
embedding is an efficient solution to block Westfeld’s clustering attack.
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Figure 4.1: Probability of the good classification for Westfeld classifier against
BA and AWC, with different Nv and Nc
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4.2.2 Countermeasure to Bas Subspace Estimation At-
tack
Bas subspace estimation attack does not use Westfeld denoising attack. There-
fore, AWC is likely not to provide any hint. This subspace estimation is based on
the fact that the embedding deeply changes the power of the signal in the secret
space. This leaves a clue for disclosing this space.
4.2.2.1 Security Measurement
The main idea of BA is to project the signal composed of the wavelet coefficients
onto a secret subspace of dimension Nv = 256. From 2000 images of the BA
databases [33], the results of the power distributions of the original projected
vector vX and the watermarked projected vector vY are shown in Figure 4.2.
The power PX in the secret space is uniformly distributed: there is no particular
reason why this vector could have more power in any given direction of the secret
space. We can measure the power for the original host signal vX in the secret
space by:
PX =
1
Nv
E(cX(1)2 + cX(2)2) (4.4)
Yet, the power PY of vY is very different: The embedding process has changed
the power distributions. In order to maximize the robustness, we push the wa-
termarked vector inside the detection region as deep as possible. This operation
inevitably increases the power along the secret cone direction, and decreases the
power of the other directions.
We model the power distribution as follows: The embedder selects one secret
cone among Nc ones with a uniform probability ps = 1/Nc. Once a given secret
cone is selected, the power is Ps = E(cY (1)2); otherwise, the power is Pn =
E( cY (2)
2
Nv−1 ), because the Nv − 1 elements share the energy of cY (2)
2. See notations
in the paper of Furon and Bas [33]. Thus, for the first Nc components of vY , the
power (expectation of the energy per component) PY (k) is:
PY (k) = ps.Ps + (1− ps).Pn
= 1
Nc
E(cY (1)2) + Nc−1Nc(Nv−1)E(cY (2)
2)
(4.5)
66
4.2 Security Improvements of “Broken Arrows”
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
Indices of VY (VX)
Ex
pe
ct
at
io
n 
of
 p
ow
er
 
 
E(PY) by BA 
E(PY) by AWC
E(PX) of original images
d2
AWC
 = 137
d1
BA
 = 4500
d2
BA
 = 156
d1
AWC
= 4094
Figure 4.2: Power distribution of the correlation vectors vY (vX) with BA and
AWC proportional embeddings (with Nv=256 and Nc=30).
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The (Nv−Nc) remaining directions of the secret space are not secret cone support.
The expection of the power PY (k) for Nc < k ≤ Nv is:
PY (k) =
1
Nv − 1E(cY (2)
2) (4.6)
The difference of power between a direction selected as a secret cone support
and a direction not selected as secret cone support in the watermarked correlation
vY can be written as:
d1 = |PY (1)− PY (Nv)| (4.7)
=
1
Nc
(E(cY (1)2)− 1
Nv − 1E(cY (2)
2)) (4.8)
The difference of power between a direction of the secret space (not a secret cone
support) and a direction not in the secret space is denoted d2:
d2 = |PX − PY (Nv))| (4.9)
=
1
Nv
E((cX(1)2 + cX(2)2))− 1
Nv − 1E(cY (2)
2) (4.10)
Bigger values of (d1, d2) ease the pirate job in disclosing the secret subspace,
and in this subspace, the directions used as secret cone directions. An embedding
technique lowering this two values provides a better level against Bas’ subspace
estimation attack, but it is impossible to achieve the ideal case: d1 = 0 and d2 = 0.
We compare the distances for these two embedding techniques: original BA with
proportional embedding and BA with AWC embedding. They have almost the
same values for d2; AWC has a distance d1 just a little bit smaller than the one of
the original BA (Figure 4.2). Whereas AWC embedding is a good counterattack
against Westfeld denoising attack and clustering attack, it does not help against
Bas’ subspace estimation attack.
4.2.2.2 Regulated Parameters
Inserting (3.5) in (4.7) and (4.9), we have:
d1 = pi
E((cX(1) +
√
ρ2 − cX(2)2)2)
Nc
+ (1− pi)
(
E((cX(1) + ρ sin(θ))2)
Nc
− E((cX(2)− ρ cos(θ))
2)
Nv − 1
)
(4.11)
68
4.2 Security Improvements of “Broken Arrows”
and
d2 = pi
E(cX(1)2 + cX(2)2)
Nv
+ (1− pi)
(
E(cX(1)2 + cX(2)2)
Nv
− E((cX(2)− ρ cos(θ))
2)
Nv − 1
)
(4.12)
where pi is the probability that cX(2) ≤ ρ cos(θ). In these two equations, ρ is a
parameter related to the embedding distortion, we can not modify it arbitrarily
since we need a high quality watermarked content and an acceptable PSNR.
Parameter θ is the angle of the detection cone region; it cannot be modified
because it fixes the false detection probability.
Therefore, we can only tune parameters Nv and Nc. The analysis is quite
involved since the statistics of cX , pi and θ also depends on these parameters.
Firstly, we fix Nc and analyze the impact of Nv. Changing Nv has almost no
effect on d1, whereas d2 is clearly decreasing with Nv. Thereby, after carefully
considering that the complexity of the embedding and detection algorithms are
in O(Nv), we choose Nv = 1024.
Now we study the last parameter Nc: d1 is decreasing function with regard
to Nc. In this regard, we should choose Nc as big as possible. But, a bigger Nc
lowers the value of θ giving birth to a small detection region, and this significantly
degrades the robustness of the system. We make a trade-off with Nc = 256.
We evaluate the power distribution of the correlation vectors for two embed-
ding techniques with the regulated parameters, Figure 4.3 shows the result. We
can see that both the distance d1 and d2 are much smaller than before (≈ 1/8).
4.2.2.3 Security Evaluations Against Attacks
With the new parameters Nv = 1024 and Nc = 256, we check the security level of
the embedding techniques against these attacks with the same database as in the
third episode of BOWS-2 (10,000 images). First of all, we test Westfeld’s clus-
tering attack. Figure 4.1 shows the performance of Westfeld’s classifier against
AWC with Nv=1024 and Nc=256, up to Nt ≤ 40: the adjusted mutual informa-
tion AMI is around 0.006, i.e. much smaller than for the case of AWC embedding
with Nv = 256 and Nc = 30. So AWC with the regulated parameters has even a
better security level than before.
69
4.2 Security Improvements of “Broken Arrows”
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Indices of VY (VX)
Ex
pe
ct
at
io
n 
of
 p
ow
er
 
 
E(PY) by BA
E(PY) by AWC
E(PX) of original images
d1
BA
 = 579
d1
AWC
= 507
d2
BA
 = 51d2
AWC
 = 47
Figure 4.3: Power distribution of the correlation vectors vY (vX) with BA and
AWC proportional embeddings (with Nv=1024 and Nc=256).
70
4.2 Security Improvements of “Broken Arrows”
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
x 104
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
 The number of observations No
N
o r
m
a l
i z
e d
 S
C
D AWC with Nv=1024 and Nc=256
AWC with Nv=256 and Nc=30
BA with Nv=1024 and Nc=256
BA with Nv=256 and Nc=30
slope ≅ 1/4.105
slope ≅ 1/17000
Figure 4.4: Normalized SCD for the embedding techniques BA and AWC with
different parameters Nv and Nc
71
4.2 Security Improvements of “Broken Arrows”
We also evaluate its security performance against Bas’ subspace estimation
attack. In order to compare the performances of this attack, we define a nor-
malized square chordal distance: SCDnorm = SCD/Nc. Note that here SCD is
the Square Chordal Distance between the secret space and the estimated sub-
space, and Nc is the number of the secret cone directions in the embedding
process. SCDnorm = 0 means that the estimated space is equal to the secret
space; SCDnorm = 1 means the subspaces are orthogonal and, therefore, the at-
tack has failed. Figure 4.4 shows the results of the OPAST algorithm applied
against the original BA and AWC embedding with different parameters. No is
the number of observations. We can see that, for BA embedding technique with
Nv = 256 and Nc = 30, SCDnorm is decreasing with the number of observations,
and the estimation keeps on improving very quickly. This confirms Patrick Bas’
results [5]. However, for BA and AWC embedding techniques with the regulated
parameters Nv = 1024 and Nc = 256, SCDnorm decreases very slowly, even after
3.104 observations, SCDnorm is always very close to 1 (more than 0.9), this shows
that the OPAST algorithm cannot effectively estimate the secret subspace any
longer.
4.2.2.4 Robustness Evaluations
To examine the robustness impact brought by the proposed solution in the wa-
termarking layer, we apply the same benchmark as in BA’s original paper. Since
we have already reviewed this benchmark in Subsection 3.4.1, we do not repeat
it here any more. Figure 4.5 reveals the impact of 15 most significant attacks
on the two embedding techniques. The probability of detecting the watermark
(i.e. number of good detections divided by 2, 000) is plotted with respect to the
average PSNR of the attacked images. Because these classical attacks produce
almost the same average PSNR, the three points for a given attack are almost
vertically aligned.
The probability of detection is slightly decreased when Nv (resp. Nc) increases
from 256 (resp. 30) to 1024 (resp. 256) for BA and AWC embeddings. The
proposed counterattacks trade a great improvement of security levels against a
little bit of robustness. Comparing to the original BA embedding, the AWC
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Figure 4.5: Probability of good detection versus average PSNR of the attacked
images for the three watermark embedding techniques: ‘BA’ proportional embed-
ding with Nv=256 and Nc=30 ‘o’, ‘BA’ proportional embedding with Nv=1024
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embedding is more robust against attacks 9-14, but less robust against attacks 5
and 6; and comparable for attacks 1-4, 7, and 15.
4.2.3 Extension to On-Off Keying
So far, we have discussed about BA as a zero-bit watermarking technique and
independently of any particular scenario. In the multimedia fingerprinting ap-
plication, BA should be used in conjunction with an anti-collusion code such as
q-ary Tardos code. Therefore, the secret subspace is decomposed of q comple-
mentary spaces: each one of them gathers the secret cone directions associated to
one symbol. Therefore, we force Nv = q.Nc. Since the symbols to be embedded
are uniformly distributed, all the directions of the secret subspace have the same
probability to serve as a secret cone support. This cancels the use of distance d1
(or in other words, this automatically sets d1 = 0). Another advantage of this
solution is that it also reduces d2.
In order to verify our arguments, we use 2000 images (as in BA [33]) to
evaluate distance d2 in the multimedia fingerprinting scenario. The PSNR of
the watermarked images is controlled around 43 dB. The alphabet size for the
fingerprinting codewords is q = 4. The reason is that: when we watermark an
image with q different symbols, and then perform an averaging attack with a
JPEG compression (Q = 20) for them, the probability for detecting a watermark
from the the watermarked image is small than 50%. So there is no advantage in
having q higher than 4 with this technique. We will give a detailed explaination
in Section 5.3.1. We also fix the parameters Nv=1024 and Nc=256 for both BA
and AWC proportional embeddings, and thereby Nv = q ∗Nc.
In this experiment, we assume that the fingerprinting symbols are uniformly
distributed over all the 2000 images. Figure 4.6 shows that, with our proposed
solution, d1 is artificially reduced to 0 in this application. This is a significant
progress, since in a pure zero-bit scenario d1 has a huge value for both embedding
methods (dAWC1 ≈ 4100 and dBA1 ≈ 4500, see Figure 4.2). On the other hand, d2
is also slightly decreased: dAWC2 = 110 and d
BA
2 = 124 (before d
AWC
2 = 137 and
dBA2 = 156, see Figure 4.2).
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4.2.4 Result Discussion
We proposed counterattacks to known attacks against the BA watermarking tech-
nique. Thanks to a conjunction of the AWC embedding, the regulated parameters
Nv and Nc plus the conditions of use in the traitor tracing scenario, the distribu-
tion of the signal power is much more uniform than before, and this is sufficient to
ruin the above mentioned attacks. The cost of a better security levels is a small
loss in robustness compared to the original BA technique, and slower embedding
and detection algorithms (by a factor of 4).
However, the assessment of a higher security level is not completed: we ad-
dressed only some known attacks, worse threats certainly still exist. It might
be possible for the pirate to use more powerful implementations of PCA than
OPAST, and to collect much more watermarked images to disclose the secret
space. Moreover, the main counterattack simply suggests to use a ‘bigger’ secret
(a ‘longer secret key’ would say a cryptographer), which is not a new idea. In the
next section, our work will try to design a watermarking technique which has a
better security levels.
4.3 Novel Robust and Secure Watermarking
In this part, we present yet another attempt towards robust and secure wa-
termarking. We start from the above mentioned watermarking technique, and
propose changes in order to strengthen the scheme against attacks based on sec-
ond order statistics such as PCA, by striking a perfectly even distribution of the
power. These changes include the introduction of a security criterion, an embed-
ding process implemented as a maximization of a robustness metric under the
perceptual and the security constraints, and a watermarking detection seen as a
contrario decision test. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that
watermarking security is enforced right into the embedding algorithm. We will
give a detailed description of this robust and secure watermarking technique in
the following subsections.
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4.3.1 A Contrario Decision
As far as we know, there is no known optimum zero-bit watermarking technique
for multimedia contents. This is mostly due to the lack of stationarity and to
the wide variety of distribution from a content to another. From the theoretical
viewpoint, [84] proposes a unifying theory of zero-bit watermarking, but its main
drawback is its lack of universality: the embedder and detector must know the
statistical distribution of the host content. More recently, Comesan˜a et al. have
found the optimum scheme under the restrictive assumption that the host dis-
tribution belongs to the white and Gaussian family [85], whatever its variance.
To apply this theoretical result into a real application, BA [33] projects many
wavelet coefficients sX ∈ RNs of the image (with Ns > 200, 000) into a secret
(i.e. pseudo-randomly generated) subspace S = Span(SC) of very low dimension
(Nv = 256). This makes the projection vector vX = S
T
CsX ∈ RNv almost white
and Gaussian distributed. In the end, we can write that vX ∼ N(0, σ2XINv), where
σ2X = ||sX ||2, i.e. the variance varies from a content to another. Several tweaks
are also deployed to tackle a perceptual model and to improve the robustness
against common image processing (see [33]).
However, as already mentioned in the last two sections, BA is robust but
not secure. The embedding pushes the vector vX deep into the acceptance region
which is an hypercone, focusing most of the embedding energy along its directions.
This brings in an uneven distribution of the watermarked signals power in the
space, and a PCA algorithm can disclose the directions of the hypercone.
We propose here a very different paradigm, inspired by works in computer
vision proposing a partial gestalt system based on the Helmholtz principle [86].
This principle groups a set of observed objects into one class if it is very un-
likely that random could have generated such configuration. This is also known
in statistics as a contrario detection. The detection decides one of the two hy-
potheses H0 or H1 based on some observations v. A statistical model is assumed
under H0 as a distribution pH0 , but the alternative H1 is far too broad to support
such a model, and/or what happens under H1 is not well known. Therefore, the
detector evaluates the probability to observe v under pH0 , and if this event is
unlikely, it decides for H1.
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Here we exactly consider the same idea: for original natural images, we assume
that the projection vector vR of the received image is white Gaussian distributed:
pH0 ∝ N(0, σ2INv). Watermark detection is triggered on when this vector is not
typical from that distribution. Therefore, embedding amounts to render vX as
much as possible (i.e. while fulfilling the constraints of embedding distortion
and security) not typical with regard to pH0 . This method is quite different
from usual approaches where embedding transforms host vector vX ∼ pH0 into
a watermarked vector vY ∼ pH1 and where the detector measures the likelihood
ratio pH1(vR)/pH0(vR) (or its derivative for a LMP test) to decide whether vR is
watermarked or not.
4.3.2 The Embedding Core Process
We detail in this subsection how the concepts introduced in the above sections are
implemented. We postpone the details concerning image processing to the next
subsection. We assume here that we have extracted a Gaussian distributed vector
vX from the host content, and that a targeted PSNR controls the watermark
embedding.
4.3.2.1 Three Functions
As mentioned above, we have to manage three criteria during the embedding: the
perceptual quality of the watermarked image, the global security of the scheme,
and the Gaussianity of the signals.
Quality Function: we assume the targeted PSNR imposes a constraint on
the Euclidean distance of the watermark signal vW = vY −vX , such that ‖vW‖ <
ρ. We will see later that parameter ρ is not only a function of the targeted PSNR
but also on some statistics of the host image. For this reason, it might vary from
a content to another, even if the required PSNR is fixed. We define the following
function:
cQ(vW ) =
‖vW‖ − ρ2
ρ2
. (4.13)
Security Function: as mentioned in the Section 4.2, a counter-attack to the
OPAST threat (and any algorithm implementing a PCA) is to make sure that, on
average, the power of the watermarked signal in the secret space S is equal to the
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one in the complementary space S⊥: PY (S) = PY (S⊥). We assume that for natural
images, the power of the host signal is evenly distributed: PX(S) = PX(S
⊥). Since
the embedding only modifies the signal in S, we need to enforce a conservation
of the power in this subspace: PY (S) = PX(S).
This argument holds on average: PX(S) is the average power present in S
over a very large collection of natural images. However, we have noticed that the
energy of the projection onto S, namely ‖vX‖, greatly varies from one image to
another, and it might be hazardous to bet on any average value. Therefore, we
enforce a stricter rule: ‖vY ‖ = ‖vX‖. If the energy is conserved for any host
image, then it must be true on average. We define the following function:
cS(vW ,vX) =
‖vX + vW‖ − ‖vX‖
‖vX‖ . (4.14)
Gaussianity Function: there are plenty of tests to decide whether a col-
lection of i.i.d. data has been drawn from a given probability distribution. For
continuous distributions and especially the Gaussian distribution, the Anderson-
Darling test is one of the most famous. In brief, the test computes the statistic
f(v) from the samples v = {v(i)}Nvi=1 as follows:
1. Mean µ and the standard deviation σ are estimated from the samples.
2. Samples are normalized: vn(i) = (v(i)− µ)/σ.
3. Samples are then sorted in increasing order to get (vs(1), . . . , vs(Nv)).
4. Compute f(v) = (−Nv − T )(1 + 4N − 25N2 ).
5. If f(v) > α, then the samples are not Gaussian distributed.
with
T = N−1v
Nv∑
i=1
[(2i− 1) ln Φ(vs(i))
+ (2(N − i) + 1) ln (1− Φ(vs(i)))]. (4.15)
The value of α depends on the level of the test: the bigger is α, the smaller is
the level. We give some critical values α for the normal distribution: 0.632 for a
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0.1 level, 0.751 for a 0.05 level, 0.870 for a 0.025 level, and 1.029 for a 0.01 level
(see [87, Table 1, part (a), page 239]). For instance, if f(v) > 1.029, the data are
deemed non Gaussian, and the probability of being wrong is 0.01. We take f(v)
as the detection score for the vector v extracted from the received image. The
image is declared as watermarked if f(v) > α and the probability of false alarm
is indeed the level of the test corresponding to this threshold.
4.3.2.2 Constrained Optimization
We consider the watermark embedding as a maximization under constraints. The
embedding looks for the watermark vector v?W which maximizes the objective
function f(vX +vW ) under the constraints that cQ(vW ) ≤ 0 and cS(vW ,vX) = 0:
v?W = arg max
vW∈RNv :cQ(vW )≤0,cS(vW ,vX)=0
f(vX + vW ) (4.16)
However, we can not give a concrete description for the distribution of the wa-
termarked vector vY = vX + vW , because this mainly depends on the original
image, but we know the fact that the watermarked vector does not follow the
Gaussian distribution.
Necessary Conditions: so far, the constraints can be trivially fulfilled by
setting vW = 0. Therefore, we are sure to maximize an objective function over
a non empty set. However, since watermarking is always a matter of trade-off
between distortion and robustness, we would like to consume all the allowed
distortion to maximize our chance of being robust. In other words, we would
like to replace the inequality by the equality cQ(vW ) = 0. There is a necessary
condition so that both equality constraints can be satisfied. The constraint on
quality describes a hypersphere of radius ρ centered on vX , whereas the constraint
on security defines a hypersphere of radius ‖vX‖ centered on 0. Both constraints
can be fulfilled if the intersection of those two regions is not empty. This holds if
the necessary condition is true:
ρ/2 ≤ ‖vX‖. (4.17)
The equality holds in this equation when the hyperspheres are tangent in a point
vW = −2vX so that vY = −vX . Since vX is assumed to be Gaussian distributed,
80
4.3 Novel Robust and Secure Watermarking
so is vY , and consequently an embedding restricted to consume all the distortion
budget fails in this case.
To avoid this situation, we need to properly design the technique so that
over a vast majority of images, Inequality (4.17) holds. However, it is clear that
some pictures will not be watermarked, such as a uniform image. This is indeed
quite sound. Watermarking content when the host power is too weak raises a
security flaw as the host is not properly hiding the watermarking signal. Since
vX(i) ∼ N(0,Σ2), with Σ2 the average power of the wavelet coefficients (see [33,
Sec. 3.3]), then E[‖vX‖2] = NvΣ2. This shows that the dimension reduction
operated by the projection from RNs to RNv must not be too strong. This is the
reason why we increase Nv from 256 (as set in the original BA technique) to 1024.
There is clearly a trade-off with the complexity of the embedder and detector.
For some rare images, this precaution is not enough and (4.17) does not
hold. We then reduce the embedding distortion to 90% of the maximum 2‖vX‖
and we stay with an equality quality constraint. Therefore, we hope that the
maximization is done over a large enough set, and with a large enough embedding
distortion budget in order to find a big and robust extremum of f .
Numerical Algorithm: we use the Matlab implementation of the ‘Interior-
Point Algorithm’ to solve this maximization under constraints. This program
can tackle large scale problems and is robust, as it can recover from ‘NaN’ or
‘Inf’ results. It also takes benefit from ’user-supplied’ derivatives, and Hessian
of the objective and the constraints functions. An important point is that these
functions are not convex; therefore, there are a priori local maxima. When
starting from different initial points, the algorithm might end at different local
maxima. Here is a way to find a suitable initial point:
1. Define the constants
α = 1− ρ
2
2‖vX‖2 , β = ‖vX‖
√
(1− α2)
2. Randomly draw a vector n ∈ RNv .
3. Compute n′ = n− nTvX‖vX‖2vX
4. Set v
(0)
W = (α− 1)vX + β n
′
‖n′‖ .
81
4.3 Novel Robust and Secure Watermarking
It is easy to see that cQ(v
(0)
W ) = cS(v
(0)
W ,vX) = 0. Since the creation of such
an initial vector is not a computational burden, we generate plenty of them, we
compute their scores with the function f , and we give Matlab the one with the
biggest score as an initial vector.
4.3.3 Plugging “Broken Arrows”
This section focuses on the embedding process and how the above algorithm
is plugged into BA still image watermarking technique. Actually, the spaces
conversions of the watermarking embedding process are almost identical as we
have described in Section 3.2.2 and 3.2.1, however, we do not need the last spaces
conversion step, which concerns the secret subspace to the MCB plane. Another
big difference is the generated watermark signal and the AWC mask. Thereby,
here we give a brief review for the main steps.
1. The discrete wavelet transform of the original image is computed. All the
wavelet coefficients except the LL subband are stored in a vector sX . Its
projection onto the secret subspace is vX = S
T
CsX . This matrix is composed
of Nv binary carriers of {+1,−1}Ns , normalized by a factor of 1/
√
Ns.
2. From the input vX , the optimization algorithm mentioned in the last section
generates a watermark vector vW of norm ρ.
3. Finally, the watermark signal vW is mapped back into the wavelet domain
via the AWC mask, to reconstruct the final watermarked image. In Sec-
tion 3.2.2, we have given a detail description on the embedding process with
a perceptual mask, and explained the impacts brought by the mask, here
we do not repeat it any more.
Except these important impacts of the perceptual mask that we have taken
into account in the embedding process, we will introduce two other improvements
to further improve the embedding accuracy. In fact, a big difference with BA is
that the score is calculated from a vector of big dimension Nv (f : RNv → R),
whereas in BA this vector was projected again on a 2D space before the score was
computed (R2 → R+). Figure 8 in [33] shows that there is some inaccuracy in the
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embedding: in this 2D space, the embedding targets a given location, and at the
detection side, the watermarked image is projected on a different position nearby.
This inaccuracy is due to the approximations we made so far, and we noticed that
its impact is even bigger with our proposed scheme, certainly because the score
is now computed on a much higher dimension space. We propose here to reduce
this inaccuracy.
4.3.3.1 Orthonormal Matrix
As discussed in the last Subsection 3.2.2.2, Relation (3.16) is obtained thanks
to the three listed assumptions, and it is quite easy to get rid off the last one.
As already mentioned, the generation of the secret matrix SC is very fast, but
this matrix is not exactly orthonormal. STCSC is positive definite, and is thus
diagonalizable as VTΛV with VTV = VVT = INv and Λ a diagonal matrix. Let
us denote by C the square root of the inverse matrix: C = VTΛ−1/2V. For a
given secret key, we compute in advance this Nv×Nv matrix. Finally, we modify
the projection steps as follows:
v = CSTCs, (4.18)
s = SCCv. (4.19)
This renders our scheme more accurate for two reasons:
• Now we have exactly ‖sW‖2 = vTWCTSTCSCCvW = vTWΛ−1/2ΛΛ−1/2vW =
‖vW‖2 instead of the Approximation (3.11).
• If Assumptions i) and ii) of the last Subsection 3.2.2.2 hold, then at the
detection side we would get vY = vX +MvW .
The storage of the pre-computed matrix C however needs 4 MB for Nv = 1024.
4.3.3.2 Iterative Embedding
The remaining assumptions i) and ii) of the last Subsection 3.2.2.2 do not exactly
hold in practice, and even with (3.17) and (3.18), we get v
(1)
Y = vY +  with
‖‖  ‖vY ‖. We propose the following iterative embedding sketched in Figure 4.7
to combat this effect.
83
4.3 Novel Robust and Secure Watermarking
(2)
Yv
(0)
Yv
(0)
W
M
v
(1)
Wv
(0)
Wv
(2)
Wv
(1)
Yv
Xv
Figure 4.7: The iterative projection scheme
1. Initialization: Once the wavelet transform completed and the extracted
coefficients stored in sX , compute vX by (4.18) and ρ by (3.17). Denote v
(0)
W
the result of the maximization under constraints (4.16) and v
(0)
Y = vX+v
(0)
W .
Compute s
(0)
W (4.19) and embed it in the host signal (3.12) to get s
(1)
Y .
2. Iteration K: From s
(K)
Y , project back onto the secret space (4.18). This
gives v
(K)
Y . Compute v
(K)
W = v
(K−1)
W + (v
(K)
Y − v(0)Y ). Compute s(K)W (4.19)
and embed it the host signal (3.12) to get s
(K+1)
Y .
3. Stop: We stop iterating when we are close to the desired point v
(0)
Y , i.e.
‖v(K)Y − v(0)Y ‖ < η. The watermarked coefficients are copied back in the
wavelet domain and the inverse wavelet transform gives the watermarked
image iY .
This iterative process does take time but, in practice, just one iteration is
enough, as it already greatly reduces the inaccuracy of the embedding.
4.3.4 Experimental Results
The perceptual distortion and the security performance of the proposed water-
marking system are ensured in the watermark signal generation as we have shown
above. So, in this section, we just assess the robustness of the proposed water-
marking scheme. First of all, we give the experimental setup.
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Figure 4.8: The good detection probability with the Gaussian noise attack.
4.3.4.1 Setup
We test 2000 luminance images of size 512×512. These pictures represent natural
and urban landscapes, people, or objects, taken with many different cameras from
2 to 5 millions of pixels. A three-level wavelet decomposition is performed for
each image, using a Daubechies 9/7 biorthogonal wavelet. Then, the selected
wavelet coefficients are projected to the secret matrix, which is generated by the
Mersenne Twister pseudorandom number generator seeded by a secret key. The
dimension of the secret space is Nv = 1024. The embedding distortion is set
by a targeted PSNR of 43dB (except in Subsection 4.3.4.2). The number of the
tested starting vectors is set to 100. The critical value α is set to 1.029 for a
1% level. The options of the Matlab Interior Point algorithm are set as follows:
TolFun=10−6, TolCon=10−6, MaxIter=120, gradConstr = ‘on’, gradObj = ‘on’,
DerivativeCheck = ‘off’, FunValCheck = ‘on’, Hessian = ‘user-supplied’.
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4.3.4.2 Noise Attacks
To evaluate the robustness against noise attack, we add the noise directly to the
watermarked vector vY :
v′Y = vY + σNn (4.20)
where n is drawn from a normal distribution, and σN is the power of the attack in
relation with a PSNRa between the attacked image and the watermarked image:
σN = 255
√
WiHi
Ns
.10−
PSNRa
20 . (4.21)
This artificial attack allows to benchmark the key ideas of our proposed water-
marking technique :
i) include the security criterion right into the embedding process;
ii) a contrario decision test, while decoupling it from this image processing im-
plementation.
To get a better simulation, for each image, we test it with 30 different noise
patterns, and compute the average acceptance rate. Figure 4.8 plots the good
detection probability against PSNRa in dB.
4.3.4.3 Common Attacks
The benchmark of the real still image watermarking technique is the same as
in [33]: the attacks are mainly composed of combinations of JPEG and JPEG 2000
compressions at different quality factors, low-pass filtering, wavelet subband era-
sure, and a simple denoising algorithm. The selected 15 attacks are exactly
identical as in the Subsection 3.4.1. However, we use a different probability of
false alarm, which is set to 1.10−2. Figure 4.9 shows the average PSNR of the
attacked images and the average probability of good detection for these 15 at-
tacks on the proposed watermarking technique. The result of the benchmark is
quite similar to the ones shown in [33, Figure 11] or Figure 4.5. In order to give a
convenient comparison, we put all the results together. In Figure 4.9, we can see
that, in general, the robustness of the proposed watermarking is weaker than the
three previous ones. For a given attack, the probability of good detection of the
attacked images for the proposed technique is always more or less smaller than
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Figure 4.9: Probability of good detection versus average PSNR of the attacked
images for the proposed robust and secure watermarking technique and three
previous ones.
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Attacks L = 0 L = 1 L = 2
Average 0.0195 0.0255 0.9550
Interleaving 0.0295 0.0275 0.9430
Maximum 0.0215 0.0270 0.9515
Minimum 0.0195 0.0300 0.9505
Uniform 0.0210 0.0285 0.9505
Table 4.1: The probabilities Prob(L) of detecting L watermarks from the attacked
images i′Y .
the ones of three previous techniques. If we want to get the same probability
of good detection, the PSNR of the attacked images for the proposed technique
must have 2−4 dB more than the ones of three previous techniques. On the other
hand, the Figure 4.9 also shows us that: for the three previous techniques, the
probability of good detection decreases very quickly between 26 dB to 28 dB, but
for the proposed robust and secure watermarking, the decline interval is larger
(between 26 dB to 32 dB), and the decline speed is slower than these previous
ones. However, this technique is much weaker than the previous ones because the
probability of false alarm here is set to 1.10−2 whereas the previous levels were
at 3.10−6. This is the price to pay for a good security level.
4.3.4.4 Collusion Attacks
We speak of collusion attacks when several copies of the same piece of content,
watermarked with different secret keys are mixed to forge an illegal copy. This
is the typical scenario of multimedia fingerprinting or traitor tracing: a water-
marking technique as the embedding layer coupling with a fingerprinting codes,
different message symbols being related to different keys. If we focus on binary
anti-collusion codes, as Tardos codes, one bit is embedded in each block of the
piece of content. So, each block i exists only in two versions: iY 1 and iY 2. We
have tested the following fusion processes at the mixing step of the attack:
1. Average: i′Y (i, j) = (iY 1(i, j) + iY 2(i, j))/2;
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2. Interleaving: i′Y (i, j) ∈ {iY 1(i, j), iY 2(i, j)} with probability Prob(i′Y (i, j) =
iY 1(i, j)) = 1/2;
3. Maximum: i′Y (i, j) = max{iY 1(i, j), iY 2(i, j)};
4. Minimum: i′Y (i, j) = min{iY 1(i, j), iY 2(i, j)};
5. Uniform: i′Y (i, j) is a random vector ∼ U([iY 1(i, j), iY 2(i, j)]).
Over a set of 2,000 images, Table 4.1 shows the estimated probability Prob(L) of
detecting L ∈ {0, 1, 2} watermarks from the attacked images i′Y . The collusion
succeeds in erasing both watermarks only with a maximum rate not larger than
3%. All attacks yield double detection with a big probability (more than 94%),
which greatly improves the performances of the tracing algorithm [88]. Note that
the high probability of false alarm is not a problem in this application because
we are only dealing with the attacked watermarked images and because the anti-
collusion fingerprinting code can deal with a small amount of detection errors.
4.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter focuses on the security aspect of the watermarking technique for
multimedia fingerprinting application. Based on the obtained result of robust-
ness improvement in the last chapter, we proposed some counterattacks for the
used watermarking technique against known security attacks, such as Westfeld
clustering attack and Bas subspace estimation attack. We further exploited the
security performance of the AWC embedding, regulated the system parameters
Nv and Nc, and extended the conditions of use to the traitor tracing scenario.
Thanks to the improvements, the proposed watermarking scheme has a better se-
curity levels, these security attacks are no longer threats. But the cost is a small
loss in robustness compared to the original BA technique, and the computational
complexity during the embedding and detection processes is increased by a factor
of 4.
However, the assessment of a higher security level is not completed: we ad-
dressed only some known attacks, worse threats certainly still exist. Moreover,
the main counterattack simply suggests to use a ‘bigger’ secret, which is not a
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new idea. For this reason, we proposed some modifications, and introduced a
novel robust and secure watermarking scheme. We presented a contrario decision
test, a constrained maximization embedding method, which aims at maximizing
robustness under the perceptual distortion and security constraints. Despite the
introduction of these new conceptions, we face once again the same trade-off be-
tween security and robustness: To keep the same performances in terms of good
detection against common image processing, we had to increase the probability
of false alarm.
Despite its poor trade-off probability of false alarm vs. robustness, we believe
that this scheme has some serious potential in the images (or video) watermarking
applications, especially in multimedia fingerprinting (a.k.a. traitor tracing), since
the contents are all watermarked in this scenario the probability of false alarm is
no longer a problem. The question is more about the symbols likely to be hidden
in the pirated copy. So far, as far as we know, the watermark detector outputs
binary decision about the presence or absence of the watermarks (this includes
potential multiple detections). The a contrario decision test can indeed provide
a probability of the presence of a given symbol; i.e. a soft output bringing more
information for the Tardos accusation step.
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Chapter 5
Robust and Secure Multimedia
Fingerprinting
A complete multimedia fingerprinting system indispensably includes two parts:
a fingerprinting codes and a watermarking technique. So far, the designs of
these two technologies have often been made separately. Fingerprinting codes
have been mostly proposed by the cryptographic community with models of the
collusion process defined on the sequence space since the pioneering work [11].
Watermarking techniques are mainly studied by people in the image or signal pro-
cessing community. Hence, it is crucial to verify that a collusion of watermarked
contents is compliant with the assumptions made by fingerprinting designers.
In this chapter, we propose a full multimedia fingerprinting scheme based
on on-off keying modulation. This scheme includes the symmetric Tardos fin-
gerprinting code combined with a watermarking technique. The watermarking
technique could be one of the three watermarking techniques mentioned in the last
two chapters. Furthermore, as fusion attacks (described in Secection 2.2.3) are
not naturally averted by the watermarking layer nor the fingerprinting layer, we
propose two different accusation functions to improve the fingerprinting detection
process and tackle them. These proposed solutions force the fusion attacks of the
pirates to help the accusation process rather than puzzle it. Some experimental
evaluations will be given to confirm our statements.
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5.1 A Full Multimedia Fingerprinting Scheme
We propose a full robust and secure multimedia fingerprinting system, which
combines a symmetric Tardos fingerprinting code [25] with one watermarking
techniques via on-off keying modulation. In detail, it can be divided into four
parts: fingerprint construction, fingerprint embedding, fingerprint detection and
pirates accusation. We give a more detail description for them in the following
subsections.
5.1.1 Fingerprint Construction
A fingerprinting code is a set of n different symbol sequences {Xj}nj=1 with size
of m. The code has the property that observing a mixture of a bounded number
of code sequences, the decoding can retrieve a subset of the original sequences
used for this forgery. In our multimedia fingerprinting scheme, we employ the
symmetric Tardos fingerprinting code introduced by Skoric et al. [25], the symbols
belong to a q-ary discrete alphabet: Xji ∈ Q, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
with Q = {0, 1, ..., q − 1}. In detail, we use the Dirichlet distribution function to
generate a set of independent random vector pi = (p
0
i , ..., p
q−1
i ), according to the
Dirichlet distribution shape parameter κi = (κ
0
i , ..., κ
q−1
i ), where the components
satisfy pαi ∈ [t/(q − 1), 1− t] and
∑q−1
α=0 p
α
i = 1, with t = 1/(300c) and c is the
collusion size. We note p¯ = {pi}mi=1, the vectors pi have the pdf F (pi) which
is invariant under any permutation over Q, if κi = cte. Thus this construction
is symmetric for all symbols α ∈ Q. In the i-th column of matrix X, random
symbols are generated according to pi such that P(Xji = α) = pαi . The j-th row
of matrix X will be used as the fingerprinting code for the j-th user.
5.1.2 Fingerprint Embedding
5.1.2.1 Block Based Embedding
Each fingerprint sequence identifying a user has to be hidden in his personal copy
through a watermarking technique. In our system, the embedding process is block
based: it divides the content into consecutive blocks and it hides a symbol per
block. We assume here that the content (a video or an audio clip) is long enough
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so that there is at least m blocks. The watermarking process starts by extracting a
long sequence s(o) of L coefficients (such as DCT, DFT, DWT coefficient...) from
the original content. This sequence is split into m blocks of l samples {s(i)X }mi=1
(we suppose that L = ml), such that s
(i)
X = (s
(o)(il + 1), . . . , s(o)((i + 1)l)). The
watermark embedding hides the symbol Xji into the block s
(i)
X producing the i-th
watermarked block for the j-th user:
s
(i)
Y,j = s
(i)
X + w(Xji, s
(i)
X ), (5.1)
where w(Xji, s
(i)
X ) denotes the embedded watermark signal. Packing back all the
watermarked blocks together, this yields the watermarked sequence sy,j, delivered
to the j-th user.
This block based embedding has two advantages. First, the blocks of content
are watermarked oﬄine in q versions containing a different symbol, the online
content server is just a switch that ships the right blocks according to the user
sequence. Second, the pirated copy is processed only once by the computationally
greedy watermark decoding for retrieving the pirated symbol sequence Y′. Then,
the accusation process of the fingerprinting code accuses some users (or nobody)
based on this ‘pirated’ sequence Y′.
5.1.2.2 On-Off Keying Modulation
Among all the attacks the colluders may perform, we distinguish pure watermark-
ing attacks, pure fingerprinting attacks, and fusion attacks (see Section 2.2). The
most challenging class in the design of a fingerprinting scheme is the fusion at-
tacks, as general robustness is not a priori sufficient to resist such an attack. Our
goal is to choose a suitable combination between the watermarking technique and
the symmetric Tardos codes, which could face a fusion attack with several copies
of the multimedia content.
In our multimedia fingerprinting system, we choose to use a block based em-
bedding, and to embed one q-ary symbol in each block. We know that zero-bit
watermarking is similar to on-off keying in digital communications. This mod-
ulation is used on very rare applications: fiber communication where it is not
possible to modulate the light emission, except by switching it on and off. Some
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theoretical works also show that on-off keying is the last solution to communicate
when the channel transmission quality is really too bad (e.g., the delay spread
of the fading is less than the symbol duration, so that channel estimation and
equalization is not possible) [89]. The use of zero-bit watermarking is not new
in multimedia fingerprinting. For instance, Safavi-Naini and Yang embed q-ary
symbols in pictures using q different secret keys of a classical spread spectrum
scheme [43]. We use some different zero-bit watermarking techniques which are
side-informed.
Since a zero-bit watermarking technique is based on on-off keying, the combi-
nation between watermarking technique and fingerprinting code of our multime-
dia fingerprinting system can also be considered as an on-off keying modulation.
By nature, a zero-bit technique does not carry any specific message, but just the
presence of a watermark. To embed symbols of a q-ary alphabet, we defined q
secret keys, and use key K(Xji) to embed symbol Xji. Since two different keys
produce two almost independent watermark signals, the fusion is now deemed as
a scaling and the addition of an independent noise. Note that this modulation is
not costly, for example, the embedding and detection of the AWC watermarking
involve three nested spaces, and the modulation is just related to the last one,
so, the computational complexity overhead is only related to this last space.
5.1.2.3 Selected Watermarking Techniques
Three watermarking techniques are proposed as a practical watermarking solu-
tion in our experimentation: the improved version of Broken Arrows after the
robustness enhancement as mentioned in Section 3.3, another improved version
of Broken Arrow after the robustness improvement as well as security improve-
ment mentioned in Section 4.2, and the new robust and secure watermarking
(RSW) proposed in Section 4.3. However, in order to adapt for on-off keying
modulation, we have to adjust the parameter Nc, since we use q = 4 different
secret keys: Nc = Nv/q. The reason why we set q = 4 will be given later. We
enumerate these three used watermarking techniques as follows:
1. First watermarking technique: the AWC watermarking with Nv = 256 and
Nc = 64;
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2. Second watermarking technique: the AWC watermarking with Nv = 1024
and Nc = 256;
3. Third watermarking technique: the robust and secure watermarking.
These three watermarking schemes have a common property: one specific form
of zero-bit watermarking. Actually, these watermarking techniques do not carry
any specific message, but just the presence of a watermark (or a symbol).
We know that for the zero-rate watermarking scheme, the watermark signal
consists of a random number with zero mean and unit variance. Compared to
the zero-rate watermarking, the q possible watermark signals {w(X, s(i)X )}X∈Q
generated by these zero-bit watermarking techniques are not strictly independent,
because they all take advantage of the side-information s
(i)
X . But they are less
dependent, since they are generated from q independent secret keys. Hence, a
fusion attacks is more similar to the scaling of the present watermark and the
addition of an independent noise (the watermarks in the others copies in the
fusion attack). Another advantage of these zero-bit watermarking is that it is
very unlikely to frame the resulting watermark inside the detection region of
symbol (i.e., a secret key) which does not belong to {Xji}j∈C, with C is the set
of colluders. The rationale is that the colluders cannot succeed to watermark a
block without knowing this secret key from signals which are independent from
this detection region. Another way to see this is that, assuming the fusion is
linear, the forged block remains in an affine space passing by the point s
(i)
X and
spanned by the watermark signals {w(Xji, s(i)X )}j∈C, which is almost orthogonal
to the detection region related to the other keys. Hence, this event should be as
rare as a false alarm.
There is a difference between the first two watermarking techniques and the
last one, with respect to the way to adapt the on-off keying modulation. For
the first two watermarking methods, we firstly perform a wavelet transform for a
given image; and then project the wavelet coefficients from the wavelet subspace
to the secret subspace according to a secret key, this step obtains a secret vector
with size Nv; finally, this vector is divided into q sets of Nc = Nv/q components
each, according to q different secret keys. Here each secret key K(Xji) is defined
by an unique symbol Xji of fingerprinting code. Therefore, everything remains
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the same except that the set in use during embedding is given by the symbol Xji.
These sets of secret directions are independent, whence all is as if the embedding
was done with q different secret keys.
However, for the last watermarking technique, the modulation method is dif-
ferent. For a given image, we first perform a wavelet transform, this step being
the same as in the first two watermarking methods; but in the next step, we
should use q different secret keys to project the wavelet coefficients to q different
secret subspaces, each secret key K(Xji) is also defined by a unique symbol Xji
of the fingerprinting code. Of course, these q secret subspaces are independent,
since they were projected with q different secret matrices generated by q different
secret keys.
5.1.3 Fingerprint Detection
The content server distributes the fingerprinted copies to lots of users, some of
them are colluders, they collect their personalized copies and preform one or more
attacks to generate a pirated copy for their illegal redistribution purpose. In the
experiments of Section 5.3, we will test several typical fusion attacks. Later, the
copyright holder finds this pirated copy, and he wants to trace back the identities
of these colluders, and then to investigate their relevant legal responsibility. First
of all, he should keep the synchronization and divide the pirated content into
consecutive blocks, as in the fingerprint embedding process. Then, he has to
detect all the symbols hidden in each block. Please note that in our scheme, the
original image is not required at the fingerprint detection side (blind detection).
Finally, he runs the accusation process to identify the colluders, of course under
an allowable small false alarm. In this section, we talk about how to detect the
fingerprint symbols in each block for the above three watermarking techniques,
the pirates accusation process will be discussed in the next section.
5.1.3.1 AWC Watermarking Detection
Among three watermarking techniques to be tested, two are AWC watermarking.
So we firstly detail the AWC watermarking detection process. For an individual
separated block of the pirated copy, the detection should output the indices of
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the sets which have given a positive output (the signal is inside one of their hy-
percones). The following steps is necessary to determine whether a given symbol
Xji is present or not, according to the secret key K(Xji). Here we take an image
as a example.
1. We perform the 2D wavelet transform (Daubechies 9/7, decomposition of
3 levels) to the test block i
′(i)
Y , then we select the coefficients from all the
bands except the low-frequency LL band, and store them into a signal s
′(i)
Y .
2. We project the s
′(i)
Y from the wavelet space to the secret space to obtain the
secret vector v
′(i)
Y . This step is realized in using the secret matrix SC which
seeded by the same secret key K as in the embedding process.
3. With the help of the secret vector v∗c , which is generated according to the
secret keyK(Xji), the host signal vector v
′(i)
Y is projected to the MCB plane.
v
′(i)
1 = v
∗
C , v
′(i)
2 =
v
′(i)
Y −
(
v
′(i)
Y
T
v
′(i)
1
)
v
′(i)
1∥∥∥v′(i)Y − (v′(i)Y Tv′(i)1 )v′(i)1 ∥∥∥ . (5.2)
The coordinates representing the pirated block are c
′(i)
Y = (c
′(i)
Y (1), c
′(i)
Y (2))
T ,
with c
′(i)
Y (1) = v
′(i)
Y
T
v
′(i)
1 and c
′(i)
Y (2) = v
′(i)
Y
T
v
′(i)
2 .
4. Finally, we consider that the symbol Xji is present in this block if:∣∣∣(1, 0) · c′(i)Y ∣∣∣∥∥∥c′(i)Y ∥∥∥ =
∣∣∣c′(i)Y (1)∣∣∣∥∥∥c′(i)Y ∥∥∥ > cos(θ). (5.3)
here θ is an angle defined by the parameters Nv, Nc and the probability
of false alarm. Actually, the cone of angle θ represents the watermark
detection region.
5.1.3.2 RSW Watermarking Detection
Another watermarking technique to be tested is the new robust and secure wa-
termarking (RSW) that we proposed in Section 4.3. For a given pirated block,
the detection outputs the indices of the sets in which the secret vector does not
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follow the Gaussian distribution. In order to determine whether the symbol Xji
is present or not for the given pirated block i
′(i)
Y , three necessary steps are as
follows:
1. We perform the 2D wavelet transform (Daubechies 9/7, decomposition of
3 levels) to the test block i
′(i)
Y , then we select the coefficients from all the
bands except the low-frequency LL band, and store them into a signal s
′(i)
Y .
2. We project the s
′(i)
Y from the wavelet space to the secret space to obtain the
secret vector v
′(i)
Y . This step is realized in using the secret matrix SC which
seeded by the same secret key K(Xji) as in the embedding process.
3. Finally, we calculate the Anderson-Darling Test result f(v
′(i)
Y ) of the vector
v
′(i)
Y , and then compare it with the critical value β for a given level. If
f(v
′(i)
Y ) ≤ β, we think that this tested vector follows the normal distribution,
and thus we decide that the tested image is not watermarked. Otherwise,
we consider a watermark is present.
5.1.3.3 Detection Effect Brought by Fusion Attacks
These above detection processes work very well for the normal watermarked
blocks, however, for the pirated blocks after fusion attacks mentioned in Se-
cection 2.2.3, their detection efficiency is different because of the additional in-
terference. We take an average attack with c different copies as an example. We
note that the watermarked signal is the sum of the original and watermark sig-
nal: s
(i)
Y = s
(i)
X + w(Xji, s
(i)
X ), and the pirated block after average attack can be
written as: s
′(i)
Y = s
(i)
X + c
−1w(Xji, s
(i)
X ) + ω. This is very different from the pure
watermarking layer attacks because of the scaling factor c−1 and the noise ω, sum
of the other watermark signals, which is not strictly independent of the host or
the watermark signals.
At the detection side, the most important thing is that, for a given symbol
of colluders, the remaining scaled watermark c−1w(Xji, s
(i)
X ) in the secret space
of this symbol is sufficient to make the watermark detector output a positive
answer. Of course, the detection results is directly upper bounded by the number
of symbols q and the collusion size c. The more symbols participated in the
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fusion, the smaller is the probability that these symbols are detected. That is
why we should give a careful choice for the parameter q in the fingerprinting
system design (see Section 5.3.1).
5.1.4 Skoric’s Accusation Functions
Now we talk about how to make use of the watermark detection results to accuse
the colluders. The number of detection outputs is indeed 2q > q, as, for each of
the q secret keys, the detector will give a binary decision. Hence there are cases
where several watermark signals are detected. At i-th block, a set of symbols
Y′i = {Y ′i (d)}Did=1 is detected, here Di represents the number of symbols detected
at i-th block. What kind of fingerprinting code can take advantage of this feature?
We found in literature the following two candidates.
Many strong c-traceable codes are based on algebraic error correcting codes
such as Reed-Solomon codes. This feature allows two strategies: list decoding or
iterative decoding. List decoding finds a group of nearest code sequences (from
the pirated sequence) [47] beyond the decoding distance, and its algorithm like
Guruswami-Sudan [46] takes into account some reliability measures about the
decoded symbols, which could be based on the decoded symbols Y′i. Another
strategy is to decode iteratively the pirated sequence to find several colluders.
In [45], symbols of the pirate sequence are replaced by erasures when they match
symbols of code sequences decoded in previous iterations. This new pirated se-
quence is again decoded at the next iteration. Here, we can replace erasure by
another symbol decoded in the block.
However, the Skoric’s original accusation function of the symmetric Tardos
fingerprinting code is not suitable for the two above decodings methods, since it
is confined to the cases of one decoded symbol for one pirated block, such as,
by the exchange attack. We recall the Skoric’s accusation functions as shown in
Section 2.5.2, which computes the accusation sum for j-th user as follows:
Sj =
∑m
i=1
U(Y ′i , Xji, p
Y ′i
i ) (5.4)
with
U(Y ′i , Xji, p
Y ′i
i ) = δ(Y
′
i , Xji)g1(p
Y ′i
i ) + (1− δ(Y ′i , Xji))g0(pY
′
i
i ) (5.5)
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where δ(Y ′, X) denotes Kronecker delta, and here the accusation weight functions
are the same as Equation (2.6):
g1(pi) = −g0(1− pi) =
√
1− pi
pi
(5.6)
Finally, we consider the j-th user is one colluder if his accusation score Sj is
greater than the accusation threshold Z. This is indeed the Skoric’s accusation
method.
Obviously, this accusation function does not make use of the information of
all decoded symbols. Hence, in the next section, we propose two new accusation
approaches to improve the efficiency of accusation process.
5.2 Our Proposed Accusation Approaches
In this section, our objective is to propose some novel accusation processes, in
order to take into account the fact that a list of symbols Y′i = {Y ′i (d)}Did=1, are
decoded from the i-th block. Note that the i-th watermark detection does not
bring any information whether user j is guilty if Di = 0 (Y
′
i is an empty set)
or Di = q (Y
′
i = Q). Now we present two extended accusation processes in the
following subsections.
5.2.1 First Accusation Method
In the first method, we propose the following score sum for the j-th user, with U
defined in (5.5):
Sj =
m∑
i=1
Di∑
d=1
U(Y ′i (d), Xji, p
Y ′i (d)
i ). (5.7)
In this way, it is equivalent as if the code length has increased from m to mD¯, with
D¯ = m−1
∑m
i=1Di. As far as we know, the longer the fingerprinting code is, the
more reliable is the accusation process. Therefore, this proposed method should
be more reliable than the previous one. However, this rationale justifying the idea
is not correct because the summands are not independent, but the experimental
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section shows however that it works great. Here we compute the average of the
score for an innocent user µI = mE(
∑
Y ′(d)∈Y′
U(Y ′(d), X, pY
′
i (d))):
µIm
−1 =
∑
Y′,X
pXpY
′ ∑
Y ′(d)∈Y′
δ(Y ′(d), X)g1(pY
′
i (d)) + (1− δ(Y ′(d), X))g0(pY ′i (d))
=
∑
Y′
pY
′ ∑
X,Y ′(d)∈Y′
pX
(
δ(Y ′(d), X)g1(pY
′
i (d)) + (1− δ(Y ′(d), X))g0(pY ′i (d))
)
=
∑
Y′
pY
′ ∑
X,Y ′(d)∈Y′
pX
δ(Y ′(d), X)√1− pY ′i (d)
pY
′
i (d)
− (1− δ(Y ′(d), X))
√
pY
′
i (d)
1− pY ′i (d)

=
∑
Y′
pY
′ ∑
Y ′(d)∈Y′
√
pY
′
i (d)(1− pY ′i (d))−
√
pY
′
i (d)(1− pY ′i (d))
= 0
Here pY
′
=
∑D
d=1 p
Y ′(d). We remind here that it is impossible to compute the
variance of the accusation score, because the number of the detected symbols for
each attacked block is indeterminate.
5.2.2 Second Accusation Method
In the second method, we keep the same score sum as Equation (5.4), but change
the summands as follows:
U(Y′i, Xji, p
Y′i
i ) = δ(Y
′
i, Xji)g1(p
Y′i
i ) + (1− δ(Y′i, Xji))g0(pY
′
i
i ) (5.8)
with δ(Y′i, Xji) = 1 if Xji ∈ Y′i, else 0, and pY
′
i
i =
∑Di
d=1 p
Y ′i (d)
i . The rationale of this
method is that it can decrease the variance of the colluders’ scores: whatever their
symbol Xji ∈ Y′i, they receive the same penalization g1(pY
′
i
i ). The experimental
results in the next section will show the excellent performances of these two
extended accusation methods. Furthermore, we will prove their effectiveness to
prevent the colluders from the fusion attacks through the experiment. For this
second method, we also compute the average of the score for an innocent user
µI = mE(Y′, X, pY
′
):
µIm
−1 =
∑
Y′,X
pXpY
′
(
δ(Y′, X)g1(pY
′
) + (1− δ(Y′, X))g0(pY′)
)
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=
∑
Y′
pY
′ ∑
X
pX(δ(Y′, X)g1(pY
′
) + (1− δ(Y′, X))g0(pY′))
=
∑
Y′
pY
′ ∑
X
pX(δ(Y′, X)
√
1− pY′
pY′
− (1− δ(Y′, X))
√
pY′
1− pY′ )
=
∑
Y′
pY
′
(√
pY′(1− pY′)−
√
pY′(1− pY′)
)
= 0
Furthermore, we compute the variance of the score σ2I = mE(U(Y′, X, pY
′
)2), for
an innocent user:
σ2Im
−1 =
∑
Y′ /∈{∅,X},X
pXpY
′
(
δ(Y′, X)g1(pY
′
)) + (1− δ(Y′, X))g0(pY′)
)2
=
∑
Y′ /∈{∅,X},X
pY
′
(∑
X∈Y′
pXg1(p
Y′)
2
+
∑
X/∈Y′
pXg0(p
Y′)
2
)
=
∑
Y′ /∈{∅,X}
pY
′
(1− pY′ + pY′) = 1− pY′(∅)− pY′(X)
5.3 Experimental Evaluations
First of all, the experimental work is dedicated to evaluate the performances of
three watermarking techniques; then, we evaluate the performance of the sym-
metric Tardos fingerprinting code; Finally, we assess the overall performance of
the complete multimedia fingerprinting scheme, and evaluate the effectiveness of
our two proposed accusation methods.
5.3.1 Evaluations of Three Watermarking Techniques
In order to evaluate the collusion resistance of these three watermarking tech-
niques, we apply four typical collusion attacks mentioned in Section 2.2: 1) Aver-
aging attack; 2) Interleaving attack; 3) Maximum attack; 4) Moderated minority
extreme attack (MMX). We have tested 2000 images with size 512 ∗ 512 the
PSNR of the watermarked images is around 43 dB. For each case, the images are
watermarked by one among the three given watermarking techniques, and then
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Table index Averaging Interleaving Maximum MMX
AWC (Nv = 256 Nc = 64) Table B.1 Table B.2 Table B.3 Table B.4
AWC (Nv = 1024 Nc = 256) Table B.5 Table B.6 Table B.7 Table B.8
RSW Table B.9 Table B.10 Table B.11 Table B.12
Table 5.1: The index of the tables that indicate the conditional probabilities
P (D|`) of detecting D watermarks from the attacked image. The images are
watermarked by one among watermarking techniques, and then attacked by one
of four fusion attacks, finally followed by a JPEG compression with a quality
factor Q = 20.
attacked by one of the four given fusion attacks with ` different fingerprinted
images, followed by a JPEG compression with a quality factor Q = 20. Finally,
we compute the probability P (D|`) of detecting D different watermarks from the
final attacked image. Table 5.1 shows the indices of the following 12 tables (Ta-
ble B.1 - Table B.12 in Appendix B), which provide the results of the conditional
probabilities P (D|`).
For the first watermarking technique AWC (Nv = 256, Nc = 64), (Table B.1
- Table B.4), we can see that, when the collusion size ` is small (1 or 2), these
four attacks have a similar performance, the detection probability is quite good
(∼ 0.98). However, when mixing more than 2 watermarked images, their perfor-
mances become worse for all these attacks, because the strength of one watermark
becomes smaller as more images are mixed. For ` = 4, more than half of the time,
we are not able detect any watermark from the images attacked by these attacks.
Especially, for averaging attack, interleaving attack and maximum attack, the
probabilities of detecting no watermark are more that 0.73 when ` = 4. The
maximum number of averaged watermarked images being min(q, c), there is no
point in having q higher than 4. This is just the reason for setting q = 4. If we
compare these four attacks, we can see that maximum attack is the most powerful
when ` = 3 and ` = 4; while moderated minority extreme attack has the worst
attack capability.
For the second watermarking technique AWC (Nv = 1024, Nc = 256), (Ta-
ble B.5 - Table B.8), we can see that, when the collusion size ` is small (1 or 2),
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the detection probability is very good (∼ 0.99), even better than for the first wa-
termarking technique. However, when mixing more than 2 watermarked images,
the detection probabilities become worse like for the last watermarking technique.
For ` = 4, more than half of the time, we are not able to detect any watermark
from the attacked images, except from the ones that were subjected to the mod-
erated minority extreme attack. These results are similar to the one of the first
watermarking technique, but much better. In brief, the fusion attack resistance
of this second watermarking technique is better than the one of the first water-
marking technique, but the cost to pay is a larger computational complexity, due
to the increases of Nv and Nc.
The results for the proposed robust and secure watermarking technique are
quite different from the ones of the two above watermarking techniques. They are
provided in Tables B.9 to B.12. Firstly, when ` is small (1 or 2), the probability of
detecting no watermark is much bigger than the ones of two former watermarking
techniques; in detail, this probability increases by 0.14 when ` = 1, and 0.25 when
` = 2. Secondly, there is a small false watermark detection in this technique (with
a probability ∼ 0.01). For example, when the attacked image is done with two
different fingerprinted images, it is possible to detect three watermarks from this
attacked image. This is due to the compromise for choosing the threshold to get
an acceptable detection probability and a detection false alarm. Thirdly, except
these two weaknesses, this watermarking technique still has a big advantage. With
the increase of the collusion size `, the probability of detecting no watermark
decreases very slowly, while this probability decreases very quickly for the last
two watermarking techniques. This means that this watermarking technique has
potential in multimedia fingerprinting design, especially when ` is big.
5.3.2 Evaluation of Fingerprinting Code
The introduced accusation methods presented in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 amount
to the same accusation process as Skoric’s in Section 5.1.4 when Y′ is a singleton.
This occurs when the colluders choose the pure fingerprinting code attack of
Section 2.2.2. The attacks are just limited to the fingerprinting code layer (such
as: the block exchange attacked, which is just an exchange of the fingerprinted
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block to produce a pirated version), and do not touch the watermarking layer.
According to Skoric et al., one of their best attacks within this class is the so-
called ‘extremal’ strategy defined in [25, Eq.(58)]. These authors also noticed
that there exist an optimal shape parameter κ to counter-attack this worst case
scenario.
In our experiment, we set m = 300, q = 4, c = 20 and κ is varying from 0.1 to
0.5. Figure 5.1 shows the experimental measures of the expectations of the scores
of an innocent µI,0 and of a colluder µC,0. Figure 5.2 shows the experimental
measures of the variances of the scores of an innocent σ2I,0 and of a colluder
σ2C,0. Noticeable features of Skoric’s method are that µI,0 = 0 and σ
2
I,0 = m, our
experiments well verifies these features.
Furthermore, we assume that the scores are Gaussian distributed, therefore,
we can compute the Kullback Leibler distance DKL between the two pdfs of these
two scores as follows:
DKL(I;C) =
1
2
(
(µI − µC)2
σ2C
+
σ2I
σ2C
− 1 + log σ
2
C
σ2I
)
. (5.9)
I did not see your answer in the manuscript. ”you should motivate more why
you use the divergence as a comparison measure here. Why not the achievable
rate?” I did not see your answer in the manuscript. This distance roughly shows
the performances of the focused accusation process: the higher DKL is, the more
powerful is the test. The motivation for using this divergence as a comparison
measure is that: it does not need lots of test. For example, if we use the achiev-
able rate as the comparison measure, we should computer a lot of scores for the
colluders and innocent users to get a precise result. Figure 5.3 shows the Kullback
Leibler distance DKL for κ from 0.1 to 0.5, we can find that κ = 0.23 is optimal
for this experimental setup, which more or less confirms Skoric et al. optimal
value of 0.27. The slight difference is not surprising because we use a completely
different optimality criterion, while Skoric’s optimality criterion is the shortest
code length.
In this section, we just evaluate the performance of the fingerprinting code.
In the next section, we keep the same test conditions and take the effect brought
by the watermarking layer into account, and then give a comparison between
Skoric’s method and our two new proposed methods.
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5.3.3 Evaluations of Our New Accusation Methods
The new accusation methods of Section 5.2 enter in the picture when the col-
lusion chooses the fusion attacks of Secection 2.2.3. We repeat that classical
cryptographic fingerprinting codes are not designed for this kind of collusion.
Our proposal (the q-ary Tardos symmetric fingerprinting code, one of three pro-
posed zero-bit watermarkings, and one of two improved accusation functions)
raises interests if we can show that the fusion strategy is worse from the col-
luders’ point of view. Therefore, the collusion will reject it and it will stick to
the pure fingerprinting code attacks, for which fingerprinting codes have been
designed.
We first investigate how frequently our methods yield different score than the
regular Skoric’s accusation process. One necessary condition is that c colluders
have more than one hidden symbol at the i-th block. Table 5.2 shows that this
occurs with a probability greater than 0.57 if c ≥ 3. Another condition is that
the number of decoded symbols after the fusion is neither 0 nor q, else the sum-
mands at that index are zeros. The performances of the watermarking techniques
against the fusion attacks has a clear impact on this condition. Combining 12
tables (Tables B.1 to B.12) and Table 5.2, we easily have the probability of decod-
ing D symbols: P (D|c) = ∑min(q,c)d=1 P (D|d)P (d|c). Another 12 tables (Table C.1
- Table C.12) show that P (D = q|c) is negligible, and that P (D = 0|c) is slowly
increasing with c thanks to the good robustness of three proposed watermark-
ing techniques. Even for c = 20, our methods are active for more than 75%
blocks for the first two proposed watermarking techniques, and 66% blocks for
the third watermarking technique. Once again, the result confirms that the third
watermarking technique has less robustness than two others.
Now we compare the performances of our two new accusation methods de-
scribed in Section 5.2 with the one of Skoric’s method as done in Section 5.3.2.
The experimentation setup is the same. In order to simplify the test, we only test
one case at first: the images are watermarked by the AWC watermarking with
Nv=256 and Nc=64, then they are attacked by the averaging attack of ` images,
and finally followed by the JPEG compression with a quality factor Q = 20.
Therefore, the collusion is based on Table B.1 to simulate a fusion: whenever the
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c ` = 1 ` = 2 ` = 3 ` = 4
2 0.60 0.40 0 0
3 0.43 0.50 0.07 0
4 0.34 0.52 0.14 0.00
5 0.28 0.52 0.19 0.01
6 0.24 0.51 0.23 0.02
10 0.15 0.46 0.33 0.06
15 0.11 0.40 0.38 0.10
20 0.08 0.36 0.42 0.14
Table 5.2: The conditional probabilities P (`|c) that the colluders have ` water-
marked versions of a block for 2 ≤ c ≤ 20 and κ = 0.23.
collusion has ` different symbols, we randomly pick up D of them. Statistics are
established from 32,000 scores for the innocents and 8,000 scores for the colluders.
Figure 5.1 shows that the expectation of an innocent’s score is zero whereas the
one of the colluder is roughly the same for both methods and especially much
higher than previously. Figure 5.2 shows that the variance of the scores (inno-
cent’s and colluder’s) are smaller than previously for both methods. The first
method is very good at lowering σ2I whereas the second method has the smallest
σ2C . The overall performances measured by the Kullback Leibler distance in Fig-
ure 5.3 confirm that the collusion has no interest in adopting the fusion strategy
such as averaging attack.
Furthermore, to evaluate the overall performances of the different watermark-
ing techniques to against the different attacks, we compute the Kullback Leibler
distances between the innocent’s and colluder’s scores pdfs, for a fixed Dirichlet
distribution shape parameter κ = 0.23. We always use the block exchange attack
for Skoric’s accusation method. Figure 5.4 shows the results, we can see that
thanks to our proposed accusation methods, the Kullback Leibler distances after
all the fusion attack is higher than the one of the block exchange attack and
Skoric’s accusation method. Especially for the AWC watermarking with Nv =
256 and Nc = 64, the AWC watermarking with Nv = 1024 and Nc = 256, the
distances are increased by a factor of 3 to 8. However, our proposed accusation
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Figure 5.1: Expectation of an innocent’s (solid) and a colluder’s (dash) score
against Dirichlet distribution shape parameter κ for the block exchange attack
and Skoric’s accusation method, the averaging fusion attack and our first accu-
sation method, the averaging fusion attack and our second accusation method.
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Figure 5.2: Variance of an innocent (solid) and a colluder’s (dash) score against
Dirichlet distribution shape parameter κ for the block exchange attack and Sko-
ric’s accusation method, the averaging fusion attack and our first accusation
method, the averaging fusion attack and our second accusation method.
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Figure 5.3: Kullback Leibler distance between the innocent’s and colluder’s scores
pdfs against Dirichlet distribution shape parameter κ for the block exchange at-
tack and Skoric’s accusation method, the averaging fusion attack and our first ac-
cusation method, the averaging fusion attack and our second accusation method.
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methods do not get a lot of gain for the robust and secure watermarking, due to
its relatively weak robustness. Among the two proposed accusation methods, the
second one is better, since the Kullback Leibler distances are twice bigger, for the
first two watermarking techniques. All the four fusion attacks gave a comparative
distances for these different watermarking techniques and method, except that
the distances are slightly bigger after the moderated minority extreme attack.
Another practical issue is the value of the threshold Z. The following rela-
tionship holds for both methods:
µI = µI,0 , µC ≥ µC,0 (5.10)
σ2I ≤ σ2I,0 , σ2C ≤ σ2C,0 (5.11)
Therefore, if the length of the code is large enough to ensure required probabilities
of false alarm and false negative when comparing the scores to Z for the pure
fingerprinting attack such as the block exchange, then, this threshold will ensure
even lower probabilities of errors for the fusion attacks thanks to the performances
of our proposed methods. Consequently, our methods forces the collusion to reject
the fusion attacks and to stick to the pure fingerprinting code attacks, for which
fingerprinting codes have been designed. However, this statement is true only
when the Gaussian assumption holds, i.e. for m large enough. Because the
given Equation 5.9 to compute the Kullback Leibler distance is correct when the
innocent’s and colluder’s scores follow the Gaussian distributions.
5.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a complete multimedia fingerprinting system, which
is based on the symmetric q-ary Tardos fingerprinting code, and the three pro-
posed watermarking techniques in the last two chapters. This combination is
realized through the on-off keying modulation. In Section 5.1, we give a detailed
description for the whole multimedia fingerprinting system, which includes the
fingerprint construction, the fingerprint embedding, the fingerprint detection, and
the colluders’ accusation.
The detection of multiple fingerprints in one attacked block gives birth to two
extended accusation methods. This is thanks to the very robust watermarking
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Figure 5.4: Kullback Leibler distances between the innocent’s and colluder’s
scores pdfs for the Dirichlet distribution shape parameter κ = 0.23. In the x
axis, ‘0’ represents uniform exchange attack and Skoric’s accusation method, ‘1’
represents the AWC watermarking with Nv = 256 and Nc = 64, ‘2’ represents
the AWC watermarking with Nv = 1024 and Nc = 256, ‘3’ represents the ro-
bust and secure watermarking. And for our proposed two method, we test four
fusion attack: ‘a’ represents the averaging attack, ‘b’ represents the interleaving
attack, ‘c’ represents the maximum attack, ‘d’ represents the moderated minority
extreme attack.
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techniques used in the multimedia fingerprinting system. We have made a detailed
presentation of these two accusation methods in Section 5.2.
In Section 5.3, we evaluate the robustness of these watermarking techniques,
and then assess the fingerprinting code. Finally, we evaluate the overall perfor-
mance of the proposed system. The experimental investigations show the ingre-
dients of our proposed multimedia fingerprinting system blend into a very good
design, because it completely shuts down the fusion attacks. Following this strat-
egy, the fusion attacks help more the accusation process than they delude it, and
the colluders have no longer interest of using this class of attack. The collusion
is then back to the pure fingerprinting code attacks, which is fully tackled by the
fingerprinting code.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future
Perspectives
In this dissertation, we have studied various aspects of multimedia fingerprint-
ing for traitor tracing. Especially, we focused on the exploration of a robust
and secure watermarking for this application; and finally proposed a complete
multimedia fingerprinting system.
This thesis started from the study of the background and the state of the art
of the multimedia fingerprinting field. We give a general framework of multime-
dia fingerprinting system, and analyze the various attacks such a system has to
face. Furthermore, we also review the three historical approaches in the design of
multimedia fingerprinting systems: the cryptography and coding approach, the
signal processing approach, and the statistical approach. Contrary to these ap-
proaches, our goal in this thesis is to consider at the same time the design of the
anti-collusion code and the design of the watermarking scheme that will embed
the code into the content. This will provide us a global overview of the robustness
of the fingerprint embedding and the efficiency of the accusation process.
As the first requirement to provide an efficient tracing is to preserve the pres-
ence of a reliable fingerprint, we need a very robust watermarking scheme. We
then begin by focusing on the watermark layer. After the comparison of two
main categories of watermarking techniques: spread spectrum watermarking and
quantization based methods, we decided to explore the spread spectrum based
watermarking schemes, focusing on a very robust zero-bit watermarking tech-
nique ‘Broken Arrows’. However, even if this technique is very robust, it has
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been attacked by Westfeld denoising attack, which is the worst robustness attack
in the first episode of BOWS-2 contest. Hence, we propose in Chapter 3 two
improved embedding variants AWC and BWC to further increase its robustness
performance. These improvements perfectly prevent Westfeld denoising attack.
Based on these results, we then focus in Chapter 4 on the security of the
watermarking technique. As there are two known security attacks on Broken Ar-
rows scheme, published by Bas and Westfeld, we propose to counter both of them.
Thanks to our counterattacks, these security attacks are no longer threats. But
the cost is a small loss in robustness and an additional computational complexity.
Finally, in order to go further and address some worst unpublished threats and
get a higher security level, we proposed some modifications, and introduced a
novel secure watermarking scheme. This scheme is based on a contrario decision
test and a constrained maximization embedding method. However, we face once
again the same trade-off between security and robustness in this scheme, but we
believe that this scheme has some serious potential in multimedia fingerprinting.
We finally proposed in Chapter 5 a complete multimedia fingerprinting sys-
tem, which is based on the symmetric q-ary Tardos fingerprinting code, and
the three above proposed watermarking techniques via on-off keying modulation.
Thanks to the very good robustness of the underlying watermarking techniques,
we can detect multiple fingerprints in one attacked block, this giving birth to two
extended accusation methods. With the extended accusation methods, we eval-
uate the overall performance of the proposed multimedia fingerprinting system.
The experimental investigations show the ingredients of our proposed multimedia
fingerprinting system blend into a very good design, because the fusion attacks,
which are usually considered as very tricky to face, help more the accusation pro-
cess than they delude it. Hence, with this design, usually tackled attacks as block
exchange are still very well managed, and usually non tackled fusion attacks are
also efficiently countered.
Despite the work carried out in this thesis, there are still several interesting
research directions which are worth to be further explored.
1. We have met several times the trade-off between security and robustness
for our proposed watermarking techniques. It seems to be inherent to any
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watermarking scheme, but until now, to our best knowledge, there is no
unifying framework to study this problem. We think this study would be
an interesting direction if we want to get a breakthrough.
2. Our proposed robust and secure watermarking scheme is not perfectly se-
cure. It is only secure against second order statistics analysis tools. How-
ever, some high order statistics might leak information on the secret space.
Therefore, the issues now turn to be how many contents and computing
power a high order analysis requires to work accurately. We believe that it
is significantly more demanding, but it is necessary to quantify this gap in
the future.
3. The watermark detector outputs binary decision, which indicates the pres-
ence or absence of the watermarks (this includes potential multiple detec-
tions). The a contrario decision test of the proposed robust and secure
watermarking can indeed provide a probability of the presence of a given
symbol, this might allow a soft output bringing more information for the
accusation step. This idea is also the subject of our next work.
4. In this thesis, we tried to design a robust and secure watermarking for mul-
timedia fingerprinting, as it can resist certain robustness attacks, security
attacks, and fusion attacks. However, there are certainly some other at-
tacks exited. Such as, the de-synchronization attack [90], which is caused
by intentional or non-intentional geometric transformation of the host sig-
nal; and stable neighboring frames attack [91], in which the pirate exchange
the perceptually similar frames to puzzle the fingerprint detection process.
We should also test our proposed multimedia fingerprinting system by these
attacks and propose some countermeasures. So our work is not finished, the
game between the designer and the attacker continues.
5. We have not studied some rare fingerprinting schemes such as asymmet-
ric fingerprinting [92], anonymous fingerprinting [93], dynamic traitor trac-
ing [94]. So we are not sure that the proposed watermarking techniques in
this thesis also works well for these rare schemes, it is interesting to verify
it in future work.
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Appendix A
Re´sume´ Franc¸ais (Version
Longue)
A.1 Introduction
L’avance´e des technologies des te´le´communications et la vulgarisation des re´seaux
a` haut de´bit ont facilite´ la distribution et le partage de documents multime´dia.
Elle a aussi en paralle`le facilite´ la duplication illimite´e des documents, leur mod-
ification arbitraire, ou encore leur redistribution ille´gale. Cette dernie`re viole
ine´vitablement la proprie´te´ intellectuelle des ayants droit des documents mul-
time´dias concerne´s, et il est ne´cessaire aujourd’hui de disposer de moyens de
protection adapte´s, pour leur conserver cette facilite´ de diffusion, tout en lim-
itant les risques de piratage. De nombreux travaux ont e´te´ mene´s depuis une
vingtaine d’anne´es sur ce sujet, meˆlant principalement des techniques venant de
la cryptographie et/ou du traitement du signal, comme le chiffrement, la signa-
ture, le tatouage, etc. On arrive aujourd’hui a` une certaine maturite´ dans la
conception de tels syste`mes de protection, mais il reste encore de nombreux de´fis
a` relever.
Le trac¸age de documents multimedia est une des solutions apporte´es pour
prote´ger les droits d’auteur. Elle vise a` personnaliser les documents au moment
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de leur de´livrance, en y inse´rant de manie`re imperceptible, graˆce a` une technique
de tatouage, des messages spe´cifiques afin d’identifier leurs utilisateurs. Ainsi,
en cas de redistribution ille´gale de ces documents, on espe`re pouvoir remonter
la piste des utilisateurs qui sont a` l’origine de cette redistribution. Toutefois, les
pirates ne sont pas stupides : afin d’e´viter d’eˆtre accuse´s, ils emploient une grande
varie´te´ d’attaques pour supprimer ces messages. L’objectif de cette the`se est de
concevoir un tel syste`me, qui re´siste aux attaques, qu’elles soient intentionnelles
ou non. Ce syste`me doit eˆtre : 1) robuste aux manipulations ge´ne´riques clas-
siques de traitement du signal (compression, filtres, etc) qui tentent de lessiver le
message cache´ tout en pre´servent une qualite´ acceptable pour l’utilisateur ; 2) suˆr
contre des attaques ayant trait a` la se´curite´, attaques plus cible´es et de´die´es, dont
l’objectif est de retrouver les cle´s secre`tes du syste`me en observant beaucoup de
contenus tatoue´s ; 3) re´sistant aux attaques par collusion, au cours desquelles les
utilisateurs malveillants ou pirates me´langent leurs copies pour forger un contenu
non perceptuellement e´quivalent, mais non prote´ge´. La conception d’un sche´ma
de trac¸age de documents multime´dia repose ainsi sur un sche´ma de tatouage,
qui va cacher les messages de manie`res les plus robuste et suˆre possibles, et un
code anti-collusion, qui va de´terminer la structure-meˆme des messages que l’on
va cacher, et qui va permettre de contrer les attaques par collusion, remontant
aux origines du message contenu dans le document forge´ par les pirates.
Dans cette the`se, nous adressons ces trois types d’attaques, au travers des
deux couches du syste`mes, a` savoir tatouage et code anti-collusion. Nous nous
appuyons sur un sche´ma de tatouage appele´ “Broken Arrows”, qui a e´te´ mis a`
l’e´preuve en 2007-2008 durant le concours BOWS-2. Nous nous inte´ressons tout
d’abord a` l’ame´lioration de sa robustesse, puis de sa se´curite´. Puis nous montrons
comment l’associer a` un code anti-collusion, ici un code de Tardos, pour contrer
les attaques par collusion et construire un syste`me complet et efficace de trac¸age
de documents multime´dia.
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Depuis le premier article e´crit par Wagner en 1983 [6], beaucoup de travaux
ont e´te´ publie´s. Ils traitent principalement des attaques que les pirates peuvent
imaginer, de la conception de codes anti-collusion, ou encore de la combinaison
entre le code de trac¸age et certaines techniques de tatouage classiques. Dans cette
section, nous pre´sentons brie`vement le cadre ge´ne´ral de ces e´tudes et re´sumons
des progre`s significatifs re´alise´s ces dernie`res anne´es.
Un sche´ma de trac¸age de documents multime´dia complet ressemble a` une
chaˆıne de communication, avec un e´metteur qui ge´ne`re le message d’identification
et le cache avec une technique de tatouage, un canal qui mode´lise les attaques
que le document risque de subir apre`s sa distribution, et un re´cepteur qui va
extraire le message cache´ afin de confondre le(s) fraudeur(s). Un tel sche´ma
peut e´galement eˆtre conside´re´ comme compose´ de trois modules : un module de
codage (code anti-collusion), un module de transmission (tatouage) et un canal
d’attaques, comme le montre la Figure 2.1.
Nous allons tout d’abord traiter des diverses attaques qui peuvent affecter
le syste`me. Une compre´hension approfondie de ces attaques est essentielle pour
concevoir un syste`me de trac¸age de documents multime´dia efficace. Ces attaques
peuvent eˆtre classe´es en trois cate´gories, en fonction de leurs objectifs. 1) Les at-
taques qui ciblent le module de tatouage peuvent eˆtre classe´es en deux familles :
les attaques lie´e a` la robustesse du sche´ma, et les attaques lie´es a` sa se´curite´. Pour
les contrer, il faut utiliser un sche´ma de tatouage robuste et suˆr. 2) Les attaques
qui ciblent le module de codage anti-collusion sans chercher a` mettre en de´faut
le module de tatouage, me´langent les diffe´rentes copies que les utilisateurs ont
rec¸ues d’un meˆme document, par exemple en intercalant des morceaux provenant
des unes et des autres. Ces me´langes ont e´te´ mode´lise´s de diffe´rentes manie`res,
dont la plus populaire et la plus ancienne est la “Marking Assumption” [11].
Pour les contrer, il faut utiliser un code anti-collusion efficace. 3) Les attaques
par fusion fusionnent les copies pour forger le document pirate, par exemple en
les moyennent pixel a` pixel. Elles sont faciles a` re´aliser par les pirates, mais
difficiles a` appre´hender pour le concepteur du syste`me, car leurs conse´quences
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sur les messages cache´s sont difficiles a` pre´voir car les messages ne se retrou-
vent plus me´lange´s comme pre´ce´demment. Pour les contrer, il faut un sche´ma
de tatouage suffisamment robuste pour permettre, malgre´ la fusion, de retrouver
des informations fiables sur les messages implique´s dans la forge du document,
puis avoir un code anti-collusion efficace. Contrairement aux deux pre´ce´dentes
familles d’attaques, qui peuvent eˆtre teste´es facilement module par module, on
ne peut envisager d’e´tude de la robustesse a´ ce troisie`me type d’attaques sans
regarder le syste`me dans son ensemble. Zhao et al. ont donne´ une description
assez comple`te d’attaques non line´aires de ce type dans [7] [8], tandis que H.
G. Schaathun a introduit plusieurs attaques par collusion pour des syste`mes de
trac¸age de documents multime´dia reposant sur des techniques de tatouage util-
isant l’e´talement de spectre [41] [9]. Aujourd’hui, ces attaques par fusion restent
l’enjeu principal lors de la conception de syste`mes de trac¸age de documents mul-
time´dia.
Dans la litte´rature, on distingue plusieurs approches pour la conception d’un
sche´ma de trac¸age de documents multime´dia. Il y a tout d’abord l’approche des
chercheurs en cryptographie et codes correcteurs d’erreurs, qui a donne´ lieu a` de
tre`s nombreuses publications et fait abstraction de la couche d’insertion pour se
focaliser sur la conception du code anti-collusion. Ces premiers travaux remontent
a` [6] (en 1983) et [10] (en 1986). Plus tard, Boneh et Shaw ont introduit un
mode`le formel d’e´tude, dit de la “Marking Assumption”, dans lequel ils supposent
que les e´le´ments du document qui sont communs a` tous les membres de la collusion
resteront inchange´s dans le document forge´. Dans ce cadre, ils ont e´galement
introduit des proprie´te´s utiles a` la mesure de la capacite´ a` tracer des codes anti-
collusion, et ont propose´ un code binaire qui les satisfait [11]. Ce code a e´te´
ame´liore´ par la suite par Yacobi pour application a` des signaux multime´dias [12].
Beaucoup de travaux se sont place´s dans ce mode`le, dont [13] et [14], qui ont
introduit dans ce cadre de nouvelles proprie´te´s lie´es aux capacite´s de trac¸age des
codes, comme la proprie´te´ de parent identifiable (IPP) ou encore le code trac¸able
(TA), plus fortes mais aussi plus contraignantes que celles initialement propose´es
par Boneh et Shaw. Les codes IPP ou TA ne peuvent pas accuser un innocent, et
sont dits a` trac¸abilite´ forte. Les codes qui peuvent parfois accuser un innocent,
avec une probabilite´ non nulle mais maˆıtrise´e sont dits a` trac¸abilite´ faible. Mais
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la trac¸abilite´ forte n’est pas accessible dans la pratique [15] [16], et on est donc
contraints d’utiliser dans des sche´mas ope´rationnels des codes a` trac¸abilie´ faible.
Ainsi, tous les codes mentionne´s dans cette the`se relv`ent de cette cate´gorie, et
peuvent parfois accuser un innocent, avec une probabilite´ d’erreur borne´e.
Plus re´cemment, une autre approche a e´te´ de´veloppe´e en paralle`le par les
chercheurs en traitement du signal, et notamment a` l’universite´ du Maryland.
Wang et al. ont utilise´ tout d’abord les signaux mutuellement inde´pendants
(ou orthogonaux) comme les signaux de trac¸age pour identifier les pirates [17].
En raison de la charge de calcul au de´codage, Trappe et al. ont employe´ plus
tard un code modulant des signaux inde´pendants pour construire les signaux
redondants [18]. En outre, afin de rendre leur syste`me de trac¸age de docu-
ments multime´dia plus efficace, certaines strate´gies accessoires ont e´te´ intro-
duites [19] [20] [21]. Enfin, certaines applications de trac¸age de documents mul-
time´dia ont e´te´ explore´es [22] [23].
En paralle`le, une perce´e a e´te´ effectue´e en 2003 lorsqu’un statisticien, G. Tar-
dos, a publie´ un nouveau code anti-collusion probabiliste binaire dont la longueur
a un ordre de grandeur the´oriquement minimum [24], et qui plus est est simple a`
mettre en œuvre et efficace. Par la suite, Skoric et al. ont e´tendu ce code de Tar-
dos original de binaire a` q-aire [25]. D’autres ame´liorations qui e´te´ propose´es, afin
de re´duire la longueur du code de Tardos [26] [27] [28] [29], d’optimiser la me´moire
d’utilisation [30], ou encore pour ame´liorer les fonctions accusations [31] [32].
Mais la plupart des publications se focalisent sur la conception du code anti-
collusion, laissant a` d’autres le soin de concevoir la couche d’insertion. Or, si
l’on souhaite obtenir un sche´ma ope´rationnel, il faut ajuster les deux couches
au mieux, et cela ne peut eˆtre obtenu qu’avec une vision globale du syste`me,
sans rien laisser de coˆte´. C’est cette voie que nous avons suivie, choisissant au
mieux les primitives d’insertion et de trac¸age, et les adaptant au besoin pour les
articuler efficacement. Dans les sections suivantes, nous allons montrer comment
choisir une technique de tatouage ade´quate, ici issue de l’ame´lioration du sche´ma
de tatouage “Broken Arrows”, puis nous montrerons comment l’articuler avec
un code de Tardos lui aussi ame´liore´ pour construire un sche´ma de trac¸age de
documents multime´dia complet et efficace.
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uments Multime´dia
N’importe quel sche´ma de trac¸age de documents multime´dia que l’on souhaite
robuste et suˆr doit s’appuyer sur une technique de tatouage robuste et suˆre pour
inse´rer les codes d’identification des utilisateurs. Toutefois, concevoir une tech-
nique de tatouage robuste et suˆre est un travail difficile, puisque la robustesse
et la se´curite´ sont deux concepts tre`s diffe´rents [62] [63] [64]. Ce sont deux as-
pects indispensables mais parfois contradictoires du tatouage. Afin de choisir une
technique de tatouage approprie´e, nous comparons la robustesse et la se´curite´ de
deux familles principales de tatouage: les me´thodes base´es sur l’e´talement de
spectre et les me´thodes base´es sur la quantification. Certains travaux ante´rieurs
montrent que les me´thodes base´es sur la quantification de´passent en performance
les me´thodes base´es sur l’e´talement de spectre dans le sens des crite`res tradi-
tionnels d’e´valuation de tatouage : la distorsion et la robustesse. Toutefois, elles
ont des niveaux de se´curite´ relativement faible. Nous avons donc choisi de nous
concentrer sur les techniques par e´talement de spectre. Cayre et Bas ont propose´
deux nouvelles modulations de tatouage dans le cadre de ‘Watermarked-Only-
Attack’ (uniquement les contenus tatoue´s sont disponibles pour l’attaquant), ap-
pele´es “tatouage naturel” et “tatouage circulaire” [78]. Ces sche´mas conside`rent
la se´curite´ comme une priorite´, et puis e´valuent la robustesse. Mais la perte
en robustesse est assez grande par rapport aux techniques robustes re´centes, et
pour cette raison nous avons choisi de regarder dans une autre direction. Nous
avons pre´fe´re´ nous appuyer sur une technique de tatouage ze´ro-bit tre`s robuste
appele´e ‘Broken Arrows’, qui, puis nous nous sommes attache´s a` ame´liorer encore
sa robustesse, puis sa se´curite´. Dans cette section, nous nous concentrons sur la
robustesse, la se´curite´ e´tant traite´e dans la section suivante.
‘Broken Arrows’ [33] a e´te´ conc¸u pour le deuxie`me concours de ‘Break Our
Watermarking System’ (BOWS-2) [34]. Ses performances en termes de la ro-
bustesse et d’imperceptibilite´ sont tre`s bonnes en comparaison a` l’e´tat de l’art.
Comme par ailleurs il a e´te´ intensivement mis a` l’e´preuve pendant le concours de
BOWS-2 et qu’il a bien re´siste´, il constitue une base de travail solide. Toutefois,
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‘Broken Arrows’ a e´te´ attaque´ par A. Westfeld [39] dans le premier e´pisode du
concours de BOWS-2. Westfeld a conc¸u une attaque spe´cifique, qui peut eˆtre
conside´re´ comme un processus de de´bruitage. Cette attaque est principalement
base´e sur l’estimation de l’amplitudes du coefficient d’ondelette en fonction des
coefficients de son voisinage par une re´gression line´aire. Notre objectif ici est de
fournir une version ame´liore´e de ‘Broken Arrows’, robuste contre cette attaque
spe´cifique, tout en restant robuste aux attaques ge´ne´riques habituelles.
Afin de renforcer la robustesse de ‘Broken Arrows’, nous proposons deux direc-
tions d’ame´lioration : (i) e´quilibrer les coefficients d’ondelette de trois sous-bandes
dans le meˆme niveau de transformation (BWC) et (ii) calculer la moyenne du co-
efficient d’ondelette avec ses quatre voisins dans la meˆme sous-bande (AWC).
La premie`re ame´lioration consiste a` corre´ler les coefficients des trois sous-bandes
dans le meˆme niveau de transformation d’ondelette (voir Figure 3.2). Intuitive-
ment, ce type d’insertion ame´liore la de´pendance entre les sous-bandes des co-
efficients d’ondelette du signal de tatouage. Cette solution est de´taille´e dans la
sous-section 3.3.1. La deuxie`me solution ame´liore la robustesse du sche´ma en
prenant en compte la de´pendance entre les coefficients voisins (voir Figure 3.3).
L’ide´e principale est inspire´e directement par l’attaque de de´bruitage de West-
feld. Nous remplac¸ons tous les coefficients d’ondelette du masque visuel par une
moyenne de cinq coefficients : lui-meˆme et ses quatre voisins locaux. De cette
fac¸on, le signal de tatouage peut modifier les signes des coefficients des signaux
hoˆtes. Comme BWC, cette me´thode AWC est e´galement une solution efficace
pour faire face a` l’attaque de de´bruitage de Westfeld. Elle est de´taille´e dans la
sous-section 3.3.2.
Pour e´valuer ces ame´lioration, nous avons utilise´e la base des 2000 images de
taille 512 × 512 de BOWS-2, et les meˆmes conditions de test que dans [33], soit
avec un PSNR souhaite´ de 43dB. Dans nos simulations, trois strate´gies diffe´rentes
sont compare´es : l’insertion proportionnelle originale BA de Broken Arrows, les
insertions proportionnelles de BWC et d’AWC. Si nous conside´rons par exemple
l’image “sheep”, le PSNR commente´ est 43 dB, le PSNR re´el d’image tatoue´e est
42.88 dB pour BA, 42.88 dB pour BWC et 42.81 dB pour AWC. Nous savons
qu’avec un PSNR supe´rieur a` 40 dB, les amplitudes des coefficients d’ondelette
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du signal de tatouage sont presque tous infe´rieurs a` 1 pour BA, donc BA con-
serve tous les signes des coefficients d’ondelette. En fait, conforme´ment a` l’essai
pour l’image “sheep”, seulement 0.76% des coefficients d’ondelette voient leur
signe modifie´ par le processus d’insertion BA. Par conse´quent, nous pouvons dire
que le signal de tatouage est alors uniquement cache´ dans l’amplitude. Mais les
normes du signal de tatouage des deux techniques ame´liore´es sont plus grandes,
et le tatouage modifie certains signes des coefficients d’ondelette. Dans notre sim-
ulation, 2.36% des coefficients d’ondelette ont change´ leur signe apre`s l’insertion
proportionnelle BWC, et 2.16% des coefficients d’ondelette ont change´ leur signe
apre`s l’insertion proportionnelle AWC. Par conse´quent, le signal de tatouage
est non seulement cache´ dans les amplitudes des coefficients d’ondelette, mais
e´galement dans leurs signes.
De manie`re ge´ne´rale, sur les 2000 images, le PSNR re´el des images tatoue´es est
compris entre 42.5 dB et 43 dB. Comme BA, les distorsions sont invisibles pour
presque toutes les images lors de l’utilisation des me´thodes d’insertion BWC ou
AWC. Nous appliquons tout d’abord le meˆme benchmark sur les images tatoue´es
que celui qui avait e´te´ applique´ dans [33] : un certain nombre d’attaques, prin-
cipalement compose´es des compressions JPEG et JPEG 2000 a` des facteurs de
qualite´ varie´s, de filtrage passe-bas, d’effacement de sous-bandes ondelette et un
algorithme de de´bruitage simple. La probabilite´ de de´tecter la marque est donne´e
pour la moyenne du PSNR des images attaque´es (voir Figure 3.9). L’impact sur
la probabilite´ de de´tection est inte´ressant : chaque technique d’insertion a son
avantage pour re´sister a` des attaques diffe´rentes, mais la performance globale
de l’insertion proportionnelle BWC est moins bonne que celle des deux autres
techniques.
Nous avons ensuite e´value´ la robustesse des trois techniques d’insertion (BA,
BWC et AWC) contre l’attaque de de´bruitage de Westfeld. Pour obtenir un
re´sultat comparable avec l’expe´rience ci-dessus, nous gardons les meˆmes condi-
tions de test et utilisons les meˆmes 2000 images. Les PSNRs des images attaque´es
vont de 19.9 a` 46.2 dB. Ce re´sultat est presque identique a` celui de Westfeld (de
19.7 a` 45.0 dB). Nous calculons les pourcentages des images attaque´es avec succe`s
pour un PSNR moyen donne´ (voir Figure 3.10). Les re´sultats expe´rimentaux mon-
trent que, pour BA, l’attaque de de´bruitage de Westfeld est vraiment puissante.
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Elle re´ussit a` 100% lorsque le PSNR est infe´rieur a` 30 dB, et meˆme si son efficacite´
diminue lorsque le PSNR croˆıt, elle re´ussit avec 40% des images attaque´es lorsque
le PSNR est environ de 35 dB. Au contraire, pour BWC, l’attaque de de´bruitage
de Westfeld ne fonctionne pas du tout : le pourcentage des images attaque´es avec
succe`s est de 0% pour tous les PSNRs. Et pour AWC, l’attaque de de´bruitage de
Westfeld fonctionne tre`s peu pour les images qui ont un PSNR de 26 a` 32 dB.
Une de nos deux techniques d’insertion ame´liore´es est suffisante pour faire face
a` l’attaque de de´bruitage de Westfeld. Toutefois, un peu de robustesse est per-
due contre certaines attaques classiques, notamment pour la me´thode d’insertion
proportionnelle BWC. Par conse´quent, afin d’e´viter l’attaque de de´bruitage de
Westfeld ainsi que les autres, nous devons faire un compromis, et la me´thode
d’insertion proportionnelle AWC semble eˆtre le meilleur choix.
A.4 Tatouage Suˆr pour Le Trac¸age de Docu-
ments Multime´dia
Dans la dernie`re section, nous avons se´lectionne´ ‘Broken Arrows’ comme tech-
nique de tatouage pour notre syste`me de trac¸age de documents multime´dia,
et propose´ des ame´liorations pour renforcer sa robustesse contre l’attaque de
de´bruitage de A. Westfeld [39]. Toutefois, des failles de se´curite´ ont e´te´ de´couvertes
pendant le troisie`me e´pisode de BOWS-2, au cours duquel les participants pou-
vaient observer beaucoup d’images tatoue´es avec la meˆme cle´ secre`te. Discute´es [5],
elles empeˆchent clairement l’utilisation du ‘Broken Arrows’ original dans le cadre
du trac¸age de documents multime´dia. Aussi, nous proposons ici des contre-
mesures pour ame´liorer les niveaux de se´curite´ et contrer ces deux attaques.
Comme nous l’avons mentionne´ dans la dernie`re section, la me´thode d’insertion
proportionnelle AWC est efficace pour empeˆcher l’attaque de de´bruitage de A.
Westfeld, tout en conservant une bonne robustesse contre les attaques habituelles.
Mais son impact sur les niveaux de se´curite´ n’a jamais e´te´ examine´ plus avant.
Cependant, comme l’attaque de regroupement de A. Westfeld, qui e´tait la plus ef-
ficace lors du troisie`me e´pisode de BOWS-2 [34], repose en partie sur l’attaque de
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de´bruitage de A. Westfeld e´voque´e plus haut, AWC devrait empeˆcher l’estimation
des signaux de tatouage, neutralisant l’attaque de regroupement, qui ne peut
plus faire une bonne classification des signaux de tatouage. Afin de confirmer
cette ide´e, nous avons reprogramme´ l’attaque de regroupement de A. Westfeld
sous Matlab, dans les meˆmes conditions. Nous avons mesure´ sa pre´cision par
l’information mutuelle ajuste´e (voir Figure 4.1). Pour la technique d’insertion
BA, l’information mutuelle ajuste´e est de 0.7 ; cela signifie que les groupes es-
time´s sont tre`s similaires aux vrais groupes, et donc l’attaque de regroupement
re´ussit a` estimer les coˆnes secrets avec une bonne pre´cision. Toutefois, ce classi-
fieur ne fonctionne pas avec notre me´thode d’insertion ame´liore´e AWC, puisque
l’information mutuelle ajuste´e est infe´rieure a` 0.05. La technique d’insertion
proportionnelle AWC est donc effectivement une solution efficace pour bloquer
l’attaque de regroupement de A. Westfeld.
L’attaque d’estimation de sous-espace de P. Bas n’utilise pas l’attaque de
de´bruitage de A. Westfeld. Cependant, nous savons que cette attaque d’estimation
de sous-espace par des techniques de type PCA, via l’imple´mentation OPAST,
est base´e sur le fait que l’insertion modifie la distribution des puissances du sig-
nal dans l’espace secret. Cela laisse un indice pour divulguer cet espace. Par
conse´quent, nous proposons un outil pour mesurer la diffe´rence de puissance en-
tre une direction se´lectionne´e comme un support de coˆne secret et une direc-
tion quelconque. Nous proposons un re´glage des parame`tres du syste`me pour
re´duire cette diffe´rence. Nous de´finissons une distance chordale carre´e normalise´e
: SCDnorm, ou` SCDnorm = 0 signifie que l’espace estime´ est e´gal a` l’espace se-
cret, et SCDnorm = 1 signifie que les sous-espaces sont orthogonaux et que, par
conse´quent, l’attaque a e´choue´. Le re´sultat expe´rimental montre que (voir Fig-
ure 4.4), pour la technique d’insertion initiale, SCDnorm est de´croissant avec le
nombre d’observations, et l’estimation converge tre`s rapidement. Cela confirme
les re´sultats de P. Bas [5]. Toutefois, pour la technique d’insertion AWC avec
les nouveaux parame`tres, SCDnorm diminue tre`s lentement : meˆme apre`s 3.10
4
observations, SCDnorm est toujours tre`s proche de 1 (plus de 0.9), ce qui montre
que l’attaque ne peut plus estimer les sous-espaces efficacement.
Nous appliquons a` nouveau le meˆme benchmark que dans l’article origi-
nal de BA pour examiner l’incidence sur la robustesse cause´e par les nouvelles
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ame´liorations propose´es. Le re´sultat montre que la robustesse est le´ge`rement
diminue´e. En d’autres termes, notre contre-mesure donne une grande ame´lioration
des niveaux de se´curite´ en sacrifiant un peu de robustesse.
Jusqu’a` pre´sent, nous avons e´voque´ BA comme une technique d’insertion ze´ro-
bit, inde´pendemment de tout sce´nario. Dans l’application de trac¸age de docu-
ments multime´dia, BA est utilise´e en conjonction avec un code anti-collusion,
plus pre´cise´ment un code de Tardos en version q-aire. Par conse´quent, nous
avons adapte´ la technique de tatouage a` la modulation ‘on-off keying’. L’espace
secret est de´compose´ en q sous-espaces : chacun entre eux rassemble les directions
de coˆnes secrets associe´es a` un symbole. E´tant donne´ que les symboles inse´re´s
sont distribue´s uniforme´ment, toutes les directions des sous-espaces secrets ont
la meˆme probabilite´ de servir comme porteuse du coˆne secret. De cette fac¸on, la
re´partition de la puissance du signal de tatouage dans l’espace secret est beau-
coup plus uniforme qu’avant, et le niveau de se´curite´ de la technique de tatouage
est encore renforce´.
En premie`re conclusion, on peut dire qu’ame´liorer le niveau de se´curite´ nous
a couˆte´ un peu en robustesse par rapport a` la technique de BA originale, et
les processus d’insertion et de de´tection sont ralentis d’un facteur 4. Dans
l’ensemble, et compte tenu du gain en se´curite´, cette ame´lioration est d’ores et
de´ja` satistfaisante. Ne´anmoins, nous proposons d’aller plus loin afin d’anticiper
sur d’autres attaques potentielles. Il est par exemple possible pour le pirate
d’utiliser des imple´mentations de PCA plus puissantes que OPAST, et de col-
lecter plus d’images tatoue´es pour divulguer l’espace secret.
Nous proposons donc de repartir de notre premie`re ame´lioration, et de la ren-
forcer pour contrer des attaques base´es sur des statistiques de second ordre, en
restituant une distribution de puissance parfaitement uniforme. Ces changements
comprennent 1) l’introduction d’un crite`re de se´curite´, 2) un processus d’insertion
mis en œuvre comme une maximisation de la robustesse, sous les contraintes de la
perception et de la se´curite´, et 3) une de´tection de tatouage base´e sur un crite`re de
de´cision a contrario. Commenc¸ons par la de´tection a contrario. Nous savons que
BA projette beaucoup de coefficients d’ondelette de l’image dans un sous-espace
secret de dimension tre`s faible, ce qui rend le vecteur projecte´ Gaussien. Partant
de ce fait, nous proposons un paradigme tre`s diffe´rent, base´ sur la de´tection a
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contrario en statistiques. La de´tection valide une des deux hypothe`ses H0 ou H1
selon certaines observations. Le cadre est le suivant : le mode`le statistique est
suppose´ sous hypothe`se H0 avec une distribution pH0 , mais l’alternative H1 est
beaucoup trop large pour soutenir un tel mode`le, et/ou ce qui se passe sous H1
n’est pas bien connu. Par conse´quent, le de´tecteur e´value la probabilite´ d’avoir
ces observations sous pH0 , et si cet e´ve´nement est peu probable il de´cide H1.
Nous appliquons exactement la meˆme ide´e a` notre application : pour les images
naturelles originales, nous supposons que le vecteur projecte´ a une distribution
Gaussienne. La de´tection du tatouage est de´clenche´e quand ce vecteur n’a pas
cette distribution typique. Par conse´quent, l’insertion de tatouage e´quivaut a`
rendre le vecteur projecte´ non typique autant que possible au regard de pH0 .
Discutons maintenant comment ce concept est mis en œuvre. Nous supposons
ici que nous avons extrait un vecteur Gaussien vX a` partir du contenu hoˆte, et
qu’un PSNR souhaite´ controˆle l’insertion de tatouage. Nous avons besoin de
trois fonctions pendant l’insertion: 1) une fonction de qualite´, qui suppose que
le PSNR souhaite´ impose une contrainte sur la puissance du signal de tatouage
pour controˆler la distorsion perceptuelle, 2) une fonction de se´curite´, qui assure
qu’une attaque de type PCA e´chouera en assurant que la puissance du signal
tatoue´ dans l’espace secret, en moyenne, est e´gale a` celle qui figure dans l’espace
comple´mentaire, 3) une fonction de Gaussianite´ qui est en fait la fonction de
test d’Anderson-Darling, utilise´e pour de´cider si le vecteur secret suit la distri-
bution Gaussienne ou non. A l’insertion, nous utilisons cette dernie`re comme
fonction objective, les deux premie`res fonctions e´tant prises comme contraintes.
L’insertion de tatouage est une maximisation sous contraintes : elle recherche le
vecteur de tatouage qui maximise cette fonction objective sous les deux fonctions
de contrainte. A notre connaissance, c’est la premie`re fois que la se´curite´ est
prise en compte de manie`re aussi formelle lors de la conception d’un algorithme
d’insertion de tatouage.
Comme la qualite´ perceptuelle et le niveau de se´curite´ du syste`me de tatouage
propose´ sont assure´es lors de la ge´ne´ration du signal de tatouage, nous e´valuons
ici seulement sa robustesse. Nos expe´riences montrent sa bonne robustesse contre
une attaque par ajout de bruit (voir Figure 4.8). Par ailleurs, nous e´valuons les
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performances de robustesse avec le meˆme benchmark qu’auparavant (voir Fig-
ure 4.9). Les re´sultats montrent que, en ge´ne´ral, la robustesse cette nouvelle
technique de tatouage propose´e est plus faible que celle des pre´ce´dentes. Pour
une attaque donne´e, la probabilite´ de bonne de´tection des images attaque´es est
plus ou moins la meˆme que celle des techniques pre´ce´dentes. Cependant, cette
technique est beaucoup moins fiable que les pre´ce´dentes parce que la probabilite´
de fausse alarme ici est ici de 1.10−2 alors que celles des pre´ce´dentes e´taient a`
3.10−6. C’est le prix a` payer pour avoir un excellent niveau de se´curite´. En-
fin, nous estimons sa robustesse contre les attaques de collusion dans le cas
binaire (q = 2) : attaque par moyennage, attaque par entrelacement, attaque
“maximum”, attaque “minimum” et attaque “uniforme” (voir Table 4.1). Les
re´sultats montrent que toutes ces attaques permettent une de´tection double avec
une grande probabilite´ (94%), ce qui ame´liore conside´rablement les performances
de l’algorithme de trac¸age [88]. Nous pensons que ce sche´ma est particulie`rement
adapte´ a` certaines applications comme le trac¸age de document multime´dia, car
alors la probabilite´ de fausse alarme n’est plus un proble`me. Par ailleurs, le test
de de´cision a contrario peut aussi fournir une probabilite´ de la pre´sence d’un sym-
bole donne´ dans le tatouage, et fournir une information non plus dure (pre´sence
ou absence), mais souple, apportant plus d’information pour l’e´tape d’accusation
du code anti-collusion.
A.5 Un Syste`me Complet, Suˆr et Robuste de
Trac¸age de Documents Multime´dia
Dans cette section, nous proposons un syste`me complet de trac¸age de documents
multime´dia, base´ sur le code de Tardos en version q-aire syme´trique, introduit
par Skoric et al. [25], et les trois techniques de tatouage pre´sente´es dans les
deux sections pre´ce´dentes. Cette combinaison est re´alise´e par une modulation
de type on-off keying. En re´sume´, le syste`me complet de trac¸age de documents
multime´dia comprend la construction du code, l’insertion des symbole, puis la
de´tection de ces symboles, et enfin l’accusation de colluders. En particulier,
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le contenu multime´dia est divise´ en blocs conse´cutifs, chaque bloc permettant
de cacher un symbole de l’identifiant. L’accusation s’effectue apre`s calcul des
scores des utilisateurs teste´s, scores obtenus a` l’aide de fonctions d’accusations,
applique´s a` leurs identifiants et au mot extrait du contenu pirate´. Plus le score
d’un utilisateur est e´leve´, plus il a de chance d’eˆtre coupable. Dans un premier
temps, nous avons utilise´ les meˆmes fonctions d’accusation que Skoric et al.
Toutefois, d’apre`s les re´sultats expe´rimentaux de la de´tection de symboles, et
graˆce a` la tre`s grande robustesse des techniques de tatouage utilise´es, plusieurs
symboles peuvent eˆtre de´tecte´s dans un bloc attaque´. Comme la fonction d’accusation
originale de Skoric ne profite pas de toute l’information des symboles de´code´s,
nous proposons deux ame´lioration pour en tirer profit. Dans la premie`re me´thode,
nous prenons tous les symboles de´tecte´s d’un bloc comme les ope´randes dans la
somme du score. De cette manie`re, tout se passe comme si la longueur du code
avait augmente´. Comme nous le savons, plus long est le code de trac¸age, plus
fiable est le processus d’accusation. Par conse´quent, cette me´thode propose´e est
plus fiable que l’originale. Dans la deuxie`me me´thode, nous gardons le meˆme score
que Skoric, mais remplac¸ons la probabilite´ du symbole de´tecte´ par la somme des
probabilite´s de tous les symboles de´tecte´s dans le bloc attaque´. La justification
de cette me´thode est qu’elle diminue la variance des scores des colluders : quel
que soit leur symbole dans la liste des symboles de´tecte´s, ils rec¸oivent la meˆme
pe´nalisation.
Dans nos expe´riences, nous e´valuons tout d’abord la robustesse des trois tech-
niques de tatouage contre des attaques de type fusion, conside´re´e comme difficiles
a` contrer. Nous appliquons quatre attaques de collusion typiques : 1) l’attaque
par moyennage, 2) l’attaque par entrelacement, 3) l’attaque “maximum”, et 4)
l’attaque de minorite´ extreˆme mode´re´ (MMX). Puis, les images attaque´s sont
encore de´grade´es par une compression JPEG avec un facteur de qualite´ Q = 20.
Les re´sultats expe´rimentaux montrent que pour les deux premie`res techniques
de tatouage, les re´sultats sont tre`s similaires et la dernie`re est un peu meilleure.
Lorsque la taille de collusion ` est petite (1 ou 2), ces quatre attaques ont une
performance similaire, la probabilite´ de de´tection est tre`s bonne (∼ 0.98). Toute-
fois, lorsque le me´lange prend plus de deux images tatoue´es, leurs performances
deviennent moindres, parce que la force du signal de tatouage est plus petite
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quand plusieurs images sont me´lange´es. Pour ` = 4, plus de la moitie´ du temps,
nous ne pouvons plus de´tecter un signal de tatouage dans les images attaque´es.
Les re´sultats de la dernie`re technique de tatouage sont assez diffe´rents de ceux
des deux pre´ce´dentes : lorsque ` est petite (1 ou 2), la probabilite´ de de´tecter
aucun symbole est beaucoup plus grande. Mais cette technique de tatouage a un
avantage : avec l’augmentation de la taille de la collusion `, la probabilite´ de ne
de´tecter aucun symbole diminue tre`s lentement. Cela signifie que cette technique
de tatouage a un certain potentiel dans la conception de trac¸age de documents
multime´dia, en particulier lorsque ` est grand.
Nous e´valuons ensuite la performance de notre code de Tardos syme´trique
q-aire. Les attaques conside´re´es dans cette partie sont limite´es a` la couche de
codage et ne concernent pas la couche de tatouage, comme par exemple l’attaque
par e´change de blocs, qui simplement choisit pour un bloc donne´ une des versions
tatoue´es de´tenues par les pirates. Nous calculons ensuite les espe´rances et les vari-
ances des scores des innocent et ceux des colluders. Ces scores sont conside´re´s
comme Gaussiens, et nous calculons la distance de Kullback Leibler entre leurs
deux distributions. Collectant ces outils et indicateurs, nous e´valuons alors la per-
formance globale du syste`me complet de trac¸age de documents multime´dia. Nous
conservons les meˆmes conditions de test que pour l’e´valuation du code de trac¸age,
et prenons en compte l’effet apporte´ par la couche de tatouage. Nous e´tudions
d’abord la probabilite´ que nos me´thodes donnent des scores diffe´rents de celui
du processus d’accusation de Skoric. Une condition ne´cessaire est qu’on de´tecte
plusieurs symboles diffe´rents cache´s dans un meˆme bloc attaque´. Le re´sultat
expe´rimental montre que ce cas se pre´sente avec une probabilite´ supe´rieure a` 0.57
si la taille de collusion c ≥ 3. Si nous prenons en conside´ration la bonne ro-
bustesse des techniques de tatouage contre les attaques de type fusion, le re´sultat
montre que la probabilite´ de ne de´tecter aucun symbole augmente lentement avec
c. Meˆme pour c = 20, nos me´thodes restent pertinentes pour plus de 75% des
blocs pour les deux premie`res techniques de tatouage, et 66% des blocs pour la
troisie`me technique de tatouage.
En outre, nous comparons les performances de nos deux nouvelles me´thodes
d’accusation avec la me´thode du Skoric. Afin de simplifier le test, nous testons
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tout d’abord un seul cas : la technique de tatouage AWC et l’attaque par moyen-
nage ; les re´sultats expe´rimentaux montrent que l’espe´rance du score d’un colluder
est beaucoup plus e´leve´e que pour la me´thode de Skoric; et de plus les variances
des scores (des innocents et des colluders) sont plus petites. Les performances
globales mesure´es par la distance de Kullback Leibler confirment que la collusion
n’a aucun inte´reˆt a` utiliser la fusion d’images. Pour e´valuer les performances glob-
ales des diffe´rentes techniques de tatouage contre les diffe´rentes attaques, nous
calculons les distances de Kullback Leibler entre les pdfs des scores des innocents
et des colluders. Les re´sultats montrent que graˆce a` nos me´thodes d’accusation, les
distances de Kullback Leibler apre`s toutes les attaques de fusion sont plus e´leve´es
que pour l’attaque par e´change de blocs avec la me´thode d’accusation de Skoric.
Par conse´quent, les attaques de fusion aident plus le processus d’accusation que
la collusion, et les collders n’ont plus aucun inte´reˆt a` utiliser ce type d’attaques.
Ainsi, nos me´thodes forcent la collusion a` rejeter les attaques par fusion et a` se
contenter des autres attaques qui, elles, sont naturellement tre`s bien ge´re´es par
les codes anti-collusion.
A.6 Conclusion
Cette the`se porte sur la conception d’un tatouage suˆr et robuste pour le trac¸age
de documents multime´dia, et propose un sche`me complet de trac¸age de traˆıtres.
L’insertion des identifiants des utilisateurs s’effectue graˆce a` une version ame´liore´e
de la technique de tatouage ze´ro-bit tre`s robuste ‘Broken Arrows’. Nous pro-
posons plusieurs variantes de cette ame´lioration, pour encore accroˆıtre sa ro-
bustesse, puis sa se´curite´. Ces ame´lioration permettent notamment de contrer les
attaques de se´curite´ connues, telles que l’attaque de regroupement de A. West-
feld et l’attaque d’estimation de sous-espace de P. Bas. En outre, afin d’anticiper
d’autres menaces et obtenir un niveau de se´curite´ encore plus e´leve´, nous al-
lons plus loin en formalisant les crite`res garantissant sa se´curite´. Nous obtenons
ainsi non seulement un sche´ma qui se comporte bien, mais aussi une estima-
tion de sa se´curite´ plus formelle. Notre dernie`re ame´lioration repose sur un test
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de de´cision a contrario et une me´thode d’insertion avec maximisation sous con-
traintes. Sa se´curite´ est garantie au regard des crite`res e´tablis. Enfin, nous
proposons un sche´ma complet de trac¸age de documents multime´dia, base´ sur les
codes anti-collusion de Tardos en version q-aire syme´trique, et les trois des tech-
niques du tatouage propose´es ci-dessus avec une modulation nume´rique “tout ou
rien”. Comme les techniques de tatouage propose´es sont tre`s robustes, nous pou-
vons de´tecter plusieurs symboles dans un seul bloc attaque´. Nous tirons parti de
ce gain d’information lors de l’accusation, en proposant deux nouvelles me´thodes
d’accusation. Les e´tudes expe´rimentales montrent que notre conception est de
bonne qualite´, car elle dissuade comple`tement les pirates d’utiliser des attaques
par fusion, qui e´taient jusque la` tant redoute´es des concepteurs de sche´ma de
trac¸age. Les pirates sont alors oblige´s de se rabattre sur des attaques plus sim-
ples, que les codes anti-collusion ge`rent bien par nature.
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P D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
`=1 0 1.00 0 0 0
`=2 0.02 0.06 0.92 0 0
`=3 0.30 0.28 0.23 0.19 0
`=4 0.74 0.19 0.05 0.01 0.01
Table B.1: The conditional probabilities P (D|`) for AWC watermarking with
Nv=256 and Nc=64, and averaging attack.
P D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
`=1 0 1.00 0 0 0
`=2 0.02 0.07 0.91 0 0
`=3 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.18 0
`=4 0.73 0.20 0.05 0.01 0.01
Table B.2: The conditional probabilities P (D|`) for AWC watermarking with
Nv=256 and Nc=64, and interleaving attack.
P D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
`=1 0 1.00 0 0 0
`=2 0.02 0.06 0.92 0 0
`=3 0.32 0.30 0.23 0.15 0
`=4 0.79 0.16 0.04 0.01 0
Table B.3: The conditional probabilities P (D|`) for AWC watermarking with
Nv=256 and Nc=64, and maximum attack.
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P D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
`=1 0 1.00 0 0 0
`=2 0.02 0.07 0.91 0 0
`=3 0.17 0.22 0.28 0.33 0
`=4 0.52 0.28 0.12 0.06 0.02
Table B.4: The conditional probabilities P (D|`) for AWC watermarking with
Nv=256 and Nc=64, and moderated minority extreme attack.
P D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
`=1 0 1.00 0 0 0
`=2 0.01 0.04 0.95 0 0
`=3 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.41 0
`=4 0.52 0.21 0.13 0.07 0.07
Table B.5: The conditional probabilities P (D|`) for AWC watermarking with
Nv=1024 and Nc=256, and averaging attack.
P D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
`=1 0 1.00 0 0 0
`=2 0.01 0.04 0.95 0 0
`=3 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.41 0
`=4 0.51 0.24 0.12 0.07 0.06
Table B.6: The conditional probabilities P (D|`) for AWC watermarking with
Nv=1024 and Nc=256, and interleaving attack.
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P D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
`=1 0 1.00 0 0 0
`=2 0.01 0.04 0.95 0 0
`=3 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.36 0
`=4 0.60 0.21 0.10 0.06 0.03
Table B.7: The conditional probabilities P (D|`) for AWC watermarking with
Nv=1024 and Nc=256, and maximum attack.
P D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
`=1 0 1.00 0 0 0
`=2 0.01 0.04 0.95 0 0
`=3 0.08 0.13 0.19 0.60 0
`=4 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.18
Table B.8: The conditional probabilities P (D|`) for AWC watermarking with
Nv=1024 and Nc=256, and moderated minority extreme attack.
P D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
`=1 0.14 0.83 0.03 0 0
`=2 0.26 0.29 0.44 0.01 0
`=3 0.41 0.29 0.21 0.09 0
`=4 0.41 0.36 0.19 0.04 0
Table B.9: The conditional probabilities P (D|`) for robust and secure water-
marking, and averaging attack.
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P D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
`=1 0.14 0.83 0.03 0 0
`=2 0.27 0.29 0.43 0.01 0
`=3 0.40 0.30 0.23 0.07 0
`=4 0.40 0.36 0.20 0.04 0
Table B.10: The conditional probabilities P (D|`) for robust and secure water-
marking, and interleaving attack.
P D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
`=1 0.14 0.83 0.03 0 0
`=2 0.27 0.29 0.43 0.01 0
`=3 0.41 0.30 0.21 0.08 0
`=4 0.43 0.31 0.19 0.07 0
Table B.11: The conditional probabilities P (D|`) for robust and secure water-
marking, and maximum attack.
P D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
`=1 0.14 0.83 0.03 0 0
`=2 0.26 0.29 0.44 0.01 0
`=3 0.41 0.29 0.22 0.08 0
`=4 0.29 0.63 0.07 0.01 0
Table B.12: The conditional probabilities P (D|`) for robust and secure water-
marking, and moderated minority extreme attack.
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c D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
2 0.01 0.62 0.37 0 0
3 0.03 0.48 0.48 0.01 0
4 0.05 0.41 0.51 0.03 0
5 0.07 0.37 0.52 0.04 0
6 0.10 0.34 0.52 0.04 0
10 0.15 0.28 0.50 0.07 0
15 0.20 0.26 0.46 0.08 0
20 0.24 0.25 0.43 0.08 0
Table C.1: The conditional probabilities P (D|c) for the AWC watermarking with
Nv=256 and Nc=64, and averaging attack.
c D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
2 0.01 0.63 0.36 0 0
3 0.03 0.49 0.47 0.01 0
4 0.05 0.42 0.51 0.02 0
5 0.07 0.37 0.52 0.04 0
6 0.09 0.35 0.52 0.04 0
10 0.15 0.29 0.50 0.06 0
15 0.20 0.27 0.46 0.07 0
20 0.23 0.25 0.44 0.08 0
Table C.2: The conditional probabilities P (D|c) for the AWC watermarking with
Nv=256 and Nc=64, and interleaving attack.
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c D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
2 0.01 0.62 0.37 0 0
3 0.03 0.48 0.48 0.01 0
4 0.06 0.41 0.51 0.02 0
5 0.08 0.37 0.52 0.03 0
6 0.10 0.34 0.52 0.04 0
10 0.16 0.29 0.50 0.05 0
15 0.21 0.26 0.46 0.06 0
20 0.25 0.25 0.43 0.07 0
Table C.3: The conditional probabilities P (D|c) for the AWC watermarking with
Nv=256 and Nc=64, and maximum attack.
c D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
2 0.01 0.63 0.36 0 0
3 0.02 0.48 0.48 0.02 0
4 0.03 0.41 0.51 0.05 0
5 0.05 0.36 0.53 0.06 0
6 0.06 0.33 0.53 0.08 0
10 0.10 0.27 0.52 0.11 0
15 0.13 0.25 0.49 0.13 0
20 0.15 0.24 0.46 0.15 0
Table C.4: The conditional probabilities P (D|c) for the AWC watermarking with
Nv=256 and Nc=64, and moderated minority extreme attack.
144
c D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
2 0 0.62 0.38 0 0
3 0.02 0.46 0.49 0.03 0
4 0.03 0.39 0.52 0.06 0
5 0.04 0.34 0.54 0.08 0
6 0.06 0.31 0.53 0.10 0
10 0.10 0.25 0.51 0.14 0
15 0.13 0.23 0.47 0.16 0.01
20 0.15 0.21 0.45 0.18 0.01
Table C.5: The conditional probabilities P (D|c) for the AWC watermarking with
Nv=1024 and Nc=256, and averaging attack.
c D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
2 0.01 0.63 0.36 0 0
3 0.03 0.49 0.47 0.01 0
4 0.05 0.42 0.51 0.02 0
5 0.07 0.37 0.52 0.04 0
6 0.09 0.35 0.52 0.04 0
10 0.15 0.29 0.50 0.06 0
15 0.19 0.27 0.46 0.07 0
20 0.23 0.26 0.43 0.08 0
Table C.6: The conditional probabilities P (D|c) for the AWC watermarking with
Nv=1024 and Nc=256, and interleaving attack.
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c D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
2 0.01 0.62 0.37 0 0
3 0.03 0.48 0.48 0.01 0
4 0.06 0.41 0.51 0.02 0
5 0.08 0.37 0.52 0.03 0
6 0.10 0.34 0.52 0.04 0
10 0.16 0.29 0.50 0.05 0
15 0.21 0.27 0.46 0.06 0
20 0.25 0.25 0.43 0.07 0
Table C.7: The conditional probabilities P (D|c) for the AWC watermarking with
Nv=1024 and Nc=256, and maximum attack.
c D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
2 0.01 0.63 0.36 0 0
3 0.02 0.48 0.48 0.02 0
4 0.03 0.41 0.51 0.05 0
5 0.05 0.36 0.53 0.06 0
6 0.06 0.33 0.53 0.08 0
10 0.10 0.27 0.52 0.11 0
15 0.13 0.25 0.49 0.13 0
20 0.15 0.24 0.46 0.15 0
Table C.8: The conditional probabilities P (D|c) for the AWC watermarking with
Nv=1024 and Nc=256, and moderated minority extreme attack.
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c D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
2 0.19 0.62 0.19 0 0
3 0.22 0.52 0.25 0.01 0
4 0.24 0.47 0.27 0.02 0
5 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.02 0
6 0.27 0.42 0.28 0.03 0
10 0.30 0.37 0.29 0.04 0
15 0.32 0.36 0.28 0.04 0
20 0.33 0.34 0.28 0.05 0
Table C.9: The conditional probabilities P (D|c) for the robust and secure water-
marking, and averaging attack.
c D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
2 0.19 0.61 0.19 0.01 0
3 0.22 0.52 0.25 0.01 0
4 0.24 0.47 0.27 0.02 0
5 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.02 0
6 0.27 0.42 0.29 0.02 0
10 0.30 0.38 0.29 0.03 0
15 0.32 0.36 0.28 0.04 0
20 0.33 0.35 0.28 0.04 0
Table C.10: The conditional probabilities P (D|c) for the robust and secure wa-
termarking, and interleaving attack.
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c D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
2 0.19 0.61 0.19 0.01 0
3 0.23 0.52 0.24 0.01 0
4 0.25 0.47 0.26 0.02 0
5 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.02 0
6 0.27 0.42 0.28 0.03 0
10 0.31 0.38 0.28 0.03 0
15 0.32 0.35 0.28 0.04 0
20 0.34 0.34 0.27 0.05 0
Table C.11: The conditional probabilities P (D|c) for the robust and secure wa-
termarking, and maximum attack.
c D = 0 D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4
2 0.19 0.61 0.19 0.01 0
3 0.22 0.52 0.25 0.01 0
4 0.24 0.47 0.27 0.02 0
5 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.02 0
6 0.27 0.43 0.28 0.02 0
10 0.29 0.39 0.29 0.03 0
15 0.30 0.38 0.27 0.04 0
20 0.32 0.38 0.26 0.04 0
Table C.12: The conditional probabilities P (D|c) for the robust and secure wa-
termarking, and moderated minority extreme attack.
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Résumé 
 
 
Cette thèse porte sur la conception d'une technique de tatouage sûr et robuste dans le contexte 
du traçage de documents multimédia, et propose un système complet du traçage de traîtres. 
Ces travaux s'appuient sur la technique de tatouage zéro-bit robuste `Broken Arrows', dont 
nous proposons des améliorations afin de la rendre plus robuste, notamment à l'attaque de 
débruitage de A. Westfeld, et plus sûre. Sa sécurité est renforcée au regard des attaques 
connues et publiées, telles que l'attaque de regroupement de A. Westfeld et l'attaque 
d'estimation de sous-espace de P. Bas. Par ailleurs, nous étendons sa sécurité en considérant 
des attaques non publiées. Nous proposons ainsi une nouvelle technique de tatouage sûr, basé 
sur un test de décision `a contrario' et une insertion avec maximisation sous contraintes 
d'imperceptibilité et de sécurité. Nous proposons dans le dernier chapitre un schéma complet 
de traçage de documents multimédia, basé sur les codes de Tardos en version q-aire 
symétrique et les techniques du tatouage améliorées mentionnées plus haut. Comme les 
techniques du tatouage sont très robustes, nous pouvons détecter plusieurs symboles en un 
seul bloc attaqué, ce qui nous permet de proposer deux méthodes d'accusation étendues pour 
le code de Tardos. Les études expérimentales montrent les bonnes performances de notre 
schéma de traçage, y compris face à des attaques jusqu’alors mal gérées comme la fusion de 
documents. 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This thesis focuses on the design of a robust and secure watermarking technique in the context 
of multimedia fingerprinting for traitors tracing; and proposes a complete multimedia 
fingerprinting system. Our work builds on a robust zero-bit watermarking technique `Broken 
Arrows', and we propose two improvements to make it more robust, especially, to prevent A. 
Westfeld's denoising attack. Its security aspect is also strengthened in view of some known 
and published security attacks, such as A. Westfeld's clustering attack and P. Bas's subspace 
estimation attack. Furthermore, we extend its security by considering some unpublished 
attacks, introducing a novel secure watermarking scheme, which is based on `a contrario' 
decision test and a maximization embedding method constrained by imperceptibility and by 
security. Finally, we propose a complete multimedia fingerprinting system, which is based on 
the symmetric q-ary Tardos fingerprinting code, and these improved watermarking techniques. 
As these watermarking techniques are very robust, we can detect multiple fingerprints in one 
attacked block; this allows us to propose two extended accusation methods for the Tardos 
code. The experimental investigations show the good performance of our design; it can even 
deal with the previously poorly managed attacks like the fusion of documents. 
 
